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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents some preliminary results of the United States compo-
nent of a comparative, empirical study of the workings of the residential real
estate markets in the United States and the United Kingdom.' Although these
markets are of enormous size, no comprehensive study has been made of them
from a socio-legal perspective. This paper sets forth some of the preliminary
results of a study based on a pretest conducted in Columbus, Ohio during the
fall of 1989, and in London, England during the spring of 1990. The Columbus
data were collected from lengthy telephone surveys of recent home purchasers
and in-person, open-ended interviews of real estate service specialists.
We believe that a productive way of studying the home purchase process is
by examining the interaction between home buyers and the various real estate
service specialists who facilitate the home transfer process. The most important
* Professor of Law. Ohio State University. J.D. 1974, Tulane Univ. I would like to thank Jack Cooper. J.D.
1992. and Lisa Merrill. J.D. 1991. for their research and assistance. I am especially grateful to Dean Francis X.
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dimension of this research would not have been possible without Professor Philip Sorenson (OSU College of Law)
and Mr. Donald Harris (Fellow, Balliol College. Oxford) and the OSU-Oxford Center for Socio-Legal Studies.
** Reader in Socio-Legal Studies, London University (QMW).
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of these specialists are real estate agents, lawyers, title companies, appraisers
and lenders. "Structural and operational changes . . .can have major conse-
quences for those the process is designed to serve . . . . [These changes] can
also have repercussions on the entire economy due to the massive size of the
American land market and its extension into every local community." 2
The research focuses on two issues raised by the purchase process. First, we
are concerned with how buyers of residential real estate form expectations con-
cerning the rights and liabilities that they acquire at various stages of the trans-
fer process, from contract signing to closing and post-closing. A second and
correlative issue we are concerned with is the role of lawyers in the process of
expectation formation. One would envision a significant role for them because
real property law consists of complex, often anachronistic rules not readily ac-
cessible to the typical home purchaser.
This research is interesting for three reasons. First is the importance of the
subject matter. The residential real estate market is important in terms of the
amount of money involved,3 the number of households involved, and the value of
the transaction to the individual purchaser."
Second, this research lends itself to comparative study. The real property
laws of the United States and the United Kingdom are very similar, and often
identical. Consequently, it is possible to make relevant cross-cultural compari-
sons of purchasers' expectations with minimal "translation" to take account of
the different legal systems. Notwithstanding similarities of their laws, practices
in the two countries differ markedly, particularly with respect to the use of law-
yers. Virtually all United Kingdom home buyers retain lawyers while only a
relatively small percentage of United States purchasers do so. We expect that
this difference will allow us to measure the effect that varying levels of lawyer
involvement have on the home purchase process. We believe that the compara-
tive dimension of this study will provide points of reference against which some
widely held beliefs about the two legal systems can be challenged and critically
evaluated.
Third, this research is important because the home purchase transaction,
perhaps more than any other, brings the general population into contact with
the formal legal system. It thus provides a broad base from which to gauge how
people adapt to a complex legal system which requires them to deal with several
strata of real estate service specialties, how effective these adaptations are in
terms of the accuracy of the expectations formed about the legal system, and
finally, how the legal system reacts as changed circumstances bring into ques-
tion the factual assumptions that led the common law to assign rights and lia-
bilities in a particular way.
2. Johnstone. Land Transfers: Process and Processors. 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 493, 494 (1988).
3. The residential real estate market is enormous. The Franklin County Recorder indicates that in a typical
month. 1,700 houses, valued at more than $180,000,000 are sold in the city of Columbus, Ohio, a mid-sized mid-
western American city.
4. Ninety-five per cent or the 132 Columbus home buyers surveyed said that their house was the most valua-
ble asset they owned and 64.5% said that they bought the most expensive house they could afford.
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This paper focuses on some of these issues. First we examine the quantity
of lawyer involvement in the residential real estate market, examining both why
people chose to use lawyers and why they chose not to. Next we consider why
lawyers have been displaced from the United States residential real estate mar-
ket, focusing primarily on the imperialism of title insurance. Third, the impact
on consumers of the present structure of the real estate service specialties is
considered; and finally, some possible law reform suggested by the preliminary
data is discussed.
II. THE CURRENT QUANTITY OF LAWYER INVOLVEMENT
A. Buyers Who Do Use Lawyers
Lawyers have been considerably displaced from representation of buyers in
the home purchase process. Of the 132 recent Columbus home buyers surveyed,
41 percent hired their own lawyer to represent them in some aspect of the
purchase.5 For many of those who hired a lawyer, the lawyer was involved fairly
early in the process. Almost 75 percent of those who hired a lawyer said that
they first consulted their lawyer either before or shortly after signing the con-
tract to purchase. Almost 25 percent, however, indicated that they first met
their lawyer either at or shortly before the closing. Approximately 75 percent
met with their lawyer 4 times or fewer, with a mean of 3.89 and a mode of 2
meetings.
The function of the lawyer who is still involved in representing home buy-
ers has changed. In the pre-title insurance era, the primary function of the law-
yer was to examine title, render an opinion thereon, and cure any discovered
defects.' Today, the lawyer's role with respect to title has greatly diminished. 7
When asked, "What are the most important reasons you used a lawyer when
buying your house?" only 13 percent said the lawyer was important to make
sure title was good, and only 14 percent said an important function of the law-
yer was to explain title insurance. The most commonly articulated reason for
hiring a lawyer was "to protect me." The need for this protection is perceived to
be the greatest in three situations: (1) for the first-time home buyer, (2) if one
or more of the usual real estate service specialists is not involved in the transac-
tion or (3) if there is concern that one or more of the service specialists or the
seller is dishonest or unscrupulous.
Thus, when asked, "What type of person do you think needs a lawyer to
help in buying a house?" typical answers included the following:
"Someone who doesn't trust their realtor."
S. Although 41% answered the question "Did you hire your own lawyer to help you purchase your house?"
in the allirmative. a second question revealed that 9 of those 54 did not pay the lawyer any fee. Moreover. 2 of
those 54 who answered affirmatively later said that they never met or spoke with their lawyer about the matter.
6. D. GAGL. LAND TITLE ASSURING AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1937).
7. In a survey of State Bar Chairpersons. 25% reported that attorneys performed title searches in their
jurisdiction. Patterson. Residential Real Estate Practices. [Fall 1987] BARRISTER 47. Even when lawyers are
involved in the home purchase process on behalf of buyers, lawyer involvement with title is less than one might
expect. Thus. in the Columbus survey, only 21 of the 54 purchasers who hired their own lawyer identified the
lawyer as having assisted them with title matters. Almost an equal number said they relied on the title company.
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"An inexperienced person. A first-time home buyer. Maybe someone not using a title
company would need one. .. ."
"Someone who is buying a house from a builder or realtor who is not well known."
"Someone who doesn't trust the seller."
People who used lawyers generally seemed satisfied with them. Thus, 94
percent of those asked indicated they were satisfied with their lawyer and 89
percent said they would use a lawyer in a future home purchase transaction.
The satisfaction rating for lawyers was higher than for any other group of real
estate service specialists. The satisfaction rate for lenders was 81 percent, and
for real estate agents, 89 percent. Those who used a lawyer, however, did not
indicate that they were more satisfied with the purchase process overall than
those who did not use a lawyer.
B. Buyers Who Do Not Use Lawyers
The Columbus survey revealed that many people do not perceive a great
need for a lawyer in the home purchase transaction. The most frequently given
reason for not hiring a lawyer is the expense. Thus, many survey respondents
said they did not hire a lawyer because it cost too much. One respondent an-
swered the question "What are the reasons you chose not to use a lawyer?"
with "Wanted $300 for one afternoon of work." Another said, "By the time you
pay the down payment, you can't afford an attorney." Some respondents re-
ferred to the lawyer as simply "a waste of money."
A second reason frequently given is that some other person in the transac-
tion performed the role of, or obviated the need for, a lawyer. Some of these
substitutes are probably reliable. One respondent, for example, relied on his fa-
ther-in-law, who was a lawyer. Other substitutes were not so reliable. For exam-
ple, many people said they did not need a lawyer because they relied on the
agent.8 While real estate agents are assumed to be knowledgeable profession-
als," buyers should be cautious in relying on agents because, legally, agents re-
present the seller and not the buyer.' 0 Still others said they did not need a
lawyer because they relied on the title insurance company's lawyer, or even the
seller's lawyer. Thus, one respondent stated:
[I did not use a lawyer] because I've owned houses before and gone through closings.
I've used a lawyer before and did not see that anything he did was worth it. Also, the
Seller's attorney was at the closing and I felt that he would watch over everything's
8. In the Columbus data, 9% of those who used lawyers said they relied on the real estate agent to assist
with title matters. Twenty-one percent of those who did not use lawyers, however, said that they relied on the
agent to assist with title matters.
9. See. e.g.. Houston & Sudman, Real Estate Agents As a Source of Information for Home Buyers. I I J.
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 110. 119-20 (1977) (indicating that real estate agents usually have information concerning
neighborhood characteristics that is as accurate as other "expert informants").
10. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the real estate agent is the agent of the seller and not
the buyer. Even if the buyer selects an agent herself, that agent is a sub-agent of the seller and is not the agent of
the buyer. See Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967): Currier. Finding the Broker's Place in
the Typical Residential Real Estate Transaction. 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 655 (1981): Comment. A Re-examination
of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343 (1972). Approximately one-third
of the buyers in the Columbus survey mistakenly thought the agent owed primary loyalty to them, and not to the
seller.
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legality. However, if I would buy a more expensive home, say $250,000 to $300,000, I
would probably want a lawyer."
Similarly, many respondents said they did not need a lawyer because they
relied on the builder from whom they bought. Thus, typical responses included
"Any questions, we asked the builder's attorney," and "There is no need for a
lawyer when the builder is involved with so many homes." These respondents
did not indicate that they perceived that the builder's experience, compared
with their relative inexperience, put them at a disadvantage. However, even on
an otherwise level playing field, to rely on the builder/vendor or his lawyer as a
source of legal information is a risky way to form expectations about legal rela-
tionships, given the obvious and apparent conflicts of interest that exist.12
III. WHY LAWYERS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED FROM THE UNITED STATES
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE MARKET
This section focuses on the process by which the lawyer's title opinion, and
hence the lawyer, has been eliminated from the land-transfer process in many
United States markets and replaced with a title insurance policy. No compara-
ble development has occurred in the United Kingdom, where solicitors are re-
tained by virtually all house buyers and sellers.13 Interviews with lawyers who
practiced law in Columbus both before and after lawyers were displaced from
the residential market indicate, without exception, that the cause of the dis-
placement was the growth in popularity of title insurance. 4
Before title insurance became common, purchasers needed lawyers to ex-
amine and pass on title, and, therefore, virtually all home purchasers were rep-
resented. Lawyers were consulted fairly early in the process, although not al-
ways before the contract was signed, and gave advice on a number of matters in
addition to title. Although title assurance was the motivating reason for retain-
ing the lawyer, once retained, buyers felt comfortable consulting their attorney
about all matters related to the purchase. Typically, the attorney and client
would meet a number of times and would spend at least one meeting going over
the title opinion in detail.
A. The Growth of Title Insurance
The growth of title insurance in the United States is accounted for by three
factors. First, it was early established by judicial decision that conveyancers and
other real estate professionals were liable only for their negligence, and thus
certain losses that fell on the purchasers of real estate could not be shifted to
II. Emphasis added.
12. As a group, the people who identified themselves as having purchased directly from the builder were as
satisfied, or slightly more satisfied, with the purchase process than the general population. These people, however.
were more likely to be involved in a dispute in connection with the purchase than the general population.
13. See, e.g., D. BURKE. LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE 2 (1986) ("Title insurance is an exclusively American
invention,").
14. A series of personal interviews was conducted with long-time Columbus attorneys who identified them-
selves as real estate specialists, during the winter of 1989 and the spring of 1990. References in the remainder of
this paper to the practice of residential real estate law in Columbus are based on those interviews.
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the real estate professionals who had assisted them.'" In response to these deci-
sions, the first title insurance company in the United States, the Real Estate
Title Insurance Company, was formed in 1876.16 Title insurance provides cover-
age against hidden risks that lawyer's opinions do not. Thus, title insurance
protects the purchaser against such defects as a forged, stolen or undelivered
deed, while the lawyer's opinion will not. Moreover, title insurance companies
provide this coverage at lower cost than lawyers, at least in some markets.17
This relative efficiency reflects the inferiority of the publicly maintained land
records compared to the privately maintained "title plants" owned by the title
companies.
The second reason for the growth of title insurance was the rapid develop-
ment of the western United States at the end of World War II. During this
period, the demand for development capital outpaced the locally available sup-
ply. The traditional sources of development capital were banks and savings and
loans. These institutions typically invested the great bulk of their mortgage loan
portfolio in mortgages secured by real estate in the locality in which the institu-
tion operated. Consequently, western developers could not look to eastern sav-
ings and loans for funds. "Life insurance companies, however, are national lend-
ers, and the larger companies hold mortgages on lands located in all parts of the
United States."' 8 Because the insurance companies were in need of title protec-
tion, it is not surprising that they readily accepted the idea of title insurance as
the source of that protection. Moreover, life insurance companies are regulated
by state laws that require that their real estate loans be secured by a first lien;
title insurance provided an easy means of establishing regulatory compliance.
The third reason for the growth in popularity of title insurance is ac-
counted for by the growth in size and importance of the secondary mortgage
market. 19 Briefly, the secondary mortgage market is a securities-like market,
organized by the federal government, in which residential mortgages originated
by local mortgage lenders are bundled into large packages, usually in excess of
$1 million, insured by the federal government, and then sold on a national mar-
ket to private investors located all over the country and, increasingly, the world.
The principal players in this market are three government-chartered secondary
market corporations: The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and The
15. See, e.g.. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
16. D. GAGE, supra note 6, at 80-82. Cf. D. BURKE, supra note 12 at 2, stating that the first title insurance
company, the "Law Property Assurance and Trust Society," was formed in 1853, but that many attribute the
advent of the industry to the decision in Watson v. Muirhead.
Title insurance is available in the United Kingdom, but the volume written is small, and there have been
"novel" suggestions why it might play a useful part in conveyancing. See Insurance in Aid ofConveyancing (pts. I
& 2), 100 SOLIC. J. 139, 100 SOLIC. J. 157 (1956).
17. See D. BURKE, supra note 13, at 14. Columbus attorneys report that under the pre-title insurance system
of relying on abstracts, the attorney's title opinion could be produced more cheaply than title insurance. If the
abstracts were not available, or had not been kept up to date, which is the current situation, then the cost of the
lawyer's title opinion would be substantially more than title insurance.
18. Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 502-03 (1957).
19. Local attorneys attribute the rise of title insurance to the large-scale FHA insured housing developments
constructed in the Columbus area during the 1950s and early 1960s. See also Johnstone, supra note 2, at 506.07
(the spread of title insurance is the result of the secondary mortgage market).
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Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). The purpose of the
secondary market is two-fold: to smooth out cyclical periods of tight money, and
to enable capital-rich regions of the county, to provide mortgage funds to areas
of the country where demand exceeds local supply.20 It has been estimated that
65 to 70 percent of all new mortgage loans each year are sold on the secondary
market.2"
The ability to participate in the secondary market is a great advantage to a
lending institution. Participation enables the lender to increase liquidity, obtain
a hedge against future inflation, and engage in the profitable mortgage servicing
business. In order to participate in these markets, however, federal government
regulations require title insurance.22
B. The Legal Profession's Reaction to Title Insurance
Lawyers have reacted to the growth of title insurance in three ways. First,
they have unsuccessfully fought in the courts to retain their role in the residen-
tial transfer process. The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, at the urging of
the organized Bar Association, held that real estate agents and title companies
who filled out form contracts, mortgages, and conveyancing instruments were
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 23 The victory was short-lived, how-
ever, since an overwhelming majority of the people of Arizona soon passed a
state constitutional amendment overriding the supreme court and restoring the
rights of real estate agents and title companies to fill out forms.2 ,
Lawyers also responded by forming their own title insurance companies.
These title companies were founded to permit lawyers to "compete more effec-
tively with nonlawyer encroachments in real property law."' 25 This reaction is
not of much significance here, because although the lawyer who acts as an
agent for a title company is preserving his economic interest in the residential
real estate market, to the extent his function is that of a title agent he has
ceased performing as a lawyer for the buyer in the transaction.
The third and most pervasive response of lawyers to the growth of title
insurance has been to abandon the residential real estate practice to nonlawy-
ers.26 Even the American Bar Association approves of the diminishing role of
the lawyer in residential real estate. "[I]t can no longer be claimed that lawyers
have the exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge required and are there-
fore the only ones able to advise clients [about real estate closings]. '2 7 Indeed,
20. A. Axt EROD. C. BERGER & Q. JOIINSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE. CASES AND MATERIALS (3d
ed. 1986) at 121-27.
21. Johnstone. supra note 2, at 515.
22. See. eg.. Housing and Urban Development. 24 C.F.R. § 221.563(a). 340.27 (1990).
23, State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76. 95-97, 366 P.2d 1. 14-15 (1961);
opinion on reh'g. 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962).
24. Marks. The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.B.A.J. 139, 140-41 (1963).
25. Bar-Related Title Insurance, [Fall 1977] BARRISTER 51.
26. D. BURKI. supra note 13. at 12.
27. - .. . . In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism.
1986. A.B.A. Comm ON PROFESSIONALISM 52 [hereinafter ....... In the Spirit of Public Service"].
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"Lawyer resistance to such inroads [by title companies and real estate agents]
for selfish reasons only brings discredit on the profession. ' 28
IV. IMPACT OF THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE REAL ESTATE SERVICE
SPECIALTIES ON CONSUMERS
The combined effect of market forces and government regulation of the
secondary mortgage market has been greatly to promote title insurance and
thereby reduce the prominence of the lawyer in the residential real estate trans-
action. In the remainder of this paper, We briefly describe two of the most
important consequences this restructuring has had on the consumers of residen-
tial land transfer services.
A. Buyers Are Not Well Informed
In the Columbus survey, a number of questions were asked to determine
how well informed purchasers were about the home-buying process. These ques-
tions were designed to determine the extent of knowledge about information
that would be useful to the purchaser personally, rather than expertise that the
purchaser could expect some other service specialist to possess and use on his
behalf. The results of the survey indicate that many purchasers-in some cases
more than one-half--don't know or are mistaken about matters of importance
to them. Thus, approximately one-third of the sample did not know that the
agent owed primary loyalty to the seller, not the buyer. In evaluating the
agent's advice on matters, the agent's legal obligation to the seller should be
relevant to the buyer.
Many purchasers were also uninformed concerning title matters. Thus, 50
percent did not know whether their deed was a general warranty deed, a limited
warranty deed, a quit claim deed, or some other type. The type of deed has
significance for the remedies that the buyer has against the seller in the event of
a dispute concerning title. Although most people knew how they held title (joint
tenancy was the most popular method indicated), 29 a significant percentage did
not (22.6 percent). Moreover, of those who knew they were joint tenants, almost
50 percent did not know the significance of how they held title.30 The signifi-
cance of a joint tenancy is that the property automatically passes to the surviv-
ing joint tenant on the death of the other joint tenant. Awareness of this conse-
quence is important for proper estate planning, since the joint tenancy takes
priority over the tenant's last will.
Another area in which a significant number seemed uninformed had to do
with title insurance. An overwhelming majority demonstrated that they did not
understand the basics of coverage provided by the policy or the exceptions from
28. Id. Not surprisingly, the position of the ABA was controversial within the organized Bar. See Patterson.
supra note 7, at 47.
29. Technically, there is no joint tenancy in Ohio. The Ohio survivorship tenancy is the equivalent of the
joint tenancy and does not differ from it in any respect that is material to this discussion.
30. Indeed, 58% said they were not even asked how they wanted to hold title. The papers were simply
prepared by the title company, presumably according to some custom.
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coverage. Only 7 percent realized that there were any exceptions to their policy.
Almost two-thirds of the Columbus respondents did not know that title insur-
ance did not cover them if the house they bought was worth less than they paid,
and more than half did not know that title insurance did not cover faulty con-
struction, but did cover adverse legal claims to the house and land.
Buyer ignorance about title matters is probably explained by a combination
of factors. For one thing, many purchasers (almost 40 percent) rely heavily on
the title insurance companies to assist them with title matters. The interest of
these companies in making their product seem valuable is inconsistent with ad-
vising buyers about the limitations on coverage contained in the policy. Second,
the overwhelming majority of buyers were not given a copy of the title policy
until at or after the closing. It is predictable that buyers would be unknowledg-
able about a matter they had no opportunity to study. Finally, buyer ignorance
in this area may be accounted for by the relatively small role that lawyers cur-
rently play as title advisers. Only 17 percent of those surveyed in Columbus said
they relied on a lawyer to assist them with title matters.
B. Many Buyers Have Unreliable Expectations
Buyers rely on service specialists other than their own lawyers to provide
them with the information needed to protect their interests and form expecta-
tions about their rights and liabilities in the home purchase process.31 In at least
some situations, these expectations may turn out to be dangerously unreliable.
For example, some buyers rely extensively on real estate agents to protect their
interests without knowing that the agent's primary loyalty is to the seller, and
not to the buyer.32
Buyers also rely on their lenders for assurance concerning many aspects of
the purchase transaction, including value of the property. Buyers tend to believe
that their interests parallel those of their lenders, so that they can take a free
ride on the lender's efforts in verifying the condition of title, value of the home,
and similar matters. Although this reliance may be unjustified, 33 it is pervasive.
Thus, when asked whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with the follow-
ing statement, "Because my lender has so much money invested in my house, if
the lender is satisfied with the house's condition, zoning value and title, my
investment is in all likelihood, safe," 78 percent agreed.
Other responses emphasize the importance that buyers place on their lend-
ers' opinion of value. Only 4.5 percent of the sample hired their own appraiser.
The most important reasons identified by the sample for not hiring an appraiser
were that it was not necessary (30 percent), that they themselves were suffi-
ciently knowledgeable of value (25 percent), and that they relied on their lend-
ers' appraisal (22 percent). Many answers combined more than one of these
31. See Note, Mortgage Lender Liability to the Purchasers of New or Existing Homes. 1988 U. ILL L. REv.
191. 214-15.
32. See supra Part IV A. and note 10 and accompanying text. See also Houston & Sudman, supra note 9.
33. "Some home buyers do not retain their own counsel because they are willing to gamble that transaction
approval by the lenders' lawyers sufficiently protects the buyers', generally similar, but in some respects quite
different. interests.'" Johnstone, supra note 2. at 501.
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themes. For example, one said, "We had a structural engineer to see if the
house was in good condition. [It] conformed with other houses in the neighbor-
hood. Once we were satisfied and the lender was satisfied, we didn't think an
appraiser was necessary." Another said there was no need for an independent
appraisal since you "end up paying the bank for an appraisal anyway."
Further measure of the extent of buyer reliance on lender opinion concern-
ing value is found in responses to the hypothetical, "If your house had been
appraised [by your lender] for less than the amount you agreed to pay for it,
would you have done anything differently?" Seventy-one percent answered
"yes." All but two said they would have gotten out of the deal or renegotiated
the price. For example, one respondent said, "I would have offered only what
the appraisal was. If turned down, I would have just kept on looking." Others
said "I would've gone back to the seller and said it's not worth what you're
trying to sell it for," and "I might have backed out. I put my trust in [the]
V[eterans] A[dministration]."
In a sense, purchasers' expectations concerning value are reliable. To the
extent that the purchase agreement contains a financing contingency (as 77 per-
cent of the respondents said that their contract did), if the house is appraised
for less than the purchase price, financing is unavailable and the buyer is ex-
cused from going ahead with the purchase. The 23 percent whose contracts
were not contingent, however, would not be able to take advantage of a low
appraisal to avoid their contract, and would either have to conclude their
purchase or be liable for breach.
Even for the majority who can escape their contract if the lenders' ap-
praisal is below purchase price, however, the protection of that appraisal may
be more illusory than real. Realtors and appraisers report that appraisals are
heavily influenced by the contract price. Fair market value is the amount that a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller with neither of them under a compul-
sion to buy or sell and both of them reasonably well informed. From the ap-
praiser's point of view, the most recent evidence of what a willing buyer would
pay a willing seller would accept is the amount agreed upon in the contract
between the parties. Thus, from the buyer's point of view, much of the protec-
tion of the appraisal is lost in its circularity. The buyer is relying on the ap-
praiser for information about which the appraiser is relying on the buyer.
In other respects, too, these expectations are unreliable. First, there are
many matters that affect the value of a house to a purchaser that do not materi-
ally affect its value as collateral to the lender. Assessments (such as for sewers)
that are less than the down payment, restrictions on use, and minor encroach-
ments are examples of such matters. Second, lenders' attorneys are typically
more lenient in approving title than a buyer's attorney. A lender's attorney dis-
counts the title risk to reflect the probability that the lender will ever become
the owner of the property through foreclosure. This discount is high if the buyer
is a good credit risk or the mortgage is to be sold on the secondary mortgage
market. These factors do not reduce the risk to the buyer, however. If the title
is bad, the buyer will pay the price for it when he tries to sell the property in
the future. Third, if the bank is negligent in hiring the appraiser, or if the ap-
praiser is negligent in making his inspection of the house, under the prevailing
[Vol. 52:469
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view the buyer has no remedy against either the lender or the appraiser.3 4 Par-
ticularly, this is the case with FHA and other government appraisals. 35 This is
ironic, since many purchasers said they felt especially safe if an agency of the
federal government was involved with the purchase. 36
V. SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS SUGGESTED BY THE DATA
At least three solutions to the problems created by the present structure of
the real estate service specialties suggest themselves. One is to provide new ways
for buyers to acquire information. This is the approach of some recent legisla-
tion. For example, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 37 is
premised on the idea that consumers need "greater and more timely informa-
tion. ' 3 8 To that end, the Act requires uniform settlement statements as well as
the distribution of booklets. It is unclear that RESPA has had positive results.
Buyers are already signing so many papers before and at the closing that addi-
tional disclosures might be expected to have little effect. Further, many real
estate service specialists think that the RESPA settlement statement is so un-
clear that they prepare their own form of statement and present it to the buyer
in addition. It is not unusual at a single closing for a buyer to receive three
settlement statements. Most lenders, and their attorneys, think RESPA has in-
creased closing costs with little or no corresponding benefit.
Another approach to the problem of getting accurate information to the
buyer is to require that buyers be represented by lawyers.39 The same type of
government regulations that effectively require title insurance could be adapted
to this purpose. For example, the FHA might require certification that the
buyer had been represented by counsel and certain matters explained to him as
a condition of selling that buyer's mortgage on the secondary market. But atti-
tudes of the public towards lawyers, market forces, and regulatory trends op-
pose such a move. The typical home purchase transaction is routine and lawyers
probably are not needed.40 The reintroduction of lawyers into the land transfer
process would increase already high transaction costs. Most importantly, pre-
liminary survey results indicate that increased lawyer involvement might not
have any beneficial effect for the following reasons:
(1) Purchasers who use lawyers are no better informed than those who do
not.
34. See. eg.. Rice v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 207 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
35. In United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961). the Supreme Court stated that no duty was owed by
the government's FHA appraiser to make careful appraisal for the purchaser's benefit.
36. For example, one respondent said he did not hire an independent appraiser because "The FHA appraiser
was enough." Another said "I didn't even think about it. I put faith in the V[eterans] A[dministration] and my
own judgment."
37. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1989).
38. 12 U.S.C. §2601(a) (1989).
39. See Gresham. The Residential Real Estate Transfer Process: A Functional Critique, 23 EMORY L.J. 421
(1974) (considers how counsel can be helpful at various stages of the real estate transfer process).
40. "... . . In the Spirit of Public Service." supra note 27, at 52.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(2) Purchasers who use lawyers are no more satisfied with the purchase
transaction. In fact, in the Columbus sample, the general satisfaction level of
those who did not use a lawyer was greater than for those who did.4'
(3) Purchasers who use lawyers are just as likely to find after signing the
contract that it contains matters which had not been explained to them or
which they did not expect. The following are some typical responses:
"A home warranty plan was not what I expected-it did not cover the kitchen
appliances."
"Occupancy. That I was expected to let him live in the house rent free for 30 days."
"Taxes were 50 percent higher than I was told they would be."
"Seller put in contract that they didn't have to repair some things that I thought they
would repair."
"Realtor's commission was higher than I had been told."
(4) Purchasers who used lawyers were no less likely to avoid disputes than
those who did not.42 Thirty-eight percent of those represented by lawyers and 37
percent of those not represented by lawyers said they had been involved in some
dispute during the process of purchasing their home. These disputes range from
fairly trivial to substantial, from concerns about whether ornamental potted
plants were included in the purchase to concerns about flooding, collapsing sep-
tic tanks, unsafe gas lines, condemned garages, and misrepresentations by the
seller about the quality of the property.
Thus, it is not self-evident that the reintroduction of lawyers into the land
transfer process as it has evolved would produce any beneficial results.
A third solution to the problem of buyers' being uninformed and having
unreliable expectations is to change the law to bring it into line with buyer
expectations. This sort of change is characteristic of the common law. Thus,
Judge Skelly Wright stated in a slightly different context, "[C]ertain of the old
rules of property . . .are inappropriate for today's transactions. In order to
reach results more in accord with the legitimate expectations of the parties and
the standards of the community, courts have been gradually introducing more
modern precepts . . . -43 Indeed, there is some evidence that such an evolu-
tionary change is in progress in the land transfer process.44 Increasingly, courts
seem ready to find land transfer service specialists, including lenders, appraisers,
realtors and sellers liable for the disappointed expectations of buyers, even in
the face of long-standing common-law rules to the contrary.
41. Eighty-four percent of those who did not use a lawyer expressed satisfaction, while 78% of those who did
use a lawyer expressed satisfaction.
42. This observation may be the result of the reduced role that lawyers play in the typical transaction. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that before title insurance became so commonplace, title insurance buyers were better
informed by their lawyers than they are today. Nonetheless, preliminary survey results suggest that buyers who
are represented by lawyers are no better off than buyers who are not.
43. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
44. See. e.g.. Larsen v. United Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 300 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1981) (bank held liable in
damages to home buyers who paid excessive price for home in reliance on negligent appraisal); Jeminson v. Mont-
gomery Real Estate & Co., 396 Mich. 106, 108, 240 N.W.2d 205, 206 (1976) (buyer has cause of action against
bank which knew or should have known that vendor was notoriously deceptive and that sales transaction was
fraudulent).
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Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment
KINGSLEY R. BROWNE*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Women do not belong in the medical profession; they should stay home
and make babies!" Is such a statement occurring in the workplace a constitu-
tionally protected expression of a currently unfashionable social view, or is it
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? If it
violates Title VII, is Title VI to that extent inconsistent with the first amend-
ment? Many courts and commentators have addressed the first question-that
is, the contours of "hostile environment" harassment-but few have acknowl-
edged the possibility of constitutional protection for such statements.' The pur-
pose of this Article is to examine the extent to which the broad definition of
"hostile work environment" adopted by the courts in harassment cases estab-
lishes a content-based--even viewpoint-based-restriction of expression that is
inconsistent with contemporary first amendment jurisprudence. To the extent
that it does establish such a restriction Title VII must be given a narrowing
construction in order to avoid a finding of invalidity.
Recent attention to the first amendment implications of racist and sexist
speech has focused largely on attempts by colleges and universities to regulate
such speech 2 and the application of general tort doctrine to such speech.3 It is
not surprising that scholars have been particularly interested in regulation of
speech in their own bailiwick. Yet the amount of attention paid university poli-
cies prohibiting racist and sexist speech seems out of proportion to their global
importance since these policies seem to be the product of a temporary aberra-
tion that would burn itself out probably sooner than later even without any kind
of legal intervention.4 Like the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance, regula-
tion of offensive speech on campus probably generates far more expression than
it regulates. Moreover, when legal intervention did occur, in the form of Doe v.
* ) Kingsley R. Browne, Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I would like to thank
John Dolan. Joseph Grano, Jessica Litman, Michael McIntyre, and Robert Sedler for our invaluable discussions
and for their helpful comments on the manuscript.
I. Two very recent exceptions are Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I
(1990). and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards. Inc.. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
2. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Post, Free Speech and Reli-
gious. Racial. and Sexual Harassment: Racist Speech. Democracy. and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 267. 267n.5 (1991) (citing 26 articles dealing with racist speech); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Hint Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431; Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484.
3. See Love. Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASt.
& LEE L. REV 123 (1990); Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults. Epithets. and Name-
Calling. 17 HARV. CR-C.L. L REV. 133 (1982).
4. The subject of campus speech codes has begun receiving substantial, and primarily negative, attention in
the popular press. See. e.g., Upside Down in the Groves of Academe, TimE. Apr. 1. 1991. at 66; Howe, The Value
of the Canon: What's Wrong with P.C.. THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 40; A Simmering Stew of Griev-
ances. TilE ECONOIlsT, Feb. 16, 1991, at 21; Taking Offense. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990. at 48; The Acadeny's
New Aatollahs US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 10, 1990, Vol. 109 at 22.
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University of Michigan5 and American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,6 the
courts' responses were sure and decisive: the first amendment prohibits regula-
tion of racist and sexist speech on the basis of the viewpoint expressed.
In contrast with the immediate rejection of regulation of campus speech
and pornography that was deemed to convey a "wrongheaded" view about
women, regulation of offensive speech in the workplace has been proceeding
apace virtually without comment for well over a decade. Although it has re-
sulted in suppression of a vast amount of expression, objections from the tradi-
tional defenders of free speech have not been forthcoming. An optimist might
suggest that the concern over free speech in the academy is simply the opening
skirmish in a broader battle to challenge regulation of offensive speech every-
where; the champions of the first amendment are simply attempting to get their
own house in order before taking on the rest of the world. The indications are
otherwise, however. Even the Doe court suggested that "speech which creates a
hostile or abusive working environment on the basis of race or sex" is unpro-
tected by the first amendment.7 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some
who would protect the speech of students and faculty but not the speech of
workers possess an elitist perspective that simply values the former group of
speakers more than the latter. The lack of value of the speech of workers seems
to be based upon one or more of the following opinions: (1) when workers speak
they do not convey ideas; (2) ideas are not important to workers; (3) the ideas
of workers are not important to us. These judgments can form no part of a first
amendment jurisprudence.
Regulation of speech in the workplace that is deemed "harassing" is perva-
sive. The Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pro-
vide the most commonly accepted definition of "sexual harassment," a definition
that courts have adapted to fit cases of racial harassment as well: "verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the purpose or effect of unreason-
ably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive work environment." 8 Although the Guidelines purport
to regulate only "verbal or physical conduct," the concept of "verbal conduct"
has no obvious meaning, and courts have consistently interpreted it to mean
"verbal expression." Relying on the EEOC's definition of hostile-environment
harassment, courts, both state and federal, have found employers liable for
"conduct" ranging from clearly unprotected forcible sexual assault and other
unwanted sexual touching to "obscene propositions," sexual vulgarity (including
5. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down the University of Michigan offensive-speech policy).
6. 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking down the Indianapolis anti-
pornography ordinance).
7. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989). See also infra. note 193.
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3). Because the EEOC lacks the authority to promulgate substantive regulations.
the Guidelines lack the force of law. However, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have uniformly relied
upon them, see. e.g.. Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57. 65 (1986). and many state statutes and
regulations have adopted the EEOC language, see. e.g.. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-101(E): MICH. Comp, LAWS §
37.2103(h).
9. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 432 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (the term "'verbal conduct of a sexual nature' . seems to be di-
rected toward profane words and pictures that deal with sex").
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"off color" jokes) and "sexist" remarks, some of which are almost certainly
protected by the first amendment.10 Similarly, racial jokes, slurs, and other
statements deemed derogatory to minorities have served as the basis for claims
of racial harassment.
The restrictions on expression created by harassment regulation are not
merely incidental; indeed, courts have recognized that the very purpose of the
law is to "prevent . .. bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that
abuses or offends their co-workers." 11 Moreover, protected expression 2 is often
a substantial, if not the primary, basis for imposing liability. That is, the trier of
fact is offended by the implicit or explicit message of the expression-for exam-
ple, that women should be sexual playthings for men, that women (or blacks) do
not belong in the workplace, or that they should hold an inferior position in our
society. Yet, the right to express one's social views is generally considered to be
at or near the core of the first amendment's protection of free expression.3
A broad definition of sexual and racial harassment necessarily delegates
broad powers to courts to determine matters of taste14 and humor,15 and the
vagueness of the definition of "harassment" leaves those subject to regulation
without clear notice of what is permitted and what is forbidden. The ines-
capable result is a substantial chilling effect on expression. Holding employers
liable for the offensive speech of their employees exacerbates that chilling effect,
because fear of litigation and liability creates a powerful incentive for employ-
ers-which in the private sector are not subject to the constraints of the first
amendment-to censor the speech of their employees. Employers have re-
sponded to these incentives by substantially overregulating the speech of their
employees.
Although with only one apparent exception' 6 no reported harassment deci-
sion has imposed liability solely on the basis of arguably protected expression, it
does not follow that hostile-environment claims therefore pose little threat to
first amendment rights. First, when protected expression is excluded from the
10. Most of the cases discussed in this Article involve claims brought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Others were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prior to the Supreme Court's rejection of harassment claims under
that statute. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). and others were brought under state anti-
discrimination statutes. Because courts have tended to apply the standards of the EEOC Guidelines in cases
brought under all of these statutes, the cases will be discussed without reference to the identity of the statute
under which they were brought.
II. Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166
(1989). Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Davis, 858 F.2d 345).
12. The terms "protected expression" and "protected speech" are used in this Article because they are com-
monly used in the literature. There is, of course, no expression that is protected or unprotected under all circum-
stances. A political speech may be prohibited by regulations prohibiting noise in an intensive-care unit. and ob-
scenity may not be prohibited by a law that distinguishes among obscene expressions based upon their political
content. Thus, it may actually be more meaningful to speak in terms of "prohibited regulation" than in terms of
"protected speech."
13. See Pickering v. Board of Educ. 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (describing the "core value" of the first
amendment as "[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance").
14. See State v. Human Rights Comm'n, 178 I1. App. 3d 1033, 1049, 534 N.E.2d 161, 171 (1989) ("Ulti-
mately this is a case where the line between tastelessness and harassment is crossed.").
15. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881. 906 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Belittling comments about
a person's ability to perform, on the basis of that person's sex, are not funny.").
16. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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liability calculus, the remaining unprotected expression or conduct, though of a
harassing nature, may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive on its own to sup-
port a judgment. Second, even if sufficient unprotected conduct or expression is
present so that a trier of fact could find against the defendant, a risk that liabil-
ity may be imposed based in part on protected speech is intolerable under the
first amendment.' 7 Third, under the doctrine of overbreadth, a legal scheme
that reaches a substantial amount of protected speech cannot be applied to
reach even unprotected expression.a8 Therefore, evidence of protected speech
should not be admitted at trial to support a claim of hostile environment.
The first amendment does not insulate all speech from legal regulation, but
in order for speech to be regulated on the basis of content, it must fall within
some recognized exception to the first amendment-such as defamation, obscen-
ity, or "fighting words"-or a new exception must be recognized. Although
some "harassing speech"' 9 falls neatly within existing exceptions, much does
not, and the Title VII standard is sufficiently broad that it covers both protected
and unprotected speech.
Part II of this Article discusses the theory of hostile-environment harass-
ment as the courts have developed it under Title VII. Part III examines the
viewpoint-based nature of the restrictions that have been imposed under Title
VII. Part IV discusses the chilling effect that harassment regulation has on
speech. Part V examines the extent to which the expression involved in those
cases is protected under current first amendment doctrine. Part VI discusses
whether first amendment doctrine should be modified to permit restriction of
currently protected expression. Finally, Part VII discusses the appropriate scope
of hostile-environment theory under first amendment doctrine properly
understood.
II. THE THEORY OF HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII expressly prohibits neither sexual nor racial harassment. Instead,
it generally provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."' 0 Nonetheless, courts have identified two forms
17. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886. 921 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware. the Court
struck down a judgment against the NAACP that had been based upon a boycott against certain whitc-owned
businesses. The Mississippi Supreme Court had upheld the judgment on the ground that the boycott was effected
in part by physical force and violence against potential customers. Id. at 895. The Supreme Court reversed.
holding that the judgment was inconsistent with the first amendment because the boycott had been enforced by
both unprotected force and protected persuasion. Id. at 922-23. According to the Court, "[tithe ambiguous find-
ings of the Mississippi Supreme Court are inadequate to assure the 'precision of regulation' demanded by [the first
amendmentl." Id. at 921. Thus, according to the Court, a judgment that rests, or might rest, in part upon pro-
tected expression is invalid. As a result, the issue in a harassment case is not whether all of the expression forming
the basis for the claim is protected; rather, the question is whether any of it is.
18. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
19. The term "harassing speech" is used to describe speech that courts have held to contribute to a finding of
harassment under Title Vll, without regard to whether the speech by itself would be actionable or whether the
speaker intended to annoy the listener.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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of sexual harassment that violate Title VII--"quid pro quo" and "hostile work
environment" harassment. "Quid pro quo" harassment typically involves a
claim that an employee, usually female, was required to submit to sexual ad-
vances as a condition of receiving job benefits or that her failure to submit to
such advances resulted in a tangible job detriment, such as discharge or failure
to receive a promotion. 21 "Hostile work environment" harassment involves the
claim that the workplace is so "polluted" with sexual hostility toward
women--or racial hostility to other races-that it discriminatorily alters the
"terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of the statute.22 The
hostility may be expressed either through conduct or through speech. The focus
of this Article is limited to hostile-environment harassment and then only to the
extent that the hostile environment is created in whole or in part by
expression. 23
The first case to recognize a hostile-environment theory under Title VII
was a race case. In Rogers v. EEOC, Judge Goldberg stated:
[E]mployees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to pro-
tection from employer abuse, and . . . the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protec-
tive ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic
or racial discrimination.
24
Numerous cases since Rogers have relied upon this broad conception of the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" to hold that a racially
or sexually hostile atmosphere violates Title VII even absent any discrimination
in wages, job assignments, or other tangible benefits, and Rogers was a major
impulse behind the EEOC's promulgation of its Guidelines. In Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court, in recognizing a cause of action for
sexual harassment leading to non-economic injury, quoted the EEOC Guide-
lines approvingly, stating that in adopting those Guidelines, "the EEOC drew
upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that
Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." 25 The Court announced that "a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for
the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning
21. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes. Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1985):
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
22. The distinction between the two kinds of harassment is not always clear, and some courts have criticized
attempts to draw such distinctions. For example, in Mitchell v. OsAir. Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio
1986). the court, referring to a hostile environment, stated that "[tihe threat of loss of work explicit in the quid
pro quo may only be implicit without being any less coercive."
23. A somewhat different form of hostile-environment claim is that consensual sexual relationships of other
persons create an offensive sexually charged environment. In Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269. 1280
(D.D.C. 1988), the court held that the plaintiff proved a sexually hostile work environment by demonstrating the
existence of pervasive consensual sexual conduct in the office. See also Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp.. 904
F.2d 853, 862 (3d Cir. 1990) (acknowledging the theory, but rejecting the argument because there was no evi-
dence that romantic relationships were -'flaunted" or prevalent).
24. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
25. 477 U.S. 57. 65 (1986). See also Scott v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986)
("After Meritor there is no mistaking the acceptability of the EEOC definition (and verbiage) found at §
1604.11 (a)").
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and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets."2 6 The Court emphasized,
however, that "not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment'
affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of
Title VII. ''21 Rather, for harassment to be actionable under Title VII, "it must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment.' "28 The Court in Vinson
had no trouble finding sufficient allegations of hostile environment, because the
plaintiff alleged that she had been forcibly raped.
The reported cases reveal that the definitions of sexual and racial harass-
ment under Title VII are at the same time broader and narrower than the con-
ventional definition of "harassment," which generally connotes a pattern of con-
duct aimed at a particular person and intended to annoy. The statutory
definition is broader in that expression can constitute "harassment" even when
it is not directed toward the plaintiff 9 and not intended to annoy,30 and nar-
rower in that it includes only harassment based upon protected status and, even
then, only harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the
terms and conditions of employment.31
Although some courts have stated that a plaintiff must show a "pattern of
harassment," rather than "a few isolated incidents, ' 32 others have expressly re-
jected that distinction and suggested that the plaintiff "need not prove that the
26. 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
27. 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("mere utterance of an ethnic
or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not affect the conditions of employment
to sufliciently significant degree to violate Title VII)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d at 904 (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d 234).
28. 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 904). See also Anderson v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14454, *20 (N.D. III. 1988) (rejecting claim based on "a few isolated
incidents of sexual harassment" on ground that it was not enough to characterize workplace as "abusive working
environment").
29. As the court explained in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794. at 30-31
(M.D. Fla. 1991):
Illncidents involving other female employees place the conduct at issue in context. The pervasiveness of
conduct constituting sexual harassment outside Robinson's presence works to rebut the assertion that the
conduct of which Robinson complains is isolated or rare. Second, the issue in this case is the nature of the
work environment. This environment is shaped by more than the face-to-face encounters between Robin-
son and male coworkers and supervisors. The perception that the work environment is hostile can be
influenced by the treatment of other persons of a plaintiff's protected class, even if that treatment is
learned second-hand.
See also Waltman v. Int'l. Paper Co.. 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Although not all the graffiti was
directed at Waltman, it is all relevant to her claim. . . . [elven a woman who was never herself the object of
harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment
was pervasive") (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141. 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985), afjd 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
30. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a "reasonable woman" standard
that "classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct
creates a hostile working environment"); Lynch v. Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1990) (upholding claim of
sexual harassment based on "sexually derogatory remarks, vulgar insults, and requests for sexual favors which the
City attempts to portray as 'teasing' or 'joking' but which were demeaning and insulting to Lynch, whatever their
purpose."); Harris v. Int'l. Paper Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4340, * 17 (D. Maine 1991) ("state and federal laws
prohibiting racial and sexual harassment are wholly uninterested in the perpetrator's intent").
31. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
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instances of alleged harassment were related in either time or type,"3 3 and
others have suggested that it is error for a court to conclude that harassment
did not exist simply because very few incidents were alleged. 4 Conduct need
not be overtly sexual or racial to be actionable; other hostile conduct directed
against the victim because of the victim's race or sex is also prohibited.35
Ironically, though couched in terms of discriminatory treatment, the real
claim in many harassment cases is that the work atmosphere did not change in
response to the addition of women (or minorities) to the environment. The ra-
tionale is that conduct that appears harmless to men may be offensive to
women, although such reasoning seems inconsistent, at least superficially, with
the view that Title VII "rejects the notion of 'romantic paternalism' towards
women."38 For example, the court in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia7 rejected
the argument that the environment was not a hostile one because "a police sta-
tion need not be run like a day care center," stating that neither should it have
"the ambience of a nineteenth century military barracks," 38 although an all-
male police station having such an ambience would certainly not violate Title
VII. The court also noted that although men might find the obscenity and por-
nography that pervaded the workplace "harmless and innocent," women might
well "feel otherwise," and such expression may be "highly offensive to a woman
who seeks to deal with her fellow employees and clients with professional dig-
nity and without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse."39 As a conse-
33. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345. 349 (6th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
See also Waltman v. Int'l. Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1989) ("focus is whether [plaintiff] was
ubjected to recurring acts of discrimination, not whether a given individual harassed [plaintiff] recurrently.").
34. King v. Board of Regents. 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) ("although a single act can be enough ....
generally repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depend-
ing on the number of incidents and the intensity of each incident"); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.. 863
F.2d 1503, 1510 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) ("the determination of whether the defendant's conduct is sufficiently 'severe or
pervasive' to constitute racial harassment does not turn solely on the number of incidents alleged by plaintiff.").
35. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court [in
Vinson] in no way limited this concept to intimidation or ridicule of an explicitly sexual nature."); Bell v. Crackin
Good Bakers, Inc.. 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (holding that valid claim could be based on "threaten-
ing, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of the sex of the
victim"); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129. 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (district court erred in assuming that incident
of physical force could not constitute sexual harassment unless "explicitly sexual").
36. United States v. City of Buffalo. 457 F. Supp. 612, 629 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Rosen v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 464 (D.C. N.J. 1990)). See also Note. Sexual Harassment and Title VII: A
Better Solution. 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (1989) (arguing that sexual harassment is not really discrimination and
urging enactment of separate sexual harassment legislation).
37. 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990).
38. Id. See also Williams v. Atchison. T. & S.F. Ry., 627 F. Supp. 752, 755-56 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
("Whatever differences may exist between railroad workers and courthouse workers, it seems impermissible to
exempt them from rules forbidding racial insults. Railroad workers doubtless know how to speak and behave in
'mixed company.' They must realize that under Title VII railroad workers are a 'mixed company.' ") (emphasis in
original).
39. See also Ellison v. Brady. 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Conduct that many men consider unob-
jectionable may offend many women"): Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611. 626 (1986) (Keith, J., dissent-
ing in part) ("in my view. the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence between most
women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men.").
It is difficult to understand the decision of the District Court that was affirmed in Bruhwiler v. University of
Tenn.. 859 F.2d 419 (1988). as animated by anything other than a sense of chivalry toward women. The District
Court laid great weight on the fact that the alleged harasser had "cursed out" the plaintiff by saying, "What the
hell is this goddamn noise about you and drug screens[?]" Id. at 423. As Judge Nelson stated in his dissent:
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quence, a locker room atmosphere that was perfectly legal before the entry of
women into the job becomes illegal thereafter.40
The extent to which courts will be willing to pursue the above logic remains
to be seen. Suppose, for example, an employer had a policy of imposing disci-
pline against any employee who used profanity in front of a woman. The as-
sumption that women as a group may be more offended by profanity than men
as a group seems like just the sort of stereotype that Title VII was intended to
erase. Just as it may be empirically true that women as a group are more of-
fended by profanity than men, it also may be empirically true that women as a
group are more nurturant than men,41 but courts have interpreted Title VII to
prohibit reliance on the latter generalization, 42 and it is unclear why the two
generalizations should enjoy a different status.
Because harassment claims rest upon a discrimination theory, a number of
courts have suggested that where sexual conduct is equally offensive to males
and females there is no actionable harassment.43 Similarly, where supervisors
are abusive to all employees, many courts have rejected racial and sexual har-
assment claims. 44 Other courts have allowed such claims, however, where the
harassment of the plaintiff took a sexual or racial form.45 The latter cases seem
inconsistent with the underlying theory of Title VII harassment, which is that
One can only conclude that Dr. Stafford's sin lay in his having forgotten that it was a lady he was talking
to. and not a man. That may have been a breach of etiquette, even in this egalitarian and frequently
profane age, but it was hardly evidence of a propensity to "discriminate against any individual . . . be-
cause of such individual's .. sex."
Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting).
40. See Williams-Hill v. Donovan, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13.992. *4-5 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (when plaintiff
began working in the office she encountered an atmosphere in which male employees "spen[t] a good portion of
the day telling each other racist, sexist and ethnic jokes"; she complained to her supervisor who announced that
the joking would have to stop but even then it did not stop).
41. See Browne, Biology. Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differences. 38
Sw. L.J. 617, 623-24 (1984).
42. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (even if basic psychological
differences between men and women make women as a class superior flight attendants, Title VII precludes reli-
ance on that fact in making employment decisions), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 481 U.S. 1041
(1987) ("instances of complained of sexual conduct that prove equally offensive to male and female workers would
not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir.
1982); Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp.. 517 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (La. App. 1987). But see Broderick v. Ruder.
685 F. Supp. 1269. 1275 n.6 (D.D.C. 1988) (in finding that hostile work environment existed, court relied on
testimony from male employee that the sexual atmosphere offended him).
44. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F,2d 99. 105 (2d Cir. 1988) (although plaintiff proved that her
supervisor was abusive, "the record showed that his temper was manifested indiscriminately toward men and
women, even his superiors."); Gilliam v. Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1975) (supervisor "apparently
subjected all of his employees, at one time or another, to abusive language and discipline."). Bradford v. Sloan
Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157. 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (although manager's actions were indefensible, they did not
reflect racial bias because the manager offended equally members of all races).
45. See Bailey v. Binyon. 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. I11. 1984) (rejecting defendant's argument that they
could not be liable to black plaintiff for racial slurs "if they also used derogatory ethnic epithets in addressing, for
example, Irish. Italian, and Jewish employees."): Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis.
1984) (rejecting defendant's contention that harassment was the result of a personality clash and that a male
would have suffered equally brutal harassment. though of a different form, stating: "the sexually offensive conduct
and language used would have been almost irrelevant and would have failed entirely in its crude purpose had the
plaintiff been a man"); Lynch v. Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Iowa 1990) (although "verbal abuse with
sexually-charged language was not reserved only for women at the Des Moines Police Department. . . [m]any of
the insulting comments aimed at Lynch were particularly reserved for women.").
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the employee suffers an adverse working environment because of race or sex. A
supervisor who refers to subordinates by terms such as "dumb bastard," "dumb
bitch," "fat bastard," "red-headed bastard," and "black bastard" cannot fairly
be said to have discriminated against the woman and the black in favor of the
fat, dumb, and red-headed employees.," All were subjected to an abusive envi-
ronment, and unless the black and the woman would have been spared the
abuse but for their race and sex, they are not victims of discrimination. By
similar reasoning, when harassment is directed against an individual because of
a personal grudge, it should not be actionable even if it takes a racial or sexual
form, though the cases come out the other way.4 7 Conversely, of course, where
the harassment does not take a sexual or racial form but is aimed at the victim
because of the victim's race or sex, harassment on the prohibited basis exists.
The Supreme Court has not yet wholly defined the extent of an employer's
liability for harassment by its employees. In quid pro quo cases, which by defi-
nition involve supervisory employees, courts generally apply automatic vicarious
liability on the theory that such behavior is like any other form of prohibited
discrimination, where the employer is liable irrespective of whether it knew of
the particular discriminatory conduct by one of its agents or had a policy
against it.48 The scope of employer liability for hostile-environment harassment
is not as well settled and may depend upon whether the harasser is a supervisor
or a co-worker. Although the EEOC Guidelines provide that an employer is
automatically liable in all cases of sexual harassment, 49 the Supreme Court in
Vinson rejected that standard.5 0 The Court declined, however, to articulate any
standard in its place, although it did suggest that courts should look to general
agency principles and consider the following factors: (1) whether the employer
has a policy prohibiting sexual harassment; (2) whether the policy was commu-
nicated to employees; (3) whether the employer had notice of the harassment;
and (4) whether the employer's response upon learning of the harassment was
adequate.51 However, the Court noted that "absence of notice to an employer
does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability."52 Courts since Vin-
46. But see Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923. 927 (N.D. II1. 1984) ("The use of the word *nigger' automat-
ically separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is discrimination per se.").
47. For example, in Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985), the plaintiff com-
plained of harassment, only some of which was of a sexual nature. Explicit pictures were posted with plaintiff's
name on them, someone wrote "the wicked witch is gone" on the calendar when she took vacation, someone tried
to set her up on a phony drug-buying charge, and she was repeatedly told that women did not belong on the police
force. Id. at 856-65. Although the hostility toward plaintiff may well have been motivated by her sex, the court's
findings indicated that the leading harasser knew her before she started work, and when she began work he
indicated that he hated her. Id. at 858. The court addressed the harassment claim, finding in her favor, without
addressing the motivation for the harassment. Id. at 869.
48. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881. 901 (1st Cir. 1988): Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers.
Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 n.22 (I Ith Cir. 1987); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc.. 755
F.2d 599. 605 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983); McCalla v. Ellis, 180 Mich.
App. 372, 379-80. 446 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1989).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
50. 477 U.S. 59. 72 (1986).
51. Id. at 71-72.
52. Id. at 72.
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son are split on whether notice is required in supervisor cases, 53 but in cases
involving co-workers most courts have required that the plaintiff show that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take ade-
quate remedial steps.54 There is no need, however, for the employee to show
that the failure of the employer to remedy the situation was discriminatory. 54
An employer that routinely tells employees to work out their problems with
their co-workers is liable for harassment if it applies the same rule to com-
plaints of harassment.5"
Reported decisions under Title VII have found a wide variety of speech to
constitute or contribute to a sexually or racially hostile working environment. In
many of the cases discussed below, additional facts contributed to the decision.
The point of the illustrations is not that only protected expression was involved
or that the ultimate conclusions by the courts were necessarily wrong. 57 Rather,
the examples show that pure expression plays a large role in many of the deci-
sions, a conclusion having substantial first amendment implications.58
53. Compare Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1989) (employer liable
for hostile environment created by supervisor even without notice); College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v, Massa-
chusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 508 N.E.2d 587 (1987) (same) (Massachusetts law);
Board of Directors Green Hills Country Club v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 162 III. App. 3d 216. 514
N.E.2d 1227 (1987) (same) (Illinois law), with Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.
1988) (employer liable for supervisory harassment if it had actual or constructive notice of the harassment and
failed to take appropriate steps to halt it); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
54. Lipsett at 902 (Ist Cir. 1988); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988).
55. Cf. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (holding that union is liable for discriminatory
processing of grievances if it took grievances raising claims of discrimination less seriously than other grievances),
56. See Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy. J., dissent-
ing) ("Here the employer's actions are fully consistent with the inference that Erebia's supervisors merely ex-
pected their foreman to handle a problem with his subordinates by himself."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
57. On the contrary, some of the reported cases describe what can only be considered egregious examples of
harassment. Consider for example, the plaintiffs' experience in Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc.. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th
Cir. 1988):
Immediately after the women started work, male members of the construction crew began to inflict verbal
sexual abuse on the women. The men incessantly referred to the women as "fucking flag girls." The men
nicknamed Ms. Ticknor "Herpes" after she developed a skin reaction due to a sun allergy. On one occa-
sion, Ms. Baxter returned to her car and found the name "Cavern Cunt" written in the dust on the
driver's side, and "Blond Bitch" written on the passenger side where Ms. Hall sat. Male crew members
repeatedly asked Ms. Hall if she "wanted to fuck" and requested that Ms. Hall and Ms. Baxter engage in
oral sex with them ...
In addition to the verbal abuse, male coworkers subjected Ms. Hall and Ms. Baxter to offensive and
unwelcomed physical touching. Male crew members would corner the women between two trucks, reach
out of the windows and rub their hands down the women's thighs. They grabbed Ms. Hall's breasts. One
crew member picked up Ms. Hall and held her up to the cab window so other men could touch her. [A
supervisor] observed this incident but did nothing.
All three women also experienced other types of abuse at work. Male crew members frequently pulled
down their pants and "mooned" the women while they were working. One crew member exposed himself
to Ms. Hall. Male crew members flashed obscene pictures of naked couples engaged in oral intercourse at
the women. A male crew member urinated in Ms. Hall's water bottle. Several men urinated in the gas
tank of Ms. Ticknor's car, causing it to malfunction. . . . Male crew members would refuse to give the
women a truck to take to town for bathroom breaks. When the women would relieve themselves in the
ditch, male crew members observed them through surveying equipment.
Id. at 1012.
58. This Article does not address at any length the first amendment implications of using protected state-
ments as evidence of discriminatory purpose for an employment decision such as a discharge or refusal to promote.
See Carter v. Sedgwick Co., 705 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan. 1988); Jordan v. Wilson, 649 F. Supp. 1038, 1058
(M.D. Ala. 1986) (in finding for plaintiff class in sex discrimination action against police department, court relied
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III. TITLE VII AS A VIEWPOINT-BASED RESTRICTION ON EXPRESSION
Expression contributing to harassment claims comes in a variety of forms.
While much of it is exceedingly crude and probably outside the protection of
the first amendment, some is merely uncivil, some at most insensitive, and some
perhaps wholly harmless. As the description of the cases below reveals, speech
that is only arguably sexist, sexual, or racist may form the basis for a claim of
harassment. Central to a finding of unlawful harassment is often a conclusion
by the court that the message is "offensive," ".inappropriate," or even "morally
wrong." Even if the employer ultimately prevails in such cases, it must incur a
high cost in litigation fees for declining to regulate the speech of employees.
Because the underlying objection to sexist or sexual speech and to racist speech
is sometimes different, the two forms of harassment will be considered
separately.5 9
A. Sexual Harassment
There are two primary messages conveyed by the expression that leads to
sexual harassment complaints. The first is a message of unwelcomeness or hos-
tility; expressions that women do not belong in the workplace or scornful or
derisive statements about women would fall in this class. The second is a mes-
sage that the harasser views the plaintiff in particular or women in general in a
sexual light. For sake of discussion, the former will be called the "hostility mes-
sage," while the latter will be called the "sexuality message."6 0
in part on expressions of "sexually-biased attitudes" by male supervisors, which, even if made in a joking manner,
revealed the "true feelings and attitudes of department officials").
59. Under Title VII, harassment on the basis of any characteristic protected by the statute-race, color,
national origin, sex, or religion-is prohibited. Most of the cases involve race or sex. Harassment on the basis of
national origin or religion is largely equivalent to discrimination based upon race, that is, the message is generally
one of hostility. See Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1984) (plaintiff referred to as
"resident Jew," "rich Jew," "Jew faggot," and "Christ Killer"); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627
(Iowa 1990) (supervisor called plaintiff a "goddamn stupid fuckin' Catholic" and made other derogatory remarks
about Catholics being stupid and having a lot of children).
One recent case presents a different twist on religious harassment, with obvious first amendment implications.
In Brown Transp. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1990), a Jewish employee
claimed that his employer engaged in religious harassment by including Bible verses on the face of its paychecks
and circulating a company newsletter containing articles with religious content. Apparently, the message of the
articles was a Christian one, not an anti-Jewish one, and the Commission found that neither the verses on the
paychecks nor the newsletter articles hindered the employee's job performance. Nonetheless, the court upheld a
finding of harassment by an administrative law judge, suggesting that the employer was obligated to remove the
religious messages from the employee's paycheck and his copy of the newsletter. 578 A.2d at 562.
60. I understand that some may argue that these are two sides of the same coin. That is, both are based on a
particular view of "woman's place" as being "in the bedroom not the boardroom"-a rejection of women as men's
equals. The merits of that position are not central to the thesis here-that hostile-environment regulation is a
restriction of free expression-instead, that debate goes only to the question whether one message is being sup-
pressed or two. Suffice it to say that it is far from clear that sexuality implies a lack of respect. Put another way,
there is no necessary contradiction in viewing one's colleague (or even one's subordinate) simultaneously as an
attractive sexual being and a competent co-worker. Indeed, the societal ideal for marriage is that the parties to the
marriage view each other as intellectual equals, as autonomous persons, and as desirable romantic partners. Ac-
ceptance of the suggestion that a relationship can be based on either mutual respect or lust, but not both, would
not bode well for the future of marriage in our society.
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Many sexual harassment cases have involved the use of "bad words" of a
sexual nature. Crude or otherwise inappropriate language referring to or ad-
dressing women is commonly present in hostile-environment cases, though it is
not generally by itself enough to establish a claim of harassment. The terms
complained of are primarily of two kinds, and they convey both of the above-
described messages: (1) the "hostility message" is conveyed by terms of deri-
sion, such as "broad," "bitch," and "cunt;""1 and (2) the "sexuality message" is
conveyed by terms of "endearment," such as "honey,"' 2 "sweetie," 63 and "ti-
ger."'64 The complained-of terms may refer to women in general, 5 particular
women other than the plaintiff, 6 or they may refer to the plaintiff herself and
be addressed either to her67 or to others while referring to her.68
At least with respect to the most vulgar expressions, arguably it is just the
use of "indecent" words-words that are "beyond the pale" of what can be
spoken in polite society-that is being regulated. That, of course, would justify
viewing the most vulgar terms as contributing to a hostile environment, but it
would not justify reliance on milder terms, such as "broad." But Title VII is not
a "clean language act,' 69 and bad language conveying no idea is not the target
61. Some words, primarily those relating to female sexual anatomy, may actually convey a dual message by
showing contempt for women by equating them with their sex organs.
62. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *27 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
63. See Walsh. Confronting Sexual Harassment at Work, Washington Post, July 21, 1986, Washington Bus-
iness, at 1, cal. 2 (Statement of Claudia Withers, director of employment programs at the Women's Legal Defense
Fund) ("when women perceive that things like 'honey' and 'sweetie make them uncomfortable on the job, it's
against the law") (quoted in Strauss, supra note I, at 9 n.29).
64. See. e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (7th Cir. 1988).
65. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1986) (supervisor of company, but
not supervisor of plaintiff, "customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion, di-
rected such obscenities to the plaintiff"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). See also id. at 624 (Keith, J.,
dissenting) (supervisor routinely referred to women as "whores," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits").
66. For example, State v. Human Rights Comm'n, 178 111. App. 3d 1033, 534 N.E.2d 161 (1989), affirmed a
finding of sexual harassment based on the plaintiff's testimony that her supervisor would describe women he liked
in terms of their physical appearance and women he did not like he would refer to in "sexually derogatory" terms.
Id. at 164.
[The plaintiff] testified ...
If he met a [woman] that he was fond of, or that he liked, he would describe her in terms of
physical appearance. For instance, he would say she had big boobs, she had a nice round ass that
was good for pushing, I like her legs, she had a sensuous mouth, I like her doe eyes. If he was
involved or had contact with a woman that he did not like, he would refer to her being on the rag,
or raggin', or he would call her a bitch, a cunt or a twat.
178 III. App. 3d at 1037, 534 N.E.2d at 163-64. See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia. 895 F.2d 1469, 1472.
1485 (3d Cir. 1990) ("women regularly were referred to in an offensive and obscene manner"), Lipsett v. Univer-
sity of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff complained that male residents "rated" women in
front of her on the basis of physical attributes and sexual desirability).
67. In EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989), both male and female supervisors made
crude and disparaging remarks about the charging party's pregnancy. A male supervisor stated that "that's what
you get for sleeping without your underwear." Id. at 1507. A female supervisor told her that she did not like
"stupid women who have kids," and on many occasions called her a "dog," a "whore," and a "slut." Id. See also
Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 270 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("[rlegular, almost daily exposure to terms
such as 'stupid cunt,' 'whore,' [and] 'bitch'"); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir.
1990) ("pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and addressed to female
employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile environment.").
68. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (coworkers used derogatory
references to female construction workers).
69. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983).
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of the harassment cases. Thus, the court in State v. Human Rights Commis-
sion, 7  distinguished between "gender-specific" terms, such as "cunt," "bitch,"
"twat," and "raggin' it"-which constitute "conduct of a sexual nature"-and
"general sexual" terms, such as "fuck" and "motherfucker" used as expletives,
which do not. The court held that a supervisor's reference to women's physical
appearance and his reference to women by "gender-specific" derogatory terms
constituted sexual harassment because it was an "expression of animosity" to-
ward women.71 The finding of harassment was not based primarily on one-to-
one expressions of hostility by the supervisor toward the employee,72 but instead
on the general disrespect he showed women in his conversations with others.7 3
More explicit expressions of "Neanderthal" attitudes toward women have
also been held to support a claim of hostile environment. Thus, in Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico,7 4 a female medical resident claimed that one of her
fellow residents told her that women should not become surgeons "because they
need too much time to bathe, to go to the bathroom, to apply makeup, and to
get dressed," and she frequently heard other comments to the effect that women
did not belong in surgery.75 Although these statements were "not explicitly sex-
ual," the court concluded that they were "charged with anti-female animus"
because they "challenged their capacity as women to be surgeons" and "ques-
tioned the legitimacy of their being in the Program at all."176 As a result, they
could contribute to the hostile environment.7 7 Rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that many of the comments were jokes, the court observed that
"[b]elittling comments about a person's ability to perform, on the basis of that
person's sex, are not funny."78
Plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases also frequently challenge the exhibi-
tion of written or pictorial material that they believe is demeaning or mocking
toward women. Pin-ups or "girlie magazines" in the workplace have been the
subject of innumerable sexual harassment claims.7" The conflicting approaches
70. 178 III. App. 3d 1033. 1046, 534 N.E.2d 161, 170 (1989).
71. Id. at 1049, 534 N.E.2d at 171. Comments similar to those in this case were not considered enough to
create a hostile environment by the court in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
72. Some of the one-to-one expressions of hostility from the supervisor to the employee are hard even to
consider "sexual": "motherfucking son of a bitch, the day was perfectly fine until you in your usual incessant
perverse nagging tone started in on me." 178 III. App. 3d at 1040, 534 N.E.2d at 165.
73. The plaintiff in Anderson v. Chicago Housing Auth., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,454 (N.D. III. 1988).
relied in part on "disparaging and sexist remarks" referring to female employees as "menopausal" or "going
through the change." but the court held that the statements. "while offensive, do not rise to the level of sexual
harassment." Id. at *18-19.
74. 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988).
75. Id. at 887. Another supervisory resident justified his assigning plaintiff menial tasks by asserting that
women should not be surgeons because they could not be relied upon while they were menstruating or. as he put
it. "in heat." Id. See also Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853. 862-63 (N.D. Okla. 1985) (comments
that women are not fit to become police officers; picture of a nude woman posted on a locker door with words "Do
women make good cops-No - No - No.").
76. 864 F.2d at 905 (emphasis in original).
77. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *28 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(coworker made statements such as "there is nothing worse than having to work around women").
78. Id. at 906.
79. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1472 (3d Cir. 1990) ("pornographic" pictures of women
were displayed in the locker room on the inside of a locker that was generally kept open); Waltman v. Interna-
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to the problem of sexually oriented displays are revealed by the majority and
dissenting opinions in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.s0 The majority rejected
a claim that was based upon anti-female language and pin-ups, stating:
The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the plaintiff's work
environment when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly
features and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the
newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places.8"
On the other hand, Judge Keith's frequently cited dissent would have
found that the alleged harasser's "misogynous language" combined with the
pin-ups constituted a Title VII violation because they "evoke and confirm the
debilitating norms by which women are primarily and contemptuously valued as
objects of male sexual fantasy.11 2 In the dissent's view, the "precise purpose" of
Title VII was to prevent sexual jokes, conversations, and literature from
"poisoning the work environment.183 Two of the displays that Judge Keith
seemed to find particularly reprehensible were a poster showing a woman in a
supine position with a golf ball on her breasts and a man standing over her, golf
club in hand, yelling "Fore" 84 and a supervisor's desk plaque declaring "Even
male chauvinist pigs need love."8 5
tional Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1989) (sexually oriented calendars on walls and in lockers); Bennett
v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1988) (presence of "obscene cartoons" bearing plaintiff's
name), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988)
(Playboy centerfolds displayed by male residents in rest facility); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 977 n.9 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) ("various pictures from Playboy, Penthouse, and other publications were posted in the station."):
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("allegation that the
pervasive presence of pornography in the workplace is offensive to female employees generally and plaintiff in
particular."); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (presence of "porno-
graphic" magazines and sexually oriented pictures and calendars). Brown v. City of Guthrie, 1980 WL 380, *3
(W.D. Okla. 1980) (presence of magazines containing photographs of nude women in police dispatcher's desk for
policemen to look at during their spare time).
80. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
81. Id. at 622.
82. Id. at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting). See also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (Ist
Cir. 1988) (quoting language from Rabidue dissent); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (explicitly rejecting Rabidue majority opinion and adopting position of Rabidue dissent that
"sexual posters and anti-female language can seriously affect the psychological well-being of the reasonable wo-
man and interfere with her ability to perform her job," id. at 573 n.2 (quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627 (Keith.
J., dissenting)), and may "create an atmosphere in which women are viewed as men's sexual playthings,"
Barbetta, 669 F. Supp. at 573): Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794 (M.D. Fla.
1988) ("To the extent that Rabidue holds that some forms of abusive, anti-female behavior must be tolerated in
the work environment because that behavior is prominent in society at large. the case conflicts with the established
law in this Circuit") (citation omitted).
83. 805 F.2d at 626.
84. In Carter v. Sedgwick County, 705 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (D. Kan. 1988), a sexual harassment claim was
based in part on the presentation to plaintiff of several "sexual novelties," including a "Mr. Peter Party Mold." a
"Pecker Pop Top," a "Mouth Organ," a "Sexy Hotdog," and nude male and female figurines. The alleged har-
asser's wife testified that these objects were joint gifts from her and her husband that were given as jokes that they
thought that plaintiff would enjoy.
See also Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1986) (unsuccessful sexual harassment claim
based in part on presence of "figures of bare-breasted mermaids as table decorations"), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1065 (1987).
85. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at 112-13 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (Title VII prohibits speech that is
"disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one sex ... because it conveys the message that they do not
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The message restricted by exclusion of pin-ups is the "sexuality message."
Kathryn Abrams describes that message as follows:
Pornography on an employer's wall or desk communicates a message about the way he
views women, a view strikingly at odds with the way women wish to be viewed in the
workplace. Depending on the material in question, it may communicate that women
should be objects of sexual aggression, that they are submissive slaves to male desires,
or that their most salient and desirable attributes are sexual. Any of these images may
communicate to male coworkers that it is acceptable to view women in a predomi-
nantly sexual way."9
The very recent case of Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,8 which
adopted the view of both the Rabidue dissent and the Abrams article, was ap-
parently the first reported decision to impose liability for sexual harassment
based entirely on the pervasive presence of sexually oriented magazines, pin-up
pictures-such as Playboy foldouts and tool-company calendars-and "sexually
demeaning remarks and jokes" by male coworkers; the plaintiff complained of
neither physical assaults nor sexual propositions.88 Some of the pictures were
posted on walls in public view, but included within the category of sexually
harassing behavior were incidents where male employees were simply reading
the offending magazines in the workplace a or carrying them in their back pock-
ets.9 0 The court rejected the suggestion of Rabidue that sexually oriented pic-
tures and comments standing alone cannot form the basis for Title VII liability,
stating that "[e]xcluding some forms of offensive conduct as a matter of law is
not consistent with the factually oriented approach" required by Title VII. 9'
A desire not to be viewed as a "sex object" also underlies the objection to
sexual propositions in the workplace. Sexual harassment cases have often in-
volved sexual propositions of varying degrees of vulgarity.92 For example, in
Continental Can Co. v. State,9 3 an employee's coworkers told her how they
could "make her feel sexually" and that they could make her want to leave her
husband."' In another case, male workers told dirty jokes, suggested that plain-
belong, that they are welcome in the workplace only if they will subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes
prevalent in that environment").
86. Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms. 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1212 n.118 (1989). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 794, at 123-24 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (quoting same).
Abrams' categorical assertion that the message of pornography is "strikingly at odds with the way women
wish to be viewed in the workplace" seems overbroad and based not on an empirical judgment that all women
object to being viewed in a sexual manner in the workplace, but rather on the normative judgment that women
should object. Moreover, not all women object to pornographic materials, even in the workplace, and many who
do object do so on grounds having nothing to do with views of "sexual subordination."
87. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
88. Id. at 90.
89. Id. at 18, 25.
90. Id. at 37.
91. Id. at 120-23. The court also examined, albeit superficially, the argument that the first amendment im-
poses limits on the kind of activity that can be the subject of sexual harassment claims. Id. at 154-62.
92. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that even "well-intentioned compliments" can form the
basis for sexual harassment claims. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. 297 N.W.2d 241. 245 (Minn. 1980).
94. Id. at 245. One coworker told her that "he wished slavery days would return so that he could sexually
train her and she would be his bitch." Id. at 246. Coworkers also told her that women who worked at factories
were "tramps." Id.
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tiff participate in a sexually explicit home video, and one worker suggested that
she "sit on [his] face."' 95 In yet another, the plaintiff alleged that the message,
"How about a little head?" appeared on the screen of her computer terminal.96
Although sometimes the advances are crude and explicit, that is not always the
case. For example, in Zowayyed v. Lowen Co., the plaintiff alleged that the
company president wrote a note to her reading, "You have very playful eyes.
Do you play?" and the next day said to her, "If you don't bait the hook, you
can't catch the fish."9 Sometimes the assertion goes beyond what the alleged
harasser has said to what the harasser is thinking. Thus, plaintiffs in sexual
harassment cases have relied on both the tone of voice 8 and the look on a
face.99
A recent Ninth Circuit case held that the plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of sexual harassment based on what can only be described as a pa-
thetic romantic overture by a coworker. 100 The accused harasser, a revenue
agent of the Internal Revenue Service named Gray, had asked the plaintiff, a
fellow agent, out for a drink after work. The plaintiff declined but suggested
that they have lunch the following week. The next week, Gray asked the plain-
tiff out for lunch, but she declined. The following week, Gray handed the plain-
tiff a note stating:
I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such
constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your
hatred for another day. 01
Plaintiff left the room and asked a male coworker to tell Gray that she was not
interested in him and to leave her alone. The next week, Gray sent plaintiff a
three-page letter stating in part:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex.. .. Leaving aside the hassles
and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months.
Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away. Admiring your style and elan.
...Don't you think it odd that two people who have never even talked together,
95. Egger v. Local 76, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 644 F. Supp. 795, 797 n.3, 799 (D. Mass. 1986). See
also Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1985) ("ad-
vances took the form of leers, obscene gestures, lewd comments, remarks about her sexual needs now that her
husband had left her, and promises that he would make it *easy' for her at [work] if she would 'go out' with him")
(quid pro quo case) (citations omitted); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 40, 734 P.2d 580, 582 (1987) (super-
visor told plaintiff, "I want to fuck you. I am going to fuck you."); Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc. v. Ohio Civil
Rights Comm.. 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 757 (1990) (harassment took form of supervisor's "smacking" charging
party on buttocks, suggestions that charging party "go home and stay all night with" supervisor, suggestions that
she have sex in back seat of car with owner, and "vulgar language" often accompanied by obscene gestures).
96. Monge v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 507, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64. 65 (1986).
97. 735 F. Supp. 1497, 1499 (D. Kan. 1990). See also Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211
(7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff alleged that she had been "propositioned," which turned out on deposition to mean that
the alleged harasser had asked to take her to a restaurant for drinks after work; not sufficient to create actionable
hostile environment).
98. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1474 (3d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff asserted that alleged
harasser spoke to her in "seductive tones").
99. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc.. 755 F.2d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff complained of "leers"); Zowayyed, 735 F. Supp. at 1499 (D. Kan. 1990) (plaintiff alleged that company
president made "goo goo eyes").
100. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 874.
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alone, are striking off such intense sparks . . .I will [write] another letter in the near
future.'
02
The letter also said, "I am obligated to you so much that if you want me to
leave you alone I will. . . . If you want me to forget you entirely, I can not do
that."'' 0 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment, rejecting the lower court's conclusion that the incident was "isolated and
genuinely trivial"'104 and holding that "Gray's conduct was sufficiently severe
and pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiff's] employment and create an
abusive working environment."' 105
Not all cases involve statements of views about women in general; some-
times the displays are more focused. For example, a female firefighter estab-
lished a claim of sexual harassment based in large part upon the appearance of
"blatant sexual mockery" in the form of graffiti and cartoons on the communal
bulletin boards and living space of the firehouse.' 06 A display that the court
seemed to find among the more offensive was a cartoon posted in the firehouse
depicting a woman firefighter at a men's urinal,'07 though the message seems
quite "political" in the context of a fire department under orders to set positions
aside for women.' 08 The term "political" is used here and throughout the Arti-
cle in its broad sense-that is, pertaining to matters of social policy. Speech
expressing views about matters of social policy-such as the proper role of the
races and sexes-should be considered political in the same sense that speech
advocating nondiscriminatory treatment should be. The most obvious interpreta-
tion of the Berkman cartoon is that it is a negative comment on the notion of
sexual integration of the fire department.
The importance of an anti-female message in harassment cases is starkly
revealed by Goluszek v. Smith, 00 in which a male plaintiff claimed that male
coworkers had harassed him. The plaintiff was an unsophisticated man who ap-
parently was quite sensitive to comments about sex. His coworkers showed him
pictures of nude women, told him they would get him "fucked," and poked him
in the buttocks with a stick," 0 all conduct that most courts would find consti-
tuted sexual harassment if directed toward women. Although the court ac-
102. Id. at 874 n.l.
103. Id, Shortly thereafter, Gray transferred to a different office, but almost immediately filed a union griev-
ance requesting a return to his original office. The IRS and the union settled the grievance by allowing Gray to
retransfer. provided he spend four more months in the new office and promise not to bother the plaintiff. When
plaintiff learned that Gray was returning, she filed a charge of sexual harassment.
104. Id. at 876.
105. Id. at 878.
106. Berkman v. New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). aftd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985).
See also Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 517 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (La. App. 1987) (dismissal of harassment
claim based on sexually oriented cartoons from magazines posted in men's room and labeled with names of various
male and female employees affirmed because cartoons labeled with the names of both male and female
employees).
107. Berkman, 580 F. Supp. at 232 n.7.
108. Id. at 228. See also Williams v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 627 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (black
employees hired pursuant to affirmative action resented by existing white work force, many of whom were related
by blood or marriage).
109. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. III. 1988),
110. Id. at 1454.
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knowledged that Goluszek was harassed because he was a male, " , it held that
the harassment was not actionable under Title VII. Unlike this case, said the
court, in a valid Title VII harassment case, "the offender is saying by words or
actions that the victim is inferior because of the victim's sex." 1 2 Because Golus-
zek was a male in a male-dominated environment, the court reasoned that the
harassment could not have embodied the message that he was inferior because
of his sex." 3
B. Racial Harassment
The message challenged in racial harassment is usually less ambiguous
than that involved in the sexual context, where either the hostility message or
the sexuality message may be operating. The objectionable message in racial
harassment cases is generally one of hostility and prejudice. Racial slurs and
epithets are common features of racial harassment cases."14 Black plaintiffs
often complain that the word "nigger" was directed at them or used in their
presence." 5 In one case, a white woman who was married to a black man com-
plained that she was called a "nigger lover.""$
Sometimes racial slurs are used not in a personally provocative fashion but
simply as part of the lexicon of the workplace. For example, in Walker v. Ford
Motor Co.," 7 the plaintiff, who was working at an automobile dealership in
Florida, complained that poorly repaired cars were referred to as "nigger-
rigged," the employee with the lowest sales was called the "black ass," and
employees among themselves often referred to black customers as "niggers. ' 's 8
I 1. Id. at 1456. The court also noted that if Goluszek were a woman, defendant would have taken action to
stop the harassment. Id.
112. Id.
113. Cf. Zabkowiez v. West Bend, Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (rejecting employer's defcnse in a
sexual harassment case brought by a female employee that a male employee would have suffered equally brutal
harassment even if of a different form).
114. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (no violation of Title VII
because "use, if any, of racial terms was infrequent, was limited to casual conversation among employees, and
with possible rare exceptions was not directed toward appellants"); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (8th
Cir. 198 1) (EEOC counselor reported repeated use of terms "niggers" and "spooks" and told by coworkers that he
was a "token"; blacks called "boy"); Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
referred to as "nigger," "coon" and "black boy"; no violation because no racial animus); United States v. City of
Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (coworkers referred to blacks as "Uncle Tom[s]"), modified
and afl'd, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D.
Minn. 1980) (coworkers referred to blacks both in private and in front of the charging party as "niggers").
115. For example, in Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981), the plaintiff complained that the terms
"niggers" and "spooks" and racial jokes were expressed in his presence. Id. at 1198. One employee said in his
presence, "Well, you know how that goes, they start treating us like niggers, they're making us park in the back
and enter through the back door now." Id. at 1199. Other employees told him that he was a "token." Id. at 1198.
See also Carter v. Sedgwick County, 705 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan. 1988) (plaintiff complained of being referred to
as her supervisor's "token nigger").
116. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 254 (N.D. Ind. 1985). See also Snell v. Suffolk
County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (use of words "nigger," "guinea," "polack," "kike," "mick,"
"black bitch," and "honkey" in workplace).
117. 684 F.2d 1355 (lth Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 1358.
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Only once was the plaintiff himself called a "nigger," and then the offending
coworker apologized.119 Nonetheless, the court upheld the claim.
Crude racial graffiti and racist material posted on bulletin boards have also
been found to support a finding of racial harassment. For example, in EEOC v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,2° the court found a Title VII violation
based upon a pattern of offensive writings. Signs were posted with such com-
ments as "Ray Wells is a nigger," "The only good nigger is a dead nigger,"
"Ray Wells is a mother," "Send all blacks back to Africa," and "Niggers are a
living example that Indians screwed buffalo. ' 121 The court was particularly of-
fended that one of the supervisors had laughed at an article derogatory of black
persons that was posted on the bulletin boards, although the court did not de-
scribe what the article was about. 122 Another case imposed liability in part on
the basis of posters stating, "The KKK is still alive" and the wearing of "Wal-
lace for President" buttons by on-duty police officers.123 Harassment claims in a
number of other cases have also relied on the posting of various racist materials
on bulletin boards. 24
A sign suggesting that Archie Bunker should be elected President because
"he would know how to handle niggers" has also been found to contribute to a
hostile environment, as has the display of a wooden cross associated with the Ku
Klux Klan. 125 The plaintiff in that case also complained that coworkers posted
articles derogatory of black persons on bulletin boards. In Moffett v. Gene B.
Glick Co.,"28 employees made comments in front of a white woman married to a
black man such as "it would be a damn good day to hoist a nigger up a flag-
pole," "niggers ought to be shot like [Vernon Jordan] was," and "they ought to
figure out some way so they'd quit breeding like that." 27 One of the defendants
suggested that they go down to the local K-Mart and harass Jesse Jackson and
other blacks who were picketing there."28 In another case, EEOC v. Beverage
Canners, Inc.,"29 the court found a hostile environment based upon references to
119, Id. at 1358. n.I.
120. 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
121. Id. at 384.
122. Id. at 385-86.
123. United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 633 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), modified and aff'd, 633 F.2d
643 (2d Cir. 1980). It is important to note that what was involved here was not the employer enforcing an even-
handed ban on the wearing of political buttons by uniformed police officers, but imposition of liability against the
employer because the officers wore certain political buttons. That is, liability would not have been imposed based
upon the wearing of Humphrey or McGovern buttons.
124. For example, in Snell v. Suffolk County. 611 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), materials included a
"study guide" for minority police officers, consisting of puzzles such as one requiring the test taker to identify
"How many Honkies are in this picture?," a cartoon depicting a Ku Klux Klan member who, after shooting a
black person, asks a ranger, "Whatcha mean, 'Out of Season'?," a questionnaire beginning "Photo not necessary
since you all look alike" and asking questions about how much time spent in prison and approximate estimate of
income from theft, welfare, and false insurance claims. See also Williams v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 627 F.
Supp. 752, 756 (W.D. Mo. 1986) ("Ku Klux Klan application" posted on bulletin board).
125. EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc.. 488 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D. Minn. 1980). See also City of
Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. at 633 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (black patrolman found statement "We don't want any niggers in
this department" on his locker).
126. 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
127. Id. at 255.
128. Id.
129. 897 F.2d 1067 (1 Ith Cir. 1990).
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blacks as "ignorant niggers" and "Swahilis" and comments to the effect that
"blacks were meant to be slaves, and were of low intelligence.""1 ' In Taylor v.
Jones,'3 ' an employee who claimed to be a KKK member hung a hangman's
noose in the supply room, and the court found the "message conveyed or at-
tempted to be conveyed by that action was unmistakable,"132 although the court
did not find that it constituted a physical threat.
The probability that at least some of the above speakers were punished
because of their social attitudes about racial and sexual matters is quite high;
indeed, some courts have expressly viewed Title VII as a prohibition on the
expression of noxious views. Although declining to find a Title VII violation
because of the employer's "remedial measures," the court in Davis v. Monsanto
Chemical Co.,"33 made clear that Title VII prohibits espousal of certain view-
points and requires employers to enforce that prohibition:
In essence, while Title VII does not require an employer to fire all "Archie Bunkers"
in its employ, the law does require that an employer take prompt action to prevent
such bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-
workers. By informing people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes in public
is unacceptable, people may eventually learn that such views are undesirable in pri-
vate, as well. Thus, Title VII may advance the goal of eliminating prejudices and
biases in our society.13
This passage was in the nature of a rebuke to District Judge Avern Cohn for
having cited the following passage from Howard v. National Cash Register
Co.:"1
5
The Archie Bunkers of this world, within limitations, still may assert their biased
view. We have not yet reached the point where we have taken from individuals the
right to be prejudiced, so long as such prejudice did not evidence itself in discrimina-
tion. This Court will secure plaintiff against discrimination; no court can secure him
against prejudice. The defendant in this case is charged by law with avoiding all dis-
crimination; the defendant is not charged by law with discharging all Archie Bunkers
in its employ. Absent a showing of something other than disrespect and prejudice by
his fellow workers, plaintiff cannot bring himself within the terms of either [Section
1981 or Title VII]. 38
The Court of Appeals in Davis stated that Judge Cohn's citation of How-
ard suggested that he "may have misunderstood the true impact of Title
VII." 1 37 The appellate court stated that "[b]y emphasizing the point that an
employer 'is not charged by law with discharging all Archie Bunkers in its em-
ploy,' the district court may erroneously be encouraging the perpetuation of the
status quo."I'3 A clearer statement of censorial purpose would be difficult to
find.
130. Id. at 1068 n.3.
131. 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 1199.
133. 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
134. Id. at 350.
135. 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
136. Id. at 606.
137. 858 F.2d at 350.
138. Id. (citation omitted).
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In all of the above cases, defendants were haled into court to defend either
their own expression or the expression of their employees. In all of these cases,
courts have suggested that they have the power to impose liability, not just be-
cause the message was expressed in a particularly offensive manner but because
of the offensiveness of the idea conveyed. The closer the expression came to
statements such as "blacks don't belong here, because they are fit only to be
slaves" or "women belong in the bedroom and not the factory," the more likely
the courts were to uphold the claim.' 39 In other words, the more "political" the
message, the more offensive it was found to be. Even when the offending expres-
sion might ordinarily be considered devoid of ideological content-such as free-
standing sexually explicit vulgarities or pictures-courts have felt compelled to
give them some additional sociopolitical meaning to find a Title VII violation. 1 0
That is, courts have not simply identified words that are prohibited in the work-
place. Instead, they have held that certain words may not be spoken in the
workplace when they convey a message of disrespect toward certain groups.
Surprisingly, the first amendment is seldom invoked in these cases, despite the
fact that the question facing the courts is whether defendants may be held lia-
ble for expression that is often rife with social and political meaning.' 4 '
IV. VAGUENESS, VICARIOUS LIABILITY, AND THE CHILLING EFFECT
Two features of harassment law coalesce to create a substantial chilling
effect on expression. The first is the vagueness of the standard; because it is
unclear what is permitted and what is not, the law pressures speakers to steer
well clear of the line between legal and illegal speech. The second is the system
of vicarious employer liability: employers are charged by law with regulating
139. For example, in Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. II1. 1984). the court found for the plaintiff
based upon a dispute between the plaintiff and her supervisor. When the supervisor stated, "all you niggers are
alike," the employee responded that he wanted to be treated "like a human being". the supervisor responded,
"You're not a human being, you're a nigger." Id. at 925. In concluding that plaintiffs claim was valid, the court
stated: "such comments 'are different qualitatively [from mere insults] because they conjure up the entire history
of racial discrimination in this country.'" Id. at 934 (quoting Words that Wound, supra note 3, at 157).
140. Illinois Dep't of Corrections v. Human Rights Comm'n, 178 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1049, 534 N.E.2d 161.
171 (1989) (obscenities were chosen "because of the expression of animosity they allow"); Katz v. Dole. 709 F.2d
251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (harassment took the form of "extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets"
that were "widely recognized as not only improper but as intensely degrading, deriving their power to wound not
only from their meaning but also from 'the disgust and violence they express phonetically.' ") (quoting C. MILLER
& K SWiFT. WORDS AND WOMEN 120 (1977)); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The proliferation of [sexual] material may be found to create an atmosphere in which women
are viewed as men's sexual playthings rather than as their equal co-workers").
141. Courts have been so little concerned with the first amendment issue that they often do not even identify
the words that serve as the basis for a finding of liability. Consider, for example, the approach of the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Lynch v. Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa 1990):
The district court made extensive findings of fact concerning the sexual comments and sexually-charged
verbal abuse which had been aimed at Lynch by [two of her fellow police officers]. We choose not to
dignify their conduct by recording it here. Suffice it to say that it involved repeated incidents of sexually
derogatory remarks, vulgar insults, and requests for sexual favors which the City attempts to portray as
"teasing" or "joking" but which were demeaning and insulting to Lynch, whatever their purpose.
In Lynch, the court also affirmed denial of the City's motion to amend its answer to raise a first amend-
ment defense on timeliness grounds. Id. at 838.
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the speech of their employees, and the incentives operating on the employer
virtually compel it to overregulate.
A. Vagueness
Under the vagueness doctrine, a regulation of expression is invalid unless it
provides reasonably clear notice of what speech is permitted and what is not.
The person whose conduct is regulated is entitled to know what the law re-
quires. Moreover, an unclear law regulating expression creates a substantial risk
of deterring speech that is constitutionally protected. 4 2 Additionally, a vague
law allows judges and juries to impose liability on the basis of their own per-
sonal preferences. 4' Even if it should ultimately be determined that the speech
is protected, "[tlhe threat of sanctions may deter [exercise of first amendment
freedoms] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.' 44 The
threat of expensive litigation acts as a similar deterrent, even where the em-
ployer has confidence that it will ultimately prevail.145
Hostile-environment harassment regulation poses all of the above dangers.
The definition of harassment provided by the EEOC Guidelines is: "[V]erbal
...conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment.' ' 6
The Guidelines speak in terms of both action and consequences. The ac-
tion-"verbal conduct of a sexual nature"-is prohibited when it has the conse-
quence of either "interfering with an individual's work performance" or "creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment." The Supreme
Court in Vinson added the limitation that to be actionable the conduct "must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment.' ,117 These definitions give little notice of what expression is prohibited.148
142. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
143. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566. 575 (1974).
The Court has also recognized as one of the bases of the vagueness doctrine the elimination of selec.
tive enforcement on a constitutionally suspect basis by police. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352. 358
(1983). Although the "selective enforcement" rationale is usually directed towards improper discrimina-
tion by police officers, the same concern applies in the civil context, where disagreement with the message
expressed may allow judges and juries to impose liability for messages of which they disapprove, while
sparing those messages with which they agree. Moreover, that private civil actions are the mechanism for
enforcement of the sexual harassment law increases the likelihood that speech will be challenged on an
improper basis, because the intervention of police or prosecuting attorneys having no personal stake in the
dispute is not required.
144. Button, 371 U.S. at, 433.
145. For example, in Lake v. Baker. 662 F. Supp. 392, 405 (D.D.C. 1987), the court suggested that from the
outset of her employment, plaintiff "embarked on a deliberate plan to expose the blatant sex discrimination that
for some reason she believed would be present, and accordingly incorrectly interpreted every event that occurred
as confirmation of her misguided perceptions"). See also. e.g., Williams-Hill v. Donovan, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13992 *17 (suggesting that plaintiff was attempting to "turn a personal feud into a sex discrimination case by
accusation").
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
147. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
148. A comparison of the notice provided to defamation defendants and harassment defendants is instructive.
A claim for defamation requires a showing of objective fact-that the defendant's statement is factually incorrect,
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 A; a claim for harassment requires satisfaction of a much more nebulous
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The fact that distinguished appellate court judges disagree about whether a
statutory violation can rest in part on a desk plaque stating "Even male chau-
vinist pigs need love,' 149 suggests that those subject to regulation will not be
able to predict whether expression of that general sort is prohibited. On a wide
variety of facts, a judge or jury could find that prohibited harassment did or did
not exist, and only in extreme cases could it fairly be said that the decision was
wrong as a matter of law.'50
Another feature of sexual harassment law that leads to overregulation of
speech is that the existence of a hostile environment is determined by the "total-
ity of the circumstances." The court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., '5 described the standard as follows:
[T]he analysis cannot carve the work environment into a series of discrete incidents
and measure the harm adhering in each episode. Rather, a holistic perspective is nec-
essary, keeping in mind that each successive episode has its predecessors, that the
impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment cre-
ated thereby may exceed the sum of the individual episodes .... It follows naturally
from this proposition that the environment viewed as a whole may satisfy the legal
definition of an abusive working environment although no single episode crosses the
Title VII threshold.152
Although there is compelling logic behind the notion that one must examine the
totality of the environment to determine whether it is hostile, this standard
means that the determination of whether Title VII prohibits a given utterance
depends not only on the content, and context, of that particular statement but
on everything else that has been said, both by the speaker and all of the plain-
tiff's coworkers. Thus, there is no way for an employer to establish narrow rules
about what cannot be said in the workplace, because the mix of expression (and
conduct) that will be called upon to support a harassment claim will be un-
known until the lawsuit comes.
standard-that the statement created an offensive work environment. Moreover, a claim for defamation requires
that the defendant acted at least negligently. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 346-47 (1974). a claim
for harassment is established if the speech has either the "purpose or effect" of creating a hostile environment.
Thus, a potential defamation defendant knows that his speech cannot subject him to liability unless it is both
objectively false and spoken with a culpable mental state. See Hustler Magazine. Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46.52
(1988) (breathing space for expression "is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover
for libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was
made with the requisite level of culpability"). The potential harassment defendant has no such assurance and
must simply hope that all of the statements that are "put in the hopper" at trial will not be enought to convince
the trier of fact that the working environment was sufficiently offensive.
149. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986). cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
150. This is especially true if the subjective reactions of the plaintiff are considered determinative. See, e.g.,
Abrams, supra note 86. at 1213 n.120 (suggesting that "male judges" should not "substitute their perceptions of
the balance of positive and negative messages the plaintiff was receiving" from her coworkers). See also Harris v.
Int'l. Paper Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4340, * 21 (the "fact finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes'" and
employ the standard "of a reasonable black person, as that can be best understood and given meaning by a white
judge").
151. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
152. See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia. 895 F.2d 1469. 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing trial court's
finding that work environment was not hostile, reasoning that the court erroneously failed to "concentrate not on
individual incidents, but on the overall scenario"): Barbetta v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp.. 669 F. Supp. 569, 572
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) ("whether sexual harassment is 'sufficiently pervasive' to constitute a Title VII violation is to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances").
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B. Vicarious Liability
If Title VII regulated offensive speech only directly, substantial restrictions
on protected expression would still occur. However, the system of holding em-
ployers liable for the offending expression of their employees under a vague
standard dramatically increases the chilling effect on constitutionally protected
speech. Employers are generally held liable for a hostile environment if they
knew or should have known of it and failed to take adequate steps to remedy
it.153 That is, the law charges employers with acting as censors of their employ-
ees' speech, and under-censorship carries with it substantial risk to the em-
ployer. The mere existence of anti-harassment policies is not a defense,154 nor is
it necessarily sufficient for an employer to conduct an investigation and act ac-
cording to its good-faith belief in the results of the investigation. Courts have
often required that the employer take extensive steps to prevent further harass-
ment, including discharging the alleged harasser if necessary.155 Even that will
not insulate employers from liability where courts impose automatic vicarious
liability irrespective of notice to the employer or the existence of subsequent
remedial measures. 156
Because of its own liability for the acts of its employees, most employers
have adopted policies to prevent harassment from occurring and to punish it
when it does. 57 That was, of course, the reason for imposing employer liability
153. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350
(6th Cir. 1988) (the law requires "that an employer take prompt action to prevent . . . bigots from expressing
their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-workers"); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir.
1981) ("employer toleration of a discriminatory atmosphere alone gives rise to a cause of action by the plaintiff");
Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1185 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Although we recognize that an employer is
unable to guarantee a working environment uncontaminated by foul invective, the law nonetheless provides that
when an employer knows or reasonably should know that co-workers are harassing an employee because of that
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the employer may not stand idly by."); EEOC v. Murphy
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Minn. 1980) ("strong steps are necessary to ascertain and to
sensitize or, if necessary, discipline the prejudiced clique of employees who were the prime offenders").
154. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
155. See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (company liable for em-
ployee's broadcast of obscenities over P.A. system even though employee told to refrain on ground that "more
than mere verbal chastisements" was needed in order for the employer "forcefully to convey the message" that
such speech would not be tolerated) (quoting DeGrace v. Rumsfcld, 614 F.2d 796. 805 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1980)); Baker
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (employer liable because it knew or should have known of
harassment even though harasser was discharged as soon as upper management learned of it); EEOC v. Murphy
Motor Freight Lines. Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Minn. 1980) (rejecting employer's argument that it had not
taken stronger steps because it might stir up further racial tensions and stating that "strong steps are necessary to
ascertain and to sensitize or. if necessary, discipline the prejudiced clique of employees who were the prime offend-
ers". id. at 385 (employer affirmatively "participated in the harassment by. . . [its] delay in removing the derog-
atory article from the company bulletin board"); Lynch v. Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Iowa 1990) (af-
firming finding of employer liability on ground that employer did not act quickly enough, even though it suspended
harassing coworkers for harassment and supervisor for ineffective supervision after plaintiff's complaints); Cf.
Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) ("Furthermore, even though
such actions were out of character for [the alleged harasser, the division manager] assumed the truth of the
allegations, took prompt remedial measures, and the incidents indisputably stopped. Under such circumstances.
Du Pont will not be held liable for the environment created by [the alleged harasser.]"); Bennett v. Corroon &
Black Corp., 517 So. 2d 1245 (La. App. 1987) (employer not liable for cartoons posted because once notified of
the incident, it investigated and terminated the chief executive officer), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 425 (La. 1988).
156. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
157. See Waks & Starr, Sexual Harassment in the Work Place: The Scope of Employer Liability, 7 EM-
PLOYEE RE. L.J. 369, 385 (1981-82) ("The company should effectively communicate this policy to its supervisory
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in the first place.158 However, the predictable result of imposition of liability on
employers is that expression is stifled to a far greater degree than when the
individual speaker is directly punished, with employers limiting speech of em-
ployees, at least male employees,159 "to that which is unquestionably safe.1160
When an individual's speech is potentially directly punishable, the amount
of speech in which he will engage is a result of two counteracting pressures. On
the one hand, a desire to escape punishment creates a disincentive to engage in
speech; on the other hand, a desire to achieve whatever gratification results
from self-expression creates an incentive to come as close to the line as possible.
The result is that, at least when the legal standards are clear, the amount of
expression that is inadvertently prevented may be minimal.
When liability is imposed on employers for the speech of their employees,
the incentives are somewhat different. The question facing employers, acting
under no constitutional constraints in the private sector, is how much of their
employees' speech to prohibit in the workplace. As with the individual em-
ployee, the employer has an incentive to limit expression-fear of litigation and
punishment. Unlike the individual, however, the employer confronts no counter-
balancing pressure to limit overregulation, at least until the employer's regula-
tion reaches the point at which the restrictions create severe morale problems.
The employer receives little gratification from its employees' free speech, but it
faces litigation costs and damage awards if its efforts to regulate such speech
are deemed inadequate 8 1 The rational employer, therefore, does not prohibit
merely the expression of actually prohibited language; it prohibits, and pun-
ishes, all expression that could even arguably be viewed as impermissible. 62
personnel. If they refrain from sexual harassment themselves, and if they can prevent co-workers from sexually
harassing their fellow employees (i.e., rid the work place of 'the locker room atmosphere'), there will be no con-
duct on which an employer's vicarious liability can be based").
158. Citing the EEOC Guidelines, the court in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), stated:
"The general goal of these Guidelines is preventive. An employer may negate liability by taking immediate and
appropriate corrective action when it learns of any illegal harassment, but the employer should fashion rules
within its firm or agency to ensure that such corrective action never becomes necessary."
Id. at 947 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
159. See Nicolo v. Citibank of New York, 147 Misc. 2d 111, 554 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (male
plaintiff complained that he was discharged for telling obscene stories and displaying obscene materials, while
female employees were not disciplined for similar conduct; complaint dismissed for lack of specificity).
160. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
161. The pressure on employers to censor the speech of their employees will be greatly increased should Title
VII be amended to allow for compensatory and punitive damages. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), would have done just that, but it was vetoed by
President Bush. 136 Cong. Rec. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24. 1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, at this writing
introduced in the House but not the Senate, would do the same. If the rhetoric of the Act's supporters is to be
believed, the "deterrent effect" of Title VII-read "pressure to censor"-will be greatly strengthened.
162. The large number of wrongful discharge actions that have been brought by alleged harassers suggests
that employers have reacted strongly. See, e.g., Walton v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 Wis. 2d 880, 434 N.W.2d 621
(1988) (table) (text at 1988 Wis. App. LEXIS 1010 *5 (1989)) (affirming dismissal of wrongful discharge action
of plaintiff who was discharged for "sexual harassment" based on unspecified "profane language," "sexually sug-
gestive remarks," and "off-color" remarks). Derstein v. Benson, 915 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff dis-
charged for sexual harassment unsuccessful in action alleging denial of due process where he was summarily
discharged without a hearing on the basis of an investigation that did not seek to obtain his side of the story). See
also Eudela v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 30 Ohio App. 3d 113, 506 N.E.2d 947
(1986) (upholding discharge of public employee based upon charges of harassment by female employee whom
employer would not identify and where employer would not specify the times, dates or places of the offending
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Sensitivity to the speech interests of alleged harassers is a risky proposition
for the employer. For example, in Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., the following
letter from one supervisor to another was used against the employer in a case
dealing with harassment of a woman who was involved in a relationship with a
black man and later married him:
Becky, I'm afraid if Sue is entering into this relationship she had better be prepared to
get snide remarks from just about anyone and everyone. I don't think inter-marriages
are accepted in our society today and although you and I certainly would not say
anything, I am not sure we can keep our staff from saying things. I am not sure that
we could fire them on the basis of their remarks. You had better check with [the
company lawyer] and see if he agrees with what I am saying.16 3
The court found that this memo was "[t]he most convincing evidence of Glick's
toleration of the harassment" and "ample evidence of an intent to discriminate
against [plaintiff] on the basis of her race because it shows that Glick would not
act against [plaintiff's] harassers due to an intolerance for interracial relation-
ships.'1 4 Faced with such judicial attitudes, it is not surprising that employers
have tended not to be overly concerned with employee free speech.
If it were clear what expression was prohibited by harassment laws-for
example, if only certain specified words were banned-the law would not en-
courage employers to "overcensor" by forbidding what the law did not. How-
ever, any statute that was specific enough as to provide reasonable notice of
what was prohibited would likely have only a trivial effect on working environ-
ments since creative substitutes for the prohibited words could be employed. It
is the in terrorem effect of a vague standard that is largely responsible for the
aggressive reaction of employers. Moreover, the fluidity of the standard adds to
the chilling effect created by its vagueness. In Ellison v. Brady,1e the court
conduct). Cf. Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280 (1988) (affirming judgment for plaintiff in
wrongful discharge action by accused harasser because evidence that investigation was inadequate could justify
jury finding that employer lacked reasonable grounds to discharge), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3163 (1989).
Although one's initial reaction might be that the availability of a wrongful discharge action acts as a counter
to employer overregulation, that is not so. First, such protection is not available to at-will employees. Second, and
more important, just-cause protection is largely procedural. That is, the employee may challenge a discharge on
the grounds that he had insufficient notice that his conduct would subject him to discharge or that he did not
engage in the conduct for which he was discharged. However, an employer has the right to prohibit conduct that
would not amount to sexual harassment, and there is little, if any, judicial inquiry into the merits of such a rule.
See, e.g., Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983) (upholding
discharge of employee for violating non-fraternization policy by engaging in consensual sexual relationship with
fellow employee, reasoning that purpose of policy was in part to avoid claims of sexual harassment).
163. 621 F. Supp. 244, 259 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
164. Id. at 275. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *85 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (holding employer liable for refusing the plaintiff's request to order sexual pictures taken down; the
employer had responded that "the men had 'constitutional rights' to post the pictures"); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic
Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1252 (6th Cir. 1985) (Mexican-American supervisor who complained to personnel
manager that subordinates called him a "'wetback" was told that it was nothing but "shop talk" but that if he
wanted to pursue charges of insubordination he should "build a case" against the union employees: sufficient to
establish employer liability), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355. 1359
(I Ith Cir. 1982) (plaintiff was told that the use of racial terms in the workplace that were not directed at him
were "just something a black man would have to deal with in the South"; sufficient to establish employer liabil-
ity); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 906 (Ist Cir. 1988) ("Dr. Gonzalez' dismissal of these
anti-female remarks as mere 'jest' may demonstrate his insensitivity to them.").
165. 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991).
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noted that "[c]onduct considered harmless by many today may be considered
discriminatory in the future."""6 In response to the concern that the "reasonable
woman" standard that it adopted would not address conduct that some women
find offensive, the court provided the consolation: "Fortunately, the reasonable-
ness standard which we adopt today is not static. As the views of reasonable
women change, so too does the Title VII standard of behavior."'61 7 What the
Ellison court failed to realize is that the "evolving standard" approach is a one-
way ratchet that leads inevitably to increasing censorship. It will be the rare
utterance that is actionable today but not actionable tomorrow; the law itself
affects attitudes about what is reasonable, and one of those attitudes is that
speech that is actionable should not be expressed. Thus, the standard will sel-
dom recede. On the other hand, expression that is not actionable today will be
held actionable tomorrow by analogy and extension both because courts will be
unable to articulate a principled basis for distinguishing the already-banned
speech from the challenged speech and because of the pride that courts often
take in being in the vanguard of our evolving standards of decency.
An example of the existing pressure for censorship is contained in a guide
for employers prepared by the Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. The guide advises employers that
sexual harassment is "any unwanted attention of a sexual nature that occurs in
the process of working or seeking work and jeopardizes a person's ability to earn
a living."' 8 Harassment, advises the Committee, "ranges from annoying or dis-
tracting comments to acts of intimidation, threats, and demands involving sex-
ual conduct."' 69 Lest employers conclude that comments in the workplace are
trivial and unworthy of employer intervention, the booklet goes on to warn that
"[a]cts that may appear to the bystander to be humorous or insignificant may
be disturbing and distracting from the victim's perspective-sufficiently so to
lead to a decline in work performance or a rise in absenteeism.' 7 0 Finally, it
warns employers of the risks of permitting any conduct or expression that even
arguably constitutes sexual harassment:
Sexual harassment is illegal and employees are increasingly filing complaints against
their employers. Defending lawsuits is time-consuming and costly, even when the em-
ployer wins, and can be even more costly if the employer loses. Steps taken to prevent
sexual harassment from occurring in your workplace can be well worth the time and
effort involved.171
166. Id. at 879 n.12.
167. Id.
168. Massachusetts Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment on the Job. A
Guide for Employers 7 (1983).
169. Id. Strauss reports that the Los Angeles Commission on the Status of Women has proposed banning
"all unwelcome written, verbal, or physical contact with suggestive overtones, including suggestive letters, jokes,
displays of suggestive objects, pictures, cartoons, and posters. Strauss, supra note I, at 3.
170. See supra note 168.
171. Id. at 9. The booklet also recommends that employers conduct a survey of employees to determine
wshether they believe that they have been subjected to sexual harassment. The definition of sexual harassment
provided by the questionnaire includes "[a] ttention of a sexual nature (degrading comments, propositions, jokes or
tricks, etc.) that you do not want" and "annoying or degrading remarks about sex." A suggested sexual harass-
ment policy would prohibit "falbusing the dignity of an employee through insulting or degrading sexual remarks
or conduct." Id. at 18.
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The above example is not meant to suggest that employers are receiving
bad legal advice when they are advised to adopt stringent measures to combat
harassment. On the contrary, in today's legal environment employers should be
encouraged to prevent employees from making comments that are even argua-
bly offensive and to refrain from "shop talk" and off-color, racial, or ethnic
jokes. 72 The soundness of the advice underscores the extraordinary chilling ef-
fect of the law.
Given the pressures on employers, it is not surprising that they have re-
sponded forcefully; yet, even when they appear to have acted entirely reasona-
bly, they still cannot avoid the burden of litigation. In Tunis v. Corning Glass
Works,' 3 for example, the plaintiff complained to the plant manager about
photographs of "naked or nearly naked women in sexually suggestive poses dis-
played on the walls," telling him that the EEOC had informed her that such
displays were illegal. The manager toured not just the plaintiff's work area, but
the entire plant as well, and ordered a supervisor to take down the materials
that he had seen and to make another tour of the area to look for any material
that he might have missed. A week later, the plaintiff complained that offensive
photographs were still on display. The plant manager sent the supervisor back
out to look for them, but he could not find any. The manager then instructed
the supervisor to have the plaintiff show him where the pictures were. They
located a postcard on the inside cover of the tool box of one of the maintenance
employees, and it was ordered removed.
Plaintiff's presence when the postcard was found exposed her as the cause
of the removal of the photographs throughout the plant. Thereafter, whenever
she visited areas of the plant from which the pictures were removed, she was
subjected to "whistles, catcalls and grunts." Plaintiff then complained about the
whistling to the plant manager, who personally went to the area to speak to the
union representative and to several supervisors and employees he regarded as
influential, urging them to cooperate in having the conduct stopped. Apparently
the whistling did not stop, but because the plaintiff could not identify who was
responsible, management took no further action beyond announcing that such
conduct was inappropriate.
Tunis had also complained about the use of sex-based job titles, such as
"foreman" and "draftsman." Although the titles had been formally changed by
the company to sex-neutral terms, employees continued to use the old terms in
conversation. Tunis repeatedly interrupted conversations-even ones to which
she was not party-to correct the speakers if gender-based terminology was
used, and she even went to such lengths as crossing out gender-based terms in a
logbook, which resulted in the entries not making sense. Because of Tunis' com-
172. One reason for such caution is that even if a plaintiff is not offended by the speech at the time, harass-
ment actions often arise after discipline or discharge. See Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co.. 858 F.2d 345. 347 (6th
Cir. 1988) (plaintiff was repeatedly disciplined, and when termination appeared immminent, he filed a racial
harassment charge), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989). Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924 (5th
Cir. 1982) (racial terms bandied about with no apparent hostility; plaintiff later quit after being given a job
assignment he did not want and brought an action alleging constructive discharge based upon racial harassment).
173. 747 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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plaint, the plant manager sent out a memorandum stating that sex-based termi-
nology "was no longer appropriate."
After later being discharged for poor performance, Tunis filed a Title VII
action, alleging that the photographs, the whistles and catcalls, and the gender-
based terminology created a hostile environment, and the case actually went to
trial. 17 4 Although the court ultimately ruled against the plaintiff, it did so not
because the conduct complained of did not violate Title VII, but because of the
employer's remedial actions. As to the pin-ups, the court observed that the pic-
tures were immediately taken down from the walls, and the existence of the
postcard in the toolbox was "insufficient to support a conclusion that defendant
failed to take reasonable remedial action promptly." Addressing the use of gen-
der-based terminology by employees, the court was ambiguous about whether in
the absence of an effective employer response it would violate Title VII.1'" Fi-
nally, turning to the whistles and catcalls, the court suggested that in the ab-
sence of an effective employer response, plaintiff would prevail: "No female em-
ployee should be required to confront whistling, catcalls or other sexually
suggestive noises from male employees, individually or in groups." However,
"[s]ince prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to resolve the problem
was taken, a claim of sexual harassment based on this complaint under Title
VII cannot prevail."
Cases like Tunis send strong messages to employers. In Tunis, the em-
ployer did everything right and was commended by the court for having gone to
such lengths to stifle the expression of its employees: the employer prohibited
employees from having sexual postcards in their tool boxes, from referring in
casual conversation to "foremen" and "draftsmen," and from addressing
whistles and catcalls to the person responsible for the restriction of their expres-
sion. Although the court declined to decide whether the pictures and the gen-
der-based language would have violated Title VII in the absence of an effective
employer response, the message to employers is the same as if the court had
found a violation: 17 6 employers seeking to escape liability should restrict the
expression of their employees, and if they seek to escape litigation altogether,
they should be very aggressive in imposing those restrictions.
The chilling effect created by the legal regime applicable to hostile-environ-
ment cases is brought into stark relief by the remedial orders issued in some
174. A summary judgment motion by the employer had previously been denied. Tunis v. Corning Glass
Works. 698 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
175, Tunis, 747 F. Supp, at 959 (In the first sentence of the paragraph, the court stated that use of the
terminology did not "constitute a Title VII violation," but most of the rest of the paragraph deals with the
employer's remedial measures.).
176. The approach taken by the Tunis court-declining to decide whether particular expression violates Title
VII-is a common tack. While it is generally appropriate for courts to decide no more than they need to, this
approach has led to a great deal of uncertainty of what the law requires, which, once again, exacerbates the
chilling effect. See. e.g., Harlow v. Kansas City, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8473 *4 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (stating that
coworker's use of foul language "including 'the "F' word' . . . asshole and bastard ... may or may not consti-
tute sexual harassment." but declining to decide because the employer's summary judgment motion was denied
based upon other incidents); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1990) (stating that claim of
religious harassment based upon statements to the effect that Catholics are stupid and have a lot of kids was a
"close one," but the issue need not be decided because the employer's response was adequate).
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harassment cases. For example, in Snell v. Suffolk County,177 the court, after
finding a racially hostile atmosphere, established "an absolute prohibition on
racial 'joking.'" Asserting that "a radical shock to the mores" was needed, the
court continued:
Whatever prejudice may manifest itself in society at large, Congress has flatly ruled
that it will not be allowed in the workplace in the United States. Prejudice, whether
blatant or subtle, whether practiced by those wearing blue collars or white collars,
whether the expression of those wearing correction officers' uniforms or grey flannel
suits, will not be tolerated when directed against employees in the workplace.
It then issued the following injunction:
The warden "shall forbid the use by correction officers on any County property and on
all County business of: (1) epithets such as 'nigger,' 'polack,' 'kike,' 'spic,' 'guinea,'
'honky,' 'mick,' 'coon,' and 'black bitch' (all of which have been used on the job by
correction officers in recent years); (2) posting or distribution of derogatory bulletins,
cartoons, and other written material; (3) mimicking officers because of what some
correction officers may believe to be stereotypical characteristics of minorities; and (4)
any racial, ethnic, or religious slurs, whether in the form of 'jokes,' 'jests,' or
otherwise.
178
Despite the extraordinary breadth of this prior restraint, the court's recognition
of the first amendment implications of its order was limited to the statement
that "[flor reasons beyond the scope of this opinion, the First Amendment does
not bar appropriate relief in the instant case of discrimination in the
workplace." ' '
V. HARASSMENT REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
First amendment principles are fully applicable to claims for hostile-envi-
ronment harassment under Title VII.180 Although the primary method of en-
177. 611 F. Supp. 521, 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
178. Id. at 532. See also Berkman v. New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (issuing "a decree
prohibiting defendants, their officers, and employees from further sexual discrimination and harassment interfer-
ing with their training and work and requiring defendants to take active steps to assure that neither the particular
acts of discrimination revealed by this trial record nor other acts of discrimination repeat themselves"). Among
the incidents complained of in Berkman was a cartoon showing a woman firefighter standing at a urinal. Id. at
231 n.7. Presumably all cartoons having any sexual overtones at all are encompassed by the court's decree. Simi-
larly in Sanchez v. Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989), a case in which the plaintiff complained of,
inter alia, references to women as "broads" and the posting of pictures from Playboy and Penthouse, the court
issued an injunction requiring the employer to cease any "conduct herein described or related thereto."
179. Snell v. Suffolk Co., 611 F. Supp. at 531.
180. It should be noted that this Article does not deal with the question of the extent to which a governmen-
tal employer qua employer may regulate offensive speech of its employees. As the Supreme Court stated in Pick-
ering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), "it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."
The uncontroversial statement from Pickering was ignored, however, by the court in Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *159-60 (M.D. Fla. 1991), where the court reasoned that it had
the power to regulate the speech of private-sector employees to the same extent that a government employer can
regulate the speech of its own employees:
[Tihe public employee speech cases lend a supportive analogy. If this Court's decree is conceptualized as a
governmental directive concerning workplace rules that an employer must carry out, then the present
inquiry is informed by the limits of a governmental employer's power to enforce workplace rules impinging
on free speech rights. In the public employee speech cases, the interests of the employee in commenting on
[Vol. 52:481
1991] TITLE VII CENSORSHIP
forcement of the harassment prohibition is through civil actions between private
parties, imposition of liability by the courts under federal and state statutes
easily falls within the definition of "state action." Just as the first amendment
limits the outlines of state civil actions between private parties for libel,181 tor-
tious interference with business relations,'18 2 and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress,' 83 the first amendment governs state and federal courts in their
decisions concerning liability for expression deemed harassing. The fact that the
enforcement mechanism is through the civil courts rather than the criminal
courts does not make the statute any less a burden on first amendment rights. 18 4
Just as there is no state-action impediment to a first amendment challenge,
there is no problem with an employer's "standing" to assert a first amendment
defense. 8 5 Although it might appear at first glance that the employer is assert-
ing its employees' constitutional rights rather than its own, that is not so for
several reasons. First, there is not even an issue of standing when the employer's
liability for supervisory harassment is premised on the theory that the supervi-
sor is the agent of the employer, because the employer is being called to answer
for "its own" conduct. Second, when liability is imposed because of the em-
ployer's failure to censor its employees, the employer is raising not only its em-
ployees' first amendment rights but its own as well.' 88 That is, the employer is
arguing that a law that holds it liable for failing to censor protected speech
violates its own first amendment rights. The government may no more compel a
person to censor the protected speech of those over whom he has control on the
ground that the government finds it offensive, than the government may compel
protected matters is balanced against the employer's interests in maintaining discipline and order in the
workplace. When an employee's exercise of free expression undermines the morale of the workforce, the
employer may discipline or discharge the employee without violating the first amendment. Analogously.
the Court may. without violating the first amendment, require that a private employer curtail the free
expression in the workplace of some employees in order to remedy the demonstrated harm inflicted on
other employees.
(Citations omitted). This is a truly bizarre argument. The government employer enjoys greater authority to regu-
late the speech of its own employees because it is acting as an employer rather than as a regulator. Acceptance of
the Robinson court's reasoning-that anything a government agency may do in its proprietary capacity, a court
may enforce against private parties-would dramatically increase the reach of governmental power.
181. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
182. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
183. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
184. Monetary awards in civil cases often dwarf the size of a criminal fine for the same conduct. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 277 (1964) (civil judgment a thousand times greater than maximum
penalty provided by relevant criminal statute). Also, the exercise of discretion by prosecutors, who are at least in
theory objective, will often weed out weak cases, but a civil plaintiff's hope for a "pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow." either by way of judgment or settlement, may prompt the filing of a case that no prosecutor would even
consider.
185. Although my colleague Robert Sedler has argued that it is incorrect to view this as a standing is-
sue-arguing instead that the question ofjus tertii is a wholly separate doctrine-the term "standing" is used
here because that is the term used in common parlance. See Sedlcr, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A
Substantive Approach. 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1308, 1315-19 (1982).
186. Under the Supreme Court's precedents, the employer probably could raise the argument that the law
violates the first amendment rights of its employees. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190. 192-93 (1976)
(permitting a bar owner to "rely upon the equal protection objections of males 18-20 years of age to establish her
claim of unconstitutionality" of a state law that prohibited the sale of beer to males under age 21 and females
under age 18).
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a person to express a message that he chooses not to express. 87 In any event,
the employer is free to argue for a narrow construction of Title VII to avoid
constitutional problems, even if such a construction is necessary only to protect
third parties. That is, the employer has standing to argue to the court, "You
should not interpret Title VII in this way, because if you do it will result in an
impairment of my employees' first amendment rights."' 18 8 Employers need not
show that the specific acts of speech for which they are punished are protected
by the first amendment. Under the doctrine of overbreadth, even one who en-
gages in unprotected expression may mount a facial challenge to a law that
inhibits a substantial amount of legally protected expression of others who may
refrain from the expression rather than risk prosecution. 189
The failure of courts to consider first amendment principles in harassment
cases is understandable, if for no other reason than that defendants seldom raise
the issue.'90 Even when courts address the issue, however, they have tended to
dismiss it summarily.' 9' Yet, hostile-environment harassment regulation poses a
far greater threat to expression than other restrictions that receive far more
attention, such as prohibition of flag-burning.' 9 ' Labelling a statement "racist"
or "sexist" might in some circumstances be the point at which analysis should
begin, but it cannot be the point at which it ends.
Had courts squarely faced the first amendment issue in hostile-environment
cases, they could not have employed the EEOC Guidelines as they did without
creating a new exception to the first amendment. The standard for hostile-envi-
ronment harassment cases is strongly viewpoint-based and can be upheld only
187. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
188. Thus, the court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 794, at *154-55
(M.D. Fla. 1991), missed the point in asserting that because the employer had "disavowed that it seeks to express
itself through the sexually-oriented pictures or the verbal harassment by its employees . . . [n]o first amendment
concern arises." Under this reasoning, the unconstitutionality of a state law allowing prosecution of parents for the
anti-war protests of their children could not be asserted in a criminal prosecution of the parents because the
expression of the parents was not being punished.
189. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491. 503 (1985).
190. See Note. The Harms of Asking, 55 U. Cmt. L. REv. 328, 351 n.93 (1988) ("No defendant has argued
in a reported case that his conduct is constitutionally protected").
191. See, e.g., Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 757
(1990), which summarily rejected a first amendment defense not on the basis of first amendment precedent, but
on the basis of the Supreme Court's statement in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that Title V II
"affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
sult." Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("For reasons beyond the scope of this
opinion, the first amendment does not bar appropriate relief in the instant case of discrimination in the work-
place"); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (acknowledging that in other
circumstances, the first amendment might be implicated). Cf. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.. 584 F. Supp. 419, 431
(E.D. Mich. 1984). afd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987):
[Tihe court need only decide whether the complained of conduct was "verbal conduct of a sexual nature."
At once it must be recognized that a constitutional First Amendment issue is raised. This issue can be
framed as follows: can Title VII prohibit people from verbally expressing themselves with language that is
not "obscene" under the legal definition of the term?
The district court in Rabidue found it unnecessary to resolve the question, because it found that the expression at
issue did not violate Title VII.
192. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). A law prohibiting flag-burning prohibits only one discrete
expression of a particular message. Any other communication of the same idea in the same place and with the
same intensity is permitted. The same cannot be said of harassment regulation.
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by a showing of a government interest of the highest order. No currently recog-
nized first amendment doctrine can explain the analysis in these cases.
A. Labor Speech
If any single aspect of first amendment law could be identified as the pri-
mary cause of the silence greeting the restriction of expression under Title VII,
it is the assumption that the first amendment has no application in the work-
place. Courts have assumed, without much explanation, that even if the speech
involved would be protected if uttered in the street, the workplace is sufficiently
different from the street that a greater degree of regulation is permissible. 193
Although the Supreme Court has endorsed a higher degree of regulation of
speech in the workplace in limited situations, none of its precedents in this area
supports the view that the speech at issue in harassment cases is entitled to
diminished protection. Indeed, the reflexive assumption that speech in the work-
place is not constitutionally protected is a classic illustration of Cardozo's dic-
tum that "[t]he half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate them-
selves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings
it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or
forgotten." 19'
The assertion that there is no general right of free speech in the workplace
is based primarily upon NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,195 in which the Supreme
Court upheld an order of the National Labor Relations Board requiring an em-
ployer to bargain with a union that had lost an election. The Board had issued
193. See, e.g.. Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 n.13 (I Ith Cir. 1987) (the whole
point of the sexual harassment claim often is the abusiveness in the workplace of behavior which may be accept-
able in other social relationships); Snell v. Suffolk County. 611 F. Supp. 521. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (although
"[c]oncern about privacy interests suggests that the courts not become involved in policing what citizens say and
do in their homes and at social gatherings . . . [t~he workplace is different because it is governed by Congress's
mandate that discrimination in employment will no longer be tolerated in this country"); Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852. 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down on first amendment grounds a university policy
prohibiting harassment of students, but suggesting in dictum that "speech which creates a hostile or abusive
working environment on the basis of race or sex" is unprotected). See also Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment. 1986 DUKE LJ. 589. 613 ("First amendment law contains several categories of speech that are
subject to ban or regulation even though they are viewpoint-based. . . . [T~he most obvious example can be found
in labor law"); Post, Correspondence. The Perils of Conceptualism: A Response to Professor Fallon, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1744, 1746 (1990) ("speech that is appropriately protected when it occurs within public discourse is also
appropriately regulated as racial or sexual harassment when it occurs within the context of an employment
relationship").
In an article devoted entirely to the topic of first amendment implications of racist and sexist speech, the
complete discussion of workplace harassment is as follows:
When racist and sexist speech is part of a transactional setting, such as harassment in the workplace, it
may be regulated. The only First Amendment inquiry is into the bona fides of the purported transactional
rationale. As long as we are satisfied that the rule is indeed genuinely transactional, it normally will be
upheld.
Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech. 47 WASI. & LEE L. REV.
171. 197 (1990). While that argument may be correct as applied to settings that are truly transactional, such as
quid pro quo harassment, it is not correct as applied to hostile-environment harassment. There is a qualitative
difference between prohibiting attempts to barter sex for job benefits and prohibiting speech that is deemed
offensive.
194. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373, 159 N.E. 173, 174
(1927).
195. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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the bargaining order because the company president had made truthful state-
ments during the union's organizing drive to the effect that selection of the
union could lead to the closing of the employer's plant or a transfer of opera-
tions if the union called a strike. The Court reasoned that "an employer's rights
cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely" and that
because of the disparity in power between employers and employees even rela-
tively moderate truthful statements could be perceived as coercive.'9 6 As a re-
sult, the Court held that the employer's right to expression could be limited to
predictions that are "carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey
an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his
control."'' 97
The reasoning of Gissel does not support a general governmental right to
regulate speech in the workplace. Regulation in the context of representation
elections is justified by the "strong governmental interest in certain forms of
economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect
on the rights of speech and association."' 98 Regulation is intended to maintain
the balance between labor and management by prohibiting speech that may be
deemed threatening or coercive. 199
The speech prohibited by Gissel is analytically similar to blackmail. That
is, the employer and the blackmailer both say, "If you don't do X (vote no; pay
me money), I will do Y (close the plant; reveal your secrets)." The employer
196. Id. at 618 ("a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion ... [is] without the protec-
tion of the First Amendment").
197. Id.
The Court's decision in Gissel suffers from several inadequacies. For example, the Court did not explain why
the employer's right to express himself free from government interference-a fundamental constitutional right-is
only "equal" to the employees' right to associate free from private interference-which is, after all, only a statu-
tory right. More fundamentally, the Court provided little justification for the Board's position that a representa-
tion election must be conducted under "laboratory" conditions. As Julius Getman has argued, "The laboratory
conditions doctrine rests ultimately upon the assumption that free choice is fragile-that it will be undermined by
the type of robust debate encouraged by the first amendment in other areas." Getman, Labor Law and Free
Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4, 12 (1984).
198. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (emphasis added).
199. The Court has also upheld restrictions on union speech in the form of picketing and secondary boycott,
both of which the Court has also tended to view as coercive. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) ("Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated"); NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694,
705 (1951)) ("Congress may prohibit secondary picketing ... [which] spreads labor discord by coercing a neu-
tral party to join the fray").
In other labor settings, robust expression has been the rule. For example, in the context of a labor dispute, the
Court has recognized that language is "often vituperative, abusive, and inexact." See Old Dominion Branch No.
496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974) (federal labor law, based on principles of the first amendment. "gives a
union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes
such rhetoric to be an effective means to make its point"); see also id. (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that it is
not federal labor law, but the first amendment, that gives unions that right). Cf. Nash v. Texas, 632 F. Supp. 951,
956 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (striking down the Texas mass picketing statute which prohibited "insulting, threaten-
ing, or obscene language" used "to interfere with, hinder, obstruct, intimidate" or to seek to do the same to
another person "in the exercise of his lawful right to work" on the ground that it prohibited more than fighting
words).
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and the blackmailer may have every right to do "Y," 200 but the government
may prohibit the transaction-the exaction of X as the price of forbearance.
While such reasoning does support regulation of quid pro quo harassment
claims-where the employer is saying, in effect, "If you don't sleep with me, I
will fire you"-it does not support regulation of offensive speech.201
Offensive speech is quite different from the speech involved in the labor
cases. Far from having an "incidental effect" on the right of speech, regulation
of offensive speech has as its primary purpose the limitation of "offensive" ex-
pression, often in the form of "offensive" ideas, that has no relation to any
threat of future action. Although advocates of such regulation may argue that
there is no desire to censor ideas, only to guarantee equal participation of
women or blacks in the workplace, the fact remains that the purpose of the
regulation is to prohibit expression because of the ideology expressed.
Even if the reasoning of Gissel could be extended to some offensive speech
in the workplace, it is difficult to see how it could be extended to cases involving
harassment by coworkers. Gissel relied heavily on the inequality of power be-
tween employer and employee to justify the restriction on employer expression.
Harassment by coworkers, or, a fortiori, subordinates, does not involve such an
imbalance in power.
Robert Post has suggested a somewhat different justification for limiting
speech in the workplace. 02 Although he argues that limitations on racist speech
in "public discourse" are highly suspect, he asserts that speech in the workplace
does not generally constitute public discourse. 20 3 Post defines "public discourse"
as "encompassing the communicative processes necessary for the formation of
public opinion, whether or not that opinion is directed toward specific govern-
mental personnel, decisions, or policies. ' '204 However, asserts Post, "within the
workplace.. .an image of dialogue among autonomous self-governing citizens
would be patently out of place. '205
Post's argument seems to presuppose that the communication contributing
to public opinion is largely limited to the press, handbillers on public streets,
and fiery orators in the parks. Yet, for most citizens-who are not political
activists-the great bulk of their discussion of political and social issues proba-
bly occures in the home and the workplace. For example, there are probably
very few workers in the United States who did not discuss the Gulf War while
200. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965) ("when an
employer closes his entire business, even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such
action is not an unfair labor practice").
201. The court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *155 (M.D. Fla.
1991), mistakenly asserted that "the speech at issue is indistinguishable from the speech that comprises a crime,
such as threats of violence or blackmail .... " an assertion facilitated by the court's belief that the speech was
not protected because it constitutes "discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment." As dis-
cussed below, see infra, text accompanying notes 250-54, infra, speech does not become "conduct" simply because
it has effects. After all, the only reason that anyone would want to regulate any speech is the perception that the
speech produces tangible adverse consequences.
202. See Post, supra note 2.
203. Id. at 289 nn. 112-13.
204. Id. at 288.
205. Id. at 289.
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at work. Presumably, Post would argue for protection of those discussions under
the first amendment, and I would hope he would do so even if the discussions
offended workers having Iraqi citizenship. If he would protect those discussions,
it is difficult to understand why he would withdraw similar protection for speech
that conveys ideas offensive to women and minorities.
Post's suggestion that workplace speech is not public discourse places too
much emphasis on where the speech takes place and too little emphasis on the
content of the speech. As Post acknowledges, "[s]peech that can be said to be
about matters of 'public concern' is ordinarily classified as public discourse.
'206
It should not lose the protection of the first amendment simply because someone
chose to express it on private property.
In sum, the term "workplace" is not a talisman that extinguishes first
amendment protections. Just as schoolchildren "do not shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," 207 workers
do not shed theirs at the factory gate.20 8 The Supreme Court has narrowly lim-
ited the circumstances in which expression in the workplace may be regulated,
and those circumstances have no relevance to hostile-environment harassment
cases.
B. Captive Audience
A separate justification, though related to the labor speech argument, is
that limitations on offensive speech in the workplace are justified because em-
ployees constitute a captive or unwilling audience and therefore lack the free-
dom that they would enjoy on the street to avoid the offensive speech. 209
Heightened restrictions on expression could therefore be warranted to protect
them. 10 However, the Supreme Court's captive-audience cases do not reach this
far.
206. Id. at 288.
207. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
208. Paradoxically, the government has been permitted less leeway in regulating the speech or public-sector
employees-where it is acting in its capacity as an employer-than it has been accorded in regulating the speech
of private-sector employees- where it is acting in its capacity as a regulator. It is difficult to understand how the
state acting as regulator can forbid the statement that "'niggers ought to be shot like [Vernon Jordan] was," see
Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985), when the government acting as employer
cannot forbid an employee's statement that she hopes the next attempt on the president's life is successful, see
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). Put another way, it is difficult to understand why an employer in the
private sector must punish such speech, while an employer in the public sector must not.
209. Strauss, supra note I. at 5 ("Employees at work constitute a captive audience and the state has an
interest in protecting these individuals from unwanted and unavoidable exposure to noxious ideas"); Delgado,
supra note 3, at 174; Abrams, supra note 86, at 1212 n.l 18:
Pornography in the workplace may be far more threatening to women workers than it is to the world at
large. . . . Moreover, while publicly disseminated pornography may influence all viewers, it remains the
expression of the editors of Penthouse or Hustler or the directors of Deep Throat. On the wall of an office,
it becomes the expression of a coworker or supervisor as well.
210. In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *158 (M.D. Fla. 1991). the
court held that harassing speech could be regulated under the captive-audience doctrine, but its entire doctrinal
discussion was the following:
The free speech guarantee admits great latitude in protecting captive audiences from offensive speech.
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-51
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The Supreme Court has been most receptive to the captive-audience argu-
ment in the context of the home.211 For example, in Frisby v. Schultz, 21 2 the
Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting focused picketing in front of a particular
residence as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. The Court observed
that "[t]he State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy
of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society."2 '
However, before deciding that this interest of the "highest order" was legiti-
mately being protected, the Court first went to some length to demonstrate that
the ordinance was content neutral.21 4 The Court similarly recognized the sanc-
tity of the home in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,"5 which
upheld a statute permitting persons having received "pandering advertisements"
for "erotically arousing or sexually provocative" materials to request the Post
Office to require mailers to stop future mailings to the addressee. Rejecting a
first amendment challenge based upon the mailers' right to communicate with
the unwilling addressee, the Court relied on the "individual autonomy" of the
householder, stating: "That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we
must be captives everywhere. 21 6
Some commentators have relied upon Lehman v. Shaker Heights... for the
principle that the government may protect employees in the workplace on a
captive-audience theory.2 18 In Lehman, the Court affirmed a city rule against
political advertising on city-owned buses. After noting that buses are not public
forums and that the city was acting in its proprietary capacity, the Court held
(1976) (plurality opinion); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (plurality
opinion).
211. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("Although in many locations, we expect individuals
simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is different") (citation omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
214. Those challenging the ordinance argued that because of a state law protecting labor picketing, there
must be an implied exception to the ordinance for labor picketing. 487 U.S. at 481. Under Police Dept. of Chi-
cago v. Mosley, 408 U.S, 92 (1972), an ordinance prohibiting picketing generally but singling out labor picketing
for protection is a content-based restriction. The Court in Frisby rejected the contention that an implied exception
existed and thus found the ordinance content neutral.
215, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
216. Id. at 738. On the "captive audience" point, the Court in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15. 21 (1971)
recognized in dictum the special status of the home: "government may properly act in many situations to prohibit
intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the
public dialogue."
The Court has also upheld restrictions on the use of sound trucks, upholding an ordinance banning amplifica-
tion devices emitting loud and raucous noises" on vehicles. Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). That ordi-
nance was justified by "the need for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting
noises" of such vehicles. Id. at 89. On the other hand, in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Court
struck down an ordinance requiring prior approval of the police chief to operate sound trucks on the ground that
the regulatory system allowed the police chief unbridled discretion to deny a permit because of the content of the
ideas expressed.
217. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
218. See Strauss, supra note I, at 12-13; Note. Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional Inflic-
tion of Entotional Distress, 17 CAP. U L. REv. 245, 268 (1988) ("if the first amendment does not prohibit a state
from banning a benign political message to a captive audience on a bus, it is difficult to conceive how it could
preclude a state from attempting to control hostile and injurious messages to a captive audience in the
workplace").
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that the city's interest in avoiding appearances of endorsement and in protecting
riders from "the blare of political propaganda" justified the ordinance.21 The
Court also pointed to the practical problems of a contrary ruling, which would
turn displays in all public buildings into "Hyde Parks open to every would-be
pamphleteer and politician. '220
Lehman does not support the argument that because employees are a "cap-
tive audience," speech directed toward them is entitled to reduced protection. In
Lehman the city was acting in its proprietary, rather than its regulatory, capac-
ity. Lehman might have provided some support if it had approved a city regula-
tion prohibiting political advertising in privately owned buses. In such a case,
the ordinance would not be supported by the city's attempt to avoid appear-
ances of endorsement or by the concern that all public displays would be con-
verted into public forums. Instead, the ordinance would be supported only by
the government's interest in protecting its citizens from the "blare of political
propaganda," plainly an invalid governmental interest. If Lehman authorizes
governmental regulation of harassing speech in the private workplace, it must
similarly provide support for regulation of political speech in the private work-
place, which, after all was the form of speech involved in that case. However, it
seems inconceivable that the first amendment would allow a state to prohibit
employees from engaging in political speech in the private workplace under a
captive-audience rationale.221
A critical distinction between the prohibition in Lehman and prohibitions
of racially and sexually offensive speech is that, though content based in that it
distinguished between political and nonpolitical speech, the regulation in Leh-
man was viewpoint neutral: it prohibited all political advertising. The harass-
ment cases, on the other hand, are selective in terms of the viewpoints that are
prohibited and are more analogous to a ban on political advertising by extremist
candidates but not by mainstream candidates. 212
The underinclusiveness of the hostile-environment harassment ban-that is,
its limitation to only certain forms of offensive speech-also casts doubt on its
entitlement to the captive-audience exception. In Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,223
219. 418 U.S. at 304.
220. Id.
221. But see Strauss, supra note I, at 35 ("Even political speech cannot be forced on an unwilling listener
when the listener is captive"). Cf. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers. 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding Hatch Act, which restricts the right of federal employees to participate in partisan
political activity).
Strauss' argument seems to be based on the incorrect assumption that if a listener cannot avoid speech, the
government may step in to regulate it. However, the Supreme Court in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205.
210 (1975), addressed that contention in words equally applicable to the present discussion:
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and
ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political
and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types
of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer.
222. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-19, at 950 n.24 (observing that "the concept of a
'captive audience' is dangerously encompassing, and the Court has properly been reluctant to accept its implica-
tions whenever a regulation is not content-neutral").
223. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting the exhibition of films contain-
ing nudity on drive-in movie screens visible from a public street. The Court
rejected the city's claim that its goal was to further the goal of traffic safety,
because the city did not aim to protect citizens from all movies that might dis-
tract motorists; instead, it singled out films containing nudity.22' Similarly, reg-
ulation of harassment cannot be justified on the basis that it attempts to shelter
workers from offensive speech in the workplace, since it singles out racial and
sexual offense, and leaves other forms of offense unregulated. 225
None of the captive-audience cases supports suppression of speech that is
deemed "harassing" under Title VII because none of these cases involves sup-
pression of speech because of the government's disagreement with the idea ex-
pressed or the government's belief that the message was inherently harmful. 228
In the harassment context, comments to the effect that women and blacks are
equal and entitled to equal respect in the workplace are permitted; comments
expressing the contrary view are not. No "captive audience" precedent comes
close to supporting such regulation.
The captive-audience doctrine, based as it is on the notion that there are
spheres in which the state may protect against intrusions, does not support insu-
lation from speech by others having an equal right to be present. A house-
holder's claim to exclude unwanted mail from distributors of pornographic ma-
terial stands on a very different footing from a worker's claim to exclude
unwanted speech by his coworkers. Indeed, the worker's claim is more similar to
a wife's claim of a right to exclude pornographic material that her cohabiting
husband wishes to bring in the house, but it is doubtful that a state could en-
force the wife's claim under the captive-audience doctrine.227 Similarly, by anal-
ogy to Lehman, allowing a captive-audience claim by the worker would be
224. Id. at 215.
225. Smolla suggests that underinclusion does not render a statute a content-based restriction, arguing that a
fighting-words statute that singled out racist and sexist speech would simply "narro[w] the range of prosecution
from a larger set or proscribable speech." Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 199 n.104 (1990). The assumption that the greater power includes
the lesser is a faulty one when the claim is that a statute discriminates-against speech or anything else. It is a
general characteristic of content-based restrictions that they restrict less speech than broader, yet permissible,
content-neutral restrictions. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189,
197 (1983).
In support of his argument, Smolla asserts that a fighting-words statute restricting only racist and sexist
words would be analogous to an obscenity statute that banned obscene films but not obscene books and magazines,
but the fallacy of the argument is obvious. A distinction between books and films is not a content-based distinc-
tion; rather, it is based upon the medium of expression. If Smolla's "greater includes the lesser" argument is truly
valid, the state would have the power to ban obscene films having an anti-democracy message, while allowing such
films with a pro-democracy message, which it plainly does not. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (suggesting in dictum that F.C.C. v. Pacifica, 438
U.S. 726 (1978), would not have sustained "a regulation prohibiting scatological descriptions of Republicans but
not scatological descriptions of Democrats").
226. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985) (captive audience doc-
trine "does not permit a government to discriminate on account of the speaker's message"), ard, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986).
227. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 741 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting
that the Court was leaving open the constitutionality of the statute's provision allowing a householder to stop
mailings to the householder's children under the age of 19 and suggesting that the provision raised "constitutional
problems").
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equivalent to an ordinance prohibiting the expression of political views by fellow
passengers on a municipal bus.
One's readiness to extend the captive-audience doctrine may ultimately de-
pend upon one's views on free will, a topic beyond the scope of this Article.
However, even if one believes that individuals have little control over their lives
and are thus "captives" wherever they might be, prudence dictates restraint in
incorporating that world view into first amendment doctrine. If expression may
be limited whenever we are captive, a broad view of captivity results in a very
narrow scope of free expression. That scope is even narrower if even a mild
burden on the listener to avoid the speech is perceived as unduly burdensome.228
We have already learned that we are captives in our homes, where even working
people may spend more than half their time, but that determination was based
upon the status of the home as "the one retreat to which men and women can
repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits. ' 229 Extension of
the captive-audience doctrine to the workplace, where workers often spend one-
third to one-half of their waking hours, would leave very little time when we are
not captives for first amendment purposes, leaving correspondingly little time
for the free expression that under our system is supposed to be the rule rather
than the exception. 230 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the ability to avoid
intrusions is "a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own
walls. '231 A wholesale extension of the captive-audience principle is likely to
reduce its strength in the home, where it is needed most, both because the doc-
trine is likely to be weakened to accommodate other settings and because alter-
native channels of communication will be thereby reduced. 23 2
C. Time, Place and Manner Regulation
Another way potentially to justify regulation of sexual and racial harass-
ment in the workplace is to view the regulation as a simple regulation of the
time, place, or manner of expression.233 Time, place, and manner regulations
228. For example, in discussing the obligation on the part of women who object to the posting of sexual
pictures in the workplace, Strauss argues that "having to take a circuitous route from her desk to the restroom to
avoid a picture would be too significant a burden on the woman employee.") Strauss, supra note I. at 49 n.189.
229. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 at 471).
230. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) ("Freedom of
expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has
provided as a safe haven for crackpots.").
231. Id.
232. Perhaps the obvious point should be noted that it is not in the economic interest of employers to tolerate
behavior by their employees that substantially compromises the ability of other employees to perform their jobs.
See Waks & Starr, The "Sexual Shakedown" in Perspective: Sexual Harassment in its Social and Legal Con-
texts, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 567. 570-71 (1982) (sexual harassment "adversely affects morale, reduces productiv-
ity, and increases the rate of absenteeism [and job turnover] among affected employees"). See also U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Is it a Problem? 76 (1981) (sexual harassment
costs the federal government $95 million per year in the kinds of indirect costs described above). Although some
employers may tolerate such behavior, most will not, at least not in its extreme forms. Thus, employees may be
captives in the job market, but they are not necessarily captives to offensive speech.
233. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards. Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794. at *156-57 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(holding that "regulation of discriminatory speech in the workplace constitutes nothing more than a time, place,
and manner regulation of speech"). The court quoted Strauss. supra note I, at 46, for the proposition that
"[b]anning sexist speech in the workplace does not censor such speech everywhere and for all time."
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are valid if they "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of commu-
nication. 2 3 The argument would be that employees may continue to express
offensive views either by limiting their expression to places outside the work-
place or, possibly, by expressing the same thoughts in the workplace but in a
less graphic or offensive manner.235
Restrictions on offensive speech immediately run up against the objection
that they are not content-neutral. As discussed above, they are not only content-
based, but viewpoint-based as well. Although Geoffrey Stone has correctly ar-
gued that limitations on profanity are more properly considered time, place and
manner restrictions rather than content-based restrictions, 236 that analysis does
not extend to the kind of regulation discussed in this Article. No word is per se
prohibited in the workplace; certain words are prohibited only in the context of
a particular sociopolitical meaning. Opponents of expression deemed harassing
cannot honestly say "it is not your message that I object to, only the particular
words you have chosen to convey it."
It is also difficult to view harassment regulation as being narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest. Whatever justification there might
be for regulating the more egregious forms of harassment is unlikely to extend
to prohibiting a nude picture on a toolbox, a plaque stating "Even male chau-
vinist pigs need love," or references to women as "broads." Moreover, "ample
alternative channels of communication" do not exist. Workers spend a large
proportion of their time in the workplace, and for all of that time, no alternative
channels of communication exist.
There is a limited circumstance in which the Court has been willing to
analyze content-based restrictions as time, place, and manner restrictions. These
are cases where the regulation is directed not at the speech itself, but rather at
its "secondary effects." The argument has been made that failing to regulate
harassing speech disadvantages women and minorities by lowering their self-
esteem and interfering with their ability to perform their jobs.237 Regulation of
expressions of prejudice or "dirty jokes" is not based upon disagreement with
the content of the message, the argument would go, but rather is based upon
the "secondary effects" of the expression-the concrete harm to the employ-
ment opportunities of women and minorities-and is therefore permissible
234. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
235. See Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 Miss. COLL L. REV. 1. 19 n.] 11 (1988) ("Most
instances of the use of racial epithets, even if thought to at least imply some social idea, seem susceptible of
reformulation so as to express pungently the speaker's contempt, animosity, or resentment without the use of
racial epithets").
236. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 189, 243 (1983) (al-
though restrictions on use of profanity are in literal sense content based, functionally they are more similar to
restrictions on the manner of expression than on the content of expression). See also Redish, The Value of Free
Speech. 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 628 n.128 (1982) ("Even if a 'stream of obscenities' were fully protected by the
first amendment, legitimate 'time, place, and manner' regulations could be imposed").
237. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note I. at 14 ("sexist speech reinstitutionalizes barriers in the workplace based
on gender. When women subjected to sexist speech leave the job, or persist but with decreased productivity, it
serves to perpetuate male dominance in the workplace").
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under Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.238 However, even assuming the cor-
rectness of the premise that expressions of prejudice or sexual jokes unaccompa-
nied by discriminatory action somehow diminish employment opportunities,
Renton provides slim authority for their regulation.
Renton involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult motion
picture theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single-
or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. 3 The City of Renton de-
fended the ordinance on the ground that it was intended to prevent crime, pro-
tect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, preserve the quality of city
neighborhoods, and generally protect the quality of life. 40 The Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance as a "content-neutral" time, place, or manner regulation
that is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. 24
Relying on the plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
242
the Court stated that a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of
theaters could properly be made "without violating the government's paramount
obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication. 12 43 It is
only the "secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not
the dissemination of 'offensive speech.' "244
Unlike the ordinance in Renton, which sought to regulate adult movie thea-
ters without reference to any "viewpoint" that might be expressed in the
films,145 sexual harassment regulations prohibit speech primarily on the basis of
the viewpoint expressed. An employee's work performance may be seriously af-
fected by his coworkers' telling him daily that he is the illegitimate offspring of
a diseased prostitute, but he is entitled to no protection. An employee may be
similarly offended by continual expressions of feminist viewpoints in the work-
place. Such employees, however, are without recourse under Title VII.
The difficulty with reliance on Renton is that if the reaction of the audi-
ence is considered a "secondary effect" of expression, then virtually any restric-
tion of expression can be justified. The state's primary interest in regulating
speech is seldom the stifling of expression in the abstract; that is, restrictions on
238, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
239. Id. at 43.
240. 475 U.S. at 48.
241. See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984) (upholding application to
Jaycees of a state statute banning sex discrimination in public accommodations because it did not "aim at the
suppression of speech" or "distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint," and
furthered a goal "unrelated to the suppression of expression").
242. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young, the Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance requiring dispersal of
"adult" theaters and bookstores against a contention that this was a content-based restriction of speech. Although
acknowledging that the restriction was based upon content, the Court emphasized that the ordinance was view-
point neutral. Id. at 70 ("the regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected
by whatever social, political, or philosophical message film may be intended to communicate; whether a motion
picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same").
243. 475 U.S. at 49 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 70).
244. Id.
245. Other than the "implicit, if not explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sexual mores." Stone, Restric-
tions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Ct. L. REv. 81,
111-12 (1978).
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expression are not generally justified by their impact on the speaker."6 Instead,
speech is usually regulated because of a conclusion that it is better for society
that listeners not hear the speech because of its detrimental effect on them-for
example, the listener may become violent, the listener may believe false state-
ments of fact, national security may be compromised by the speech, or the
speech may undermine the moral fabric of society. Under a broad definition of
"secondary effects," prohibition of speech urging overthrow of the government
could be justified on the basis that some people might be inclined to attempt a
violent overthrow of the government even if there is little likelihood that such an
attempt is imminent. The government interest in suppressing speech because it
is offensive to the listener can in no sense be said to be an interest "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression"; 7 instead, its interest is in protecting the
listener from the expression of the speaker. 248 Thus, the listener's reaction to
speech must be a "primary effect" of speech, rather than a "secondary effect,"
unless Renton is interpreted to repudiate a half-century of first amendment
jurisprudence.249
The attempt to distinguish between the speech itself and the effects of the
speech is untenable. For example, Marcy Strauss suggests a distinction between
"speech that discriminates" and "speech that advocates discrimination." 250
"[S]peech that discriminates" we are told, occurs "when the message causes
women to leave their jobs, or to suffer impediments at work that men need not
endure. '251 The distinction, according to Strauss, is that discriminatory speech
causes "direct and immediate" harm, while the harm of speech advocating dis-
crimination is more "speculative." 252 Strauss' argument is a formalism analo-
246. But see Delgado, supra note 3. at 176 ("[B]igotry, and thus the attendant expression of racism, stifles.
rather than furthers, the moral and social growth of the individual who harbors it").
247. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
248. The reliance on Renton in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, "157-
58 (M.D. Fla. 1991). is puzzling. The court simply cites Renton for the conclusion that "[t]o the extent that the
regulation here does not seem entirely content neutral, the distinction based on the sexually explicit nature of the
pictures and other speech does not offend constitutional principles." However, the court's discussion of the harass-
ment standard makes clear that it is not imposing liability solely on the basis of the existence of sexually explicit
pictures and language without regard to the message that is conveyed. For example, one of the court's findings of
fact was that only pictures of women had been posted, implying that the analysis might be affected if pictures of
both men and women were posted. Also, the court's acceptance of the view that the evil of pornography in the
workplace is that it "communicates a message about the way [the employer] views women," id. at 124, shows that
it is not sexual explicitness in itself that provides the basis for regulation. Moreover, not all of the speech that the
court finds harassing is even sexually explicit. Part of the harassing speech included use of terms such as "honey,"
"dear." "baby." ".sugar." and "momma," id. at 27, and statements such as "women are only fit company for
something that howls" and "there's nothing worse than having to work around women," id. at 28.
249. See. e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (prohibition of "For Sale" signs was
based upon the Township's fear of "their 'primary effect-that they will cause those receiving the information to
act upon it."). See also Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3
YALE L & POL REV 130 (1984) ("The core element in first amendment theory is that the impact of
peech-whether considered good, bad or indifferent-cannot be invoked as a basis for governmental control of
speech").
250. Strauss, supra note I. at 39. See also Delgado, supra note 3. at 164 ("the use of a racial insult against a
member of a minority group is race discrimination").
251. Strauss, supra note I. at 39.
252. Id. at 40. It is difficult to accept Strauss' assertion, that regulation of "speech that discriminates" is
"viewpoint-neutral," supra note I, at 39. She says that "[i]t does not matter whether the speaker tells the woman
that she belongs in the bedroom or in the boardroom; a judgment need not be made about which statement, if
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gous to labelling speech as "conduct."2 53 The distinction for Strauss is simply
that "discriminatory speech" has an unattractive effect, but that is not a basis
for treating it as an unprotected class of expression.25'
No one disputes that harm can flow from much of the expression regulated
in harassment cases. However, the fact that some harm may flow from speech is
not adequate justification for regulating it. Opponents of virtually any ideology
deemed offensive enough that some want to ban its dissemination can point to a
risk of concrete harm. Many believe that advocating the violent overthrow of
the government creates a serious risk of harm-some may actually try it, while
others may react to the message violently. Others believe that burning the flag
is an "evil and profoundly offensive" action2 55 that will tarnish its value as a
symbol of this nation and its ideals. Still others believe that criticism of a war
being waged by the United States lends aid and comfort to the enemies and
enhances the risk of harm to our fighting forces. Rejection of attempts to regu-
late such expression does not depend upon rejection of the premise that some
harm may flow from it, but rather from the conclusion that the value of free
expression is sufficiently high that the risk of harm must be tolerated.2 58 These
either, subordinates or degrades women." Id. Yet how can suggesting to a woman that she belongs in the boar-
droom cause her to leave her job or to suffer impediments that men need not endure? Presumably, Strauss is not
suggesting that a speaker could be exposed to liability for making such a supportive comment.
253. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the slogan on Cohen's
jacket was "mainly conduct and little speech").
Expression is not converted into conduct simply because it has effects. See State Div. of Human Rights v.
McHarris Gift Center, 52 N.Y.2d 813, 418 N.E.2d 393, 436 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1980), aF'g 71 A.D.2d 813, 419
N.Y.S.2d 405 (1979) (ruling four to three that display of Polish joke items, such as coffee cups with the handles
on the inside, does not deny equal access to stores to people of Polish descent). But see Justice Jasen's dissent
where he states that such materials "contribute to the creation and maintenance of prejudicial beliefs and discrim-
inatory behavior" and violate "the fundamental right of all ethnic and racial groups to be free of the adverse
effects of intentional ethnic or racial discrimination and ridicule." Id. at 816-17, 418 N.E.2d at 394-95, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 879-80.
254. Many of the arguments made in support of regulation of offensive speech in the workplace are the same
as those made by supporters of feminist anti-pornography statutes, who also point to the adverse impact on atti-
tudes and actions created by the speech they seek to regulate. The anti-pornography statutes have defined pornog-
raphy in ideological terms: "sexually explicit material that depicts women as sexual objects whose essential nature
is fulfilled by providing sexual pleasure to men." In attempting to defend a pornography ordinance adopted by the
City of Indianapolis, the City argued that it served the function of altering the socialization of men and women
and would "play an important role in reducing the tendency of men to view women as sexual objects, a tendency
that leads to both unacceptable attitudes and discrimination in the workplace and violence away from it." Ameri-
can Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). In striking
down the ordinance, the Seventh Circuit identified it as a viewpoint-based restriction that distinguished between
sexually explicit material premised on equality and sexually explicit material premised on domination. Hudnut,
771 F.2d at 325. According to the court, "[tihe Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right and
silence opponents." Id.
Just as the Indianapolis ordinance weighed in on one side of what might be called the equality/dominance
issue, regulation of sexist, sexual, and racist speech in the workplace takes a position on the function and status of
the races and sexes. A worker may have magazines in the workplace, as long as they are not the like of Playboy,
which "evokels] and confirm[s] the debilitating norms by which women are primarily and contemptuously valued
as objects of male sexual fantasy." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied.
481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (Keith, J., dissenting). A feminist tract, no matter how contemptuous of men, would likely
be beyond the reach of the statute.
255. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2555 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
256. It is not even clear that the desire to suppress racist and sexist speech is truly based upon a desire to
eliminate harm to the object of the slur. For example, in an article arguing for criminalization of racist speech,
Mari Matsuda declines to repeat racial slurs not just "to avoid harm to others," but "to prevent desensitization to
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ideas cannot be converted from protected speech to unprotected speech simply
by labelling the harm a "secondary effect."
In sum, it is not the "secondary effects" of the offensive speech that is the
basis for the regulation. Instead, the basis for the regulation is its "primary
effect"-the impact of the speech on the audience. Thus, advocates of regula-
tion will have to look elsewhere for justification.
D. Defamation and Group Libel
Defamation, like obscenity, is entitled to reduced first amendment protec-
tion. Just as a few reported harassment decisions involve statements that qualify
as fighting words or obscenity, a few involve statements that are defamatory in
the traditional sense. For example, statements made to or in the presence of
others that a particular woman is a "whore" could be considered defamatory to
the extent that the statement is reasonably susceptible of its ordinary mean-
ing.257 On the other hand, a statement that "all women are whores" would not
generally be considered defamatory. 258 However, very few cases present facts
where traditional defamation law would apply.
More significant is the question whether some recovery is constitutionally
permissible for statements that fall within the category of "group libel." Under
the reasoning of Beauharnais v. Illinois, 59 some statements disparaging blacks
or women as a group arguably lie outside the scope of constitutional protection.
Beauharnais upheld a conviction under an Illinois group libel law, which
provided:
It shall be unlawful . . . to . . . publish . . . any lithograph, moving picture, play,
drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, un-
chastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion
which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy ... 260
The defendant had been charged with violating the statute by circulating a leaf-
let urging the Mayor and City Council "to halt the further encroachment, har-
assment and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and per-
sons, by the Negro .. ,,2"I The publication also stated: "If persuasion and the
need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not
unite us, then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana
harmful words. ... Matsuda. Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story 87 Micti. L.
RLV 2320. 2329 n.49 (1989). In other words, she affirmatively desires that slurs continue to offend, apparently
because if they no longer offend, i.e.. "harm." they may no longer be suppressed.
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 574 & comment C.
258. Biggerstaff v. Zimmerman. 108 Colo. 194, 114 P.2d 1098 (1941); See also Old Dominion Branch No.
496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974) (holding that use or the term "traitor" to describe employees who
refused to join union could not be construed as a representation of fact; rather the statement was "merely rhetori-
cal hyperbolc").
259. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
260. Id. at 251.
261. Id. at 252.
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of the negro, surely will."' 62 Attached to the leaflet was an application for mem-
bership in the "White Circle League of America, Inc. 263
The Supreme Court provided two justifications for upholding the convic-
tion. The first justification was Chaplinsky's suggestion that epithets and per-
sonal abuse are not protected by the Constitution. 264 The second was the asser-
tion that because defamation of individuals is not constitutionally protected
neither is defamation of groups.265 Neither of these justifications has withstood
the test of time. First, under current doctrine, epithets and personal abuse are
protected by the Constitution unless they create an imminent risk of breach of
the peace.266 Second, twelve years after Beauharnais, the Supreme Court held
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6 7 that the first amendment does indeed
place substantial limitations on governmental power to punish defamation of
individuals. Although the Supreme Court has not overruled Beauharnais, both
lower courts268 and commentators28 9 have questioned its continuing vitality.270
Given the close resemblance between the kind of group libel involved in Beau-
harnais and the advocacy of unpopular social views, there is little reason to
think that the Court would permit such regulation today.
E. Fighting Words
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2 17 the Supreme Court described a cate-
gory of speech that lies outside the protection of the Constitution: "the insulting
or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. '272 It could be argued that many of
the comments in sexual harassment cases fall within the broadest reading of
this definition; that is, they are "insulting" words that "by their very utterance
inflict injury," if "injury" in this context means "hurt feelings" or "offense."
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 257.
265. Id. at 258.
266. See infra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
267. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
268. American Booksellers Ass'n Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985). affd. 475 U.S. 1001
(1986); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
269. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment. 76 CALIF.
L. REv. 297, 330 (1988) (Beauharnais is "damaged goods"); J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 925-26 (3d ed. 1985).
270. But see Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916. 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lower
court decision was "in some tension with Beauharnais [which] has not been overruled or formally limited in any
way").
There are other aspects of Beauharnais which make it clear that even if the Court were willing to accept the
general principle that derogatory untrue statements of fact about racial groups could be actionable, the current
Court would not sustain the conviction in that case. First, the leaflet involved a matter of political concern; indeed,
it contained a petition for governmental action. Second, some of the statements may have been objectively true.
However, the Court approved the portion of Illinois law that required that for the defense of truth to prevail, not
only must truth be shown, but it must also be shown that it was published "with good motives and for justifiable
ends," Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. at 265-66. Finally, some of the statements were almost certainly protected
"opinion."
271. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
272. Id. at 572.
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However, case law subsequent to Chaplinsky has narrowed the scope of this
exception.2 73 Thus, in Gooding v. Wilson,' 4 a conviction under a Georgia stat-
ute prohibiting use of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause
a breach of the peace" was overturned on the strength of the Court's conviction
that the statutory terms "opprobrious" and "abusive" have a meaning broader
than the term "fighting words. ' 27 5 Under the Georgia statute, the Supreme
Court concluded, a defendant could be convicted for using "harsh insulting lan-
guage," 278 which was a result it believed incompatible with the first amendment.
The Court also held that the statutory phrase "tending to cause a breach of the
peace" was overbroad-as interpreted by Georgia courts-because it would
constitute a breach of the peace "merely to speak words offensive to some who
hear them .... .",27 In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,17  the Court made clear
that words "conveying or intended to convey disgrace" are not necessarily
"fighting words. 1 79 Thus, the supervisor who refers to women and blacks in
general by such terms without regard to whether any women or blacks are pre-
sent to hear the comments cannot be said to have uttered "fighting words," 2 0
although the supervisor who calls his subordinate "a fucking whore" or "a fuck-
ing nigger" may have.21
Only a few harassment cases have involved expression that fits within the
definition of "fighting words." Even in those cases, however, it is disingenuous
to justify regulation of offensive speech on a fighting-words theory. The fighting-
words doctrine is based upon the government's interest in preserving the peace.
273. See Downs. Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
629. 635 (1985) (suggesting that Cohen altered Chaplinsky in three respects: (I) limiting the "circumstances
under which a speech act could be considered fighting words"; (2) ignoring "Chaplinskys notion of the harm
some assaultive speech may inflict"; and (3) articulating an extreme moral skepticism or relativity of valuels] that
is inconsistent with the basic normative logic of Chaplinsky); Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "'Words that
Wound". 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585, 588 (1983) ("despite its continuing references to Chaplinsky the Court
will no longer permit convictions for uttering offensive words to stand, whether the words be insulting, racist, or
otherwise abusive").
274. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
275. Id. at 525. The defendant was an anti-war protester who was accused of saying to a police officer at a
disturbance at an induction center, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you," "You son of a bitch. I'll choke you to
death," and "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again. I'll cut you all to pieces." Id. at 520 n.I.
276. Id. at 525.
277. Id. at 527. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 547-48 (the "offen-
sive character of an idea" to a recipient can never "justify an attempt to censor its expression").
278. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
279. See also Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976) (overturning denial or habeas
corpus for petitioner who was convicted under abusive-language statute for calling police "in. f. son-of-a-bitches"
and "m. f. pigs" on ground that "words must do more than offend, cause indignation or anger the addressee to
lose the protection or the First Amendment").
280. The extent to which sexual propositions might be considered fighting words is unclear. For example, one
court held that the question, "How about some pussy?." to a 16-year-old girl in front of her five-year-old brother
did not fall under the Georgia fighting-words statute. Rozier v. State, 140 Ga. App. 356. 231 S.E.2d 131 (1976).
Another court held that the statement, "I bet your honey doesn't have the nine and one-half inch penis I have,"
might. Lamar v. Banks. 684 F.2d 714 (11 th Cir. 1982) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on petition for habeas
corpus). Although some sexual propositions may properly be viewed as fighting words, a more appropriate analysis
would be under a privacy theory. See infra notes 291-98 and accompanying text.
281. See United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307. 310 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky
harassment statute providing that "f[a] person is guilty of harassment when with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another person he . . .in a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or addresses
abusive language to any person present ....").
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The purpose of regulating offensive speech is not to preserve the peace, but to
protect members of protected groups from offense and thereby enhance their
employment opportunities. It is the absence of any effective response by the
victim (i.e., a lack of power) that underlies harassment theory, not simply the
lack of a nonviolent response.
F. Obscenity and Indecency
Another possible avenue for defending the restrictions of expression created
by Title VII is to assert that they are a permissible attempt to regulate obscen-
ity or indecency. Obscenity, according to the Supreme Court, is not "speech"
and therefore lies outside of the protection of the first amendment.2 2 Vulgarity
and indecency, however, are entitled to first amendment protection, although in
some contexts this protection is less than full.
Although courts in harassment cases often describe pictures or language in
the workplace as "obscene," they appear to be using the term in the lay sense
rather than the constitutional sense. Under the test of Miller v. California,283
little, if any, of the speech or pictures at issue are obscene in the first amend-
ment sense.28"
The power of government to regulate the use of profane words is limited,
even where the regulation is viewpoint neutral. In overturning a conviction for
displaying a jacket bearing the statement "Fuck the Draft," the Supreme Court
in Cohen v. California28 5 warned against "a governmental power to force per-
sons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of
expression." 8  The Supreme Court further noted that "governments might soon
seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning
the expression of unpopular views.1 281 That, of course, is the rub.
The concern that the government might use the censorship of particular
words as a pretext to shut off unpopular views is a serious threat in harassment
cases. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that underlying the Court's opinion
in Cohen is the suspicion that if Cohen's jacket had said "Fuck the
Draftdodgers" he would not have been prosecuted. It is similarly doubtful that
282. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1957).
283. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Under Miller, in order for a work to be obscene, it must: (1) appeal to a "prurient
interest" in sex; that is, it must be erotic; (2) depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) "lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Id. at 24-25. Vulgar language, even vulgar sexual language, does not ordinarily appeal to a prurient interest in
sex.
284. Indeed, in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978), the Supreme Court reviewed an exercise
of the FCC's regulatory power with respect to several of the words that figure prominently in sexual harassment
cases in which it was conceded by all parties that the words were not "obscene" in the constitutional sense. The
Court upheld an FCC ruling against a radio station for broadcasting a George Carlin monologue discussing the
words that cannot be said on the radio. The famous "seven dirty words" were: "shit, piss. fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits." Id. at 751. Carlin also added three others: "fart," "turd," and "twat." Id. at 755. The
Court's decision was based on the narrow ground that broadcasting "has received the most limited First Amend-
ment protection" of all media of expression. Id. at 748.
285. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
286. Id. at 23.
287. Id. at 26. But see Wright, supra note 235, at 2 ("it will ordinarily be possible to disaggregate the speech
into a protected ideational component and an unprotected racist epithet component").
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a finding of sexual or racial harassment would be made on the basis of sexually
explicit language to argue in favor of sexual equality ("Just because they have
cunts doesn't mean they can't do the work") or racially explicit language to
argue in favor of racial equality ("You think they are just a bunch of dumb
niggers, but they are human beings entitled to just as much respect as you give
white people"). On the other hand, a finding of harassment is considerably more
likely based upon speech of a similar crude nature expressing the contrary view.
Such viewpoint-based regulation cannot be sustained on an "indecency"
theory.288
In sum, hostile-environment harassment regulation cannot be supported as
an attempt to regulate obscenity or indecency, While it may be that some of the
sexually explicit pictures involved in sexual harassment cases constitute obscen-
ity under Miller, we do not know because courts have not addressed the issue or
even described with any specificity the nature of the material. However, it is
quite clear that Playboy magazines and "pin-up" calendars are well outside the
definition of "obscenity."28 9 Indeed, it would be difficult even to label such
materials "indecent" in today's society, given its ready availability at grocery
stores, drug stores, and convenience stores.2 90
G. Privacy
Another justification for regulation of offensive speech is the protection of
employees' privacy interests. 91 The Court in Cohen v. California, though disal-
lowing prosecution for an offensive motto on a jacket, nonetheless acknowledged
that states could restrict speech when "substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."29 2 However, it is necessary to
consider carefully the kinds of speech that might be regulable under such a
theory since a broad view of protectable privacy could become the exception
that swallows the first amendment.
Whatever the term "invasion of privacy" might mean in this context, it
must mean more than disturbances of one's inner tranquility-that is, offense.
288. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (invalidating federal statute punishing actors wearing
United States military uniforms if the portrayal tended to '*discredit'* that armed force). The Court in Schacht
held that a law "which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons ... to prison for
opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment." Id. at 63.
289. See Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1137-38 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094
1986) (noting that although Hustler Magazine is palpably more vulgar than Playboy, there was no suggestion
that it was obscene).
290. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.
1986). cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). The Rabidue court stated:
For better or worse, modern America features open displays of written and pictorial erotica. Shopping
centers, candy stores and prime time television regularly display pictures of naked bodies and erotic real
or simulated sex acts. Living in this milieu, the average American should not be legalt' offended by
sexually explicit posters.
Rabidue. 584 F. Supp. at 433.
291. See, e.g., Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Wards Intended to Inflict Severe Emo-
tional Distress, 85 COLIJM. L. REv. 1749 (1985).
292. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). See also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609
(1989) (acknowledging "the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between the First
Amendment and privacy rights").
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Otherwise, much first amendment doctrine becomes superfluous. Fighting
words, obscenity, and indecency are regulated in part because they offend, but
speech must do more than "merely" offend to be regulable. Derogatory state-
ments about women or minorities, even if profoundly offensive, do not violate
privacy. They do not intrude into an inner sanctum where others may be pro-
hibited from treading. Even personal invective, demonstrating that the speaker
holds the listener in utter contempt, does not violate a protectable privacy
interest.
Unwanted explicit sexual propositions and other personal statements of a
sexual nature raise much stronger privacy concerns because they may be viewed
as coercing intimacy-even if only a verbal intimacy-about what are unques-
tionably private matters. 29 3 A claim to sexual privacy does not depend upon the
use of obscene or indecent words though the use of such language strengthens
the claim.2 94 Moreover, the mere presence of sexual magazines in the workplace
does not violate an objecting woman's privacy because it does not coerce inti-
macy. On the other hand, to repeatedly show her graphic pornographic pictures
and relate the pictures to her might fairly be viewed as invading a sphere of
personal privacy.29 5
Nonetheless, the absence of reasonably definite standards militates against
regulation of such speech. There seems to be no way to limit protection of psy-
chological solitude to the most egregious cases. If a coworker's repeated display
of graphic pictures and comparisons to the plaintiff invades her privacy, it is
unclear why a coworker's query about whether she looked like a model on a pin-
up calendar would not. If the latter allegation suffices, so would, probably, a
claim that when the plaintiff asked a man to take down a pin-up, he responded
by saying that she was just jealous because she did not look like that. Moreover,
if a woman could state a claim by asserting that she felt "violated" by illicit
proposals, there seems to be no basis for excluding a claim that she felt violated
by the presence of sexual pictures that were merely posted in the workplace
without comment.
293. See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Corp., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (holding that an employer's
repeated requests that plaintiff engage in oral sex and questions concerning plaintiffs sexual activity with her
husband constituted a tortious intrusion into plaintiff's "psychological solitude"); Schauer. Speech and
"'Speech --- Obscenity and "Obscenity"; An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo
L.J. 899, 922-26 (1979) (equating touching a person's thigh with speech having the same purpose and effect). But
see Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970) (finding no
invasion of privacy in allegation that defendant caused plaintiff "to be accosted by girls with illicit proposals").
294. Thus, a suggestion that a woman "sit on [a man's] face," see Wolf v. Jerry Burum, Rent-A-Center or
Am., Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6700 (D. Kan. 1990); Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union. 644
F. Supp. 795. 799 (D. Mass. 1986), or the inquiry "How about a little head?," see Monge v. Superior Court. 176
Cal. App. 3d 503, 507, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65 (1986), may be just as regulable as the question whether a woman
"wanted to fuck," Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988).
295. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (white supervisor showed the plaintiff, a
black woman, a photograph depicting an interracial act of sodomy and told her that the photograph showed the
"talent" of a black woman and that she was hired for the purpose indicated in the photograph). Cf. Coley v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (plaintiffs supervisor kept track or her menstrual
cycle on office calendar and made comments about her breasts).
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwell,29
the inability to create a workable standard is a sufficient basis for refusing to
recognize a cause of action. Rejecting a claim for outrageous conduct by evan-
gelist Jerry Falwell based upon a vulgar parody containing suggestions that he
had engaged in sexual relations with his mother in an outhouse, the Court
stated:
If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the
other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that
there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description "out-
rageous" does not supply one.297
Recognition of a claim for violating "psychological solitude" would almost
inevitably evolve into recognition of a claim for "offense." Yet, in Falwell, the
Court rejected the "outrageousness" standard precisely because it would "allow
damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience. 298
VI. SHOULD FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE BE MODIFIED TO ENCOMPASS
SEXUALLY AND RACIALLY OFFENSIVE SPEECH IN THE WORKPLACE?
If, as argued above, the current interpretation of Title VII cannot with-
stand scrutiny under current first amendment doctrine,2 99 one obvious response
would be to modify the doctrine to permit restriction of sexist and racist speech.
A number of recent commentators have suggested that such modifications be
adopted. 00 However, the case for modification is a weak one that is fundamen-
tally hostile to first amendment values. Moreover, it assumes something that has
yet to be demonstrated-that offensive speech totally lacks value under the first
amendment.
A. The Arguments of Proponents of Modification
Richard Delgado was one of the earliest advocates in the recent movement
to strip offensive speech of first amendment protection.301 He has urged recogni-
tion of a first amendment exception for "[r]acial epithets uttered in face-to-
face, one-on-one situations marked with an inequality of power and author-
ity.130 2 Donald Downs has referred to such speech as "targeted vilification,"' 3
296. 485 U.S 46 (1988).
297. Id. at 55.
298. Id.
299. See Strauss, supra note I. at 21 ("Sexist speech. . . does not fit within any of the existing categories of
expression excluded from First Amendment protection").
300. Strauss, supra note I; Matsuda, supra note 256; Wright, supra note 235; Delgado, supra note 3.
301. Delgado, supra note 3.
302. Delgado, Professor Delgado Replies, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593, 593 (1983). The elements of the
claim are not clear from Delgado's writings. In his initial article, Delgado stated that to prevail in an action for
"racial insult," the plaintiff would have to prove that: "Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant
that was intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as intended to demean
through reference to race; and that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult." Delgado, supra note 3,
at 179. However, in defending the thesis of his original article against criticism that it was insufficiently attentive
to first amendment interests, see Heins, supra note 273, he recharacterized the elements of the tort of racial insult
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a characterization that will be used here. General statements suggesting group
inferiority would continue to enjoy first amendment protection. Although there
is an intuitively appealing sense in which the two kinds of statements differ,
closer scrutiny tends to obliterate the distinction.
"Targeted vilification" is not punishable in Delgado's view simply because
it insulted the target. "Targeted vilification" is punishable only when the insult
goes beyond the individual and insults a whole group."" The statement, "Blacks
are inferior; you are a black; therefore, you are inferior," is arguably punisha-
ble. It is less clear, however, if the simple statement, "blacks are inferior,"
would be punishable, although it may matter to Delgado whether the statement
is made directly to or in the presence of a black. But what possible constitu-
tional distinction can there be between the protected status of the entire syllo-
gism and that of the major premise? After all, the minor premise is simply a
matter of fact in a given case, and the conclusion necessarily follows from the
two premises whether or not articulated.
Creating a workabfe definition of the term "targeted vilification" is not so
easy. Many statements that could be viewed as insulting or demeaning would
not constitute vilification in the sense of "abus[ing] as hateful or vile. '3 0 5 More-
over, many ethnic jokes, although relying on stereotypes, are not necessarily
venomous. However, courts in harassment cases have generally proceded no fur-
ther than identifying the presence of "ethnic jokes" to condemn the workplace
as hostile without inquiring into the nature of the particular joke.306 Delgado's
definition of "vilification" is far broader than scurrilous racial epithets, includ-
ing any speech that "demean[s] through reference to race. '3 0 7 It is unclear, for
example, whether a restaurant owner engaged in targeted religious vilification
when he told a waitress that she thought she was special, "just like all the other
f-ing Jewish broads around here."30 8 The New York Court of Appeals upheld
a damages award in her favor on the ground that the owner had discriminated
against the waitress by "revil[ing] her religion in a matter related to her work-
ing conditions."309 Yet, stripped of the crudeness of the message, the owner was
simply saying that all of his Jewish female employees thought they were spe-
to the standard of one-on-one abuse described in the text. There may be a large difference between language
"'intended to demean through reference to race" and "racial epithets." the former including much speech that is
far more subtle than the latter. Moreover, Delgado's initial formulation did not require an inequality of power. It
is not clear whether Delgado has changed the definition of the tort or whether his "retreat" was merely tactical.
303. Downs, supra note 273, at 661.
304. Cf. Matsuda, supra note 256, at 2357-58 (advocating criminalizing racist speech having the following
characteristics: (I) a message of "racial inferiority"; (2) directed against a "historically oppressed group"; and (3)
the message is "persecutorial, hateful, and degrading." Thus, the first amendment has some continuing vitality
since "[hiateful verbal attacks upon dominant-group members by victims is permissible"). See also Downs, supra
note 273. at 646 (arguing for regulation of "targeted racial and ethnic vilification").
305. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2552 (3d ed. 1986).
306. See. e.g., Woods v. Graphic Communications. 925 F.2d 1195. 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1991) ("racial jokes")-
Snodgrass v. Brown, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418 at *26 (D. Kan. 1990) ("sexual jokes").
307. Professor Delgado Replies, supra note 302, at 593.
308. Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd.. 436 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233. 417 N.E.2d 525, 527
(1980).
309. Id.
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cial.310 That may be an unfair or untrue stereotype, but it is difficult to see how
the statement reviles the Jewish religion. Had the New York Court of Appeals
applied the "targeted vilification" standard proposed by Delgado, however,
there appears little doubt about the outcome. Similarly, how does one deal with
a reference to someone as "the ugly black guy" or "the dumb-looking white
guy." Those statements arguably "demean through reference to race," although
they do not demean the race. At bottom, those advocating reduced protection
for racist and sexist speech are simply trying what so many people who have
gone before them have tried-to reserve the power to censor speech they do not
like. As is so often the case, it is difficult to be optimistic that any exception so
created could be contained.3 11
The argument for a first amendment exception for racist speech suffers
from a substantial internal inconsistency. Delgado suggests that the words are
"harmful in themselves 31 2 and that "they constitute 'badges and incidents of
slavery' and contribute to a stratified society in which political power is pos-
sessed by some and denied to others."31 3 He also asserts that such words "injure
the dignity and self-regard of the person to whom they are addressed, communi-
cating the message that distinctions of race are distinctions of merit, dignity,
status, and personhood. ' 31 4 Not only do the words convey that message, accord-
ing to Delgado, they convey it effectively, because minorities "will find it diffi-
cult not to accept those judgments." ' 5 After describing in detail how racial
insults cause harm by communicating a social message with which he disagrees,
Delgado then argues that racial insults are not protected by the policies of the
first amendment since they do not "advance political dialogue, further the
search for truth, or help society strike a balance between stability and orderly
change.'316 The latter assertion-that the words may be banned because they
convey no message-is difficult to square with his earlier assertion that the
words cause harm because of their message a17
If, as Delgado argues, a racial insult may be prohibited because of its im-
plicit message that "distinctions of race are distinctions of merit, dignity, status,
310. Moreover, at least in terms of the words that were used, it is arguably more insulting to women than to
Jews.
311. For example, in a comment criticizing the court's decision in Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp.
852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). which struck down the University's offensive-speech policy, a student commentator,
describing the problem of racist and sexist speech on campus, equates the statement "Die Chink. Hostile Ameri-
cans want your yellow hide" with references to women students as "fat housewives." Comment, First Amendment
Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus-Court Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech-Doe v. Uni-
versity of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), 103 HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1400 (1990). Both are
subsumed under the category of "hate speech." Cf. id. at 1400. Many people would not think that the two state-
ments are equivalent in any moral sense; the commentator does. The wisdom of a first amendment doctrine that
leaves it to a judge or jury to make such decisions on a case-by-case basis is far from apparent.
312. Delgado, supra note 3, at 173.
313. Id. at 178 (footnotes omitted) (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
314. Id. at 135-36.
315. Id. at 146 (footnote omitted) (quoting K. KENNISTON. ALL OUR CHILDREN 33 (1977). See also
Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 462-63 (1987).
316. Professor Delgado Replies, supra note 302, at 594.
317. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense,
that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection").
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and personhood,"318 it is unclear why the explicit statement that distinctions of
race are distinctions of merit, dignity, status, and personhood" may not be simi-
larly prohibited. Calling a black person "nigger" probably conveys a more of-
fensive message than a statement that blacks are not entitled to equal status in
our society, but that is largely because the word conveys a passionate and com-
plex message rife with social and historical meaning.319 It is offensive precisely
because of its capacity to convey meaning.
One highly unsatisfactory response to first amendment objections is simply
to label racist speech sui generis and declare that the normal rules do not apply.
Mari Matsuda makes such an argument by asserting that racist speech presents
"an idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of
violence and degradation of the very classes of human beings who are least
equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside the realm of protected
discourse. 'a20 The flaws in her argument are manifest. First, there is substantial
irony in labelling an idea both "historically untenable" and "dangerous" at the
same time. Its danger suggests that it has not been found quite so untenable
historically. Second, it is far from clear that without the coercive power of the
state victims of racist speech are unable to respond. James Watt, Earl Butz, Al
Campanis, Jimmy Breslin, and Andy Rooney may well have a different view.
Third, racist speech has no greater claim-indeed a lesser claim-to sui generis
status than some other forms of speech that are unregulable, such as speech
advocating the violent overthrow of the government. 32 1
Fourth, the difficulty in determining whether particular speech subjects the
speaker to sanctions would cause a major chilling effect on all speech dealing
with racial matters. 32 For example, Matsuda would allow an assertion that par-
ticular groups are genetically superior only if it was made "in a context free of
318. Delgado, supra note 3, at 135-36.
319. See Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech, 42 RUTGERS L. RLv. 287. 304
(1990) (when laws regulate group epithets and slurs, "what is being suppressed really is a message whose content
and intensity is judged hurtful and obnoxious. This language cannot be characterized as 'low value' speech, except
by virtue of a judgment about its substantive message").
320. Matsuda, supra note 256, at 2359. See also Kretzmer, supra note 315, at 458 ("racism is unique").
321. See Bork. Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. I. 31 (1971) where
Bork states:
Speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government . . . violates constitutional truths about
processes and . . . is not aimed at a new definition of political truth by a legislative majority. Violent
overthrow of government breaks the premises of our system concerning the ways in which truth is defined.
and yet those premises are the only reasons for protecting political speech.
Unlike speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government, racist speech does not violate the premises of our
system. Though such speech may clash with egalitarian ideals, it does not challenge the notion of majority rule.
The most that can be said of racist speech is that it deserves no more protection than speech advocating a nonvio-
lent transition to a nondemocratic form of government or speech advocating any other nondemocratic idea.
322. Justice Douglas' dissent in Bcauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. 286 (1952), was prophetic:
Today a white man stands convicted for protesting in unseemly language against our decisions invalidating
restrictive covenants. Tomorrow a Negro will be haled before a court for denouncing lynch law in heated
terms. Farm laborers in the West who compete with field hands drifting up from Mexico; whites who feel
the pressure of orientals; a minority which finds employment going to members of the dominant religious
group-all of these are caught in the mesh of today's decision.. .. The Framers of the Constitution knew
human nature as well as we do. They too had lived in dangerous days; they too knew the suffocating
influence of orthodoxy and standardized thought. They weighed the compulsions for restrained speech and
thought against the abuses of liberty. They chose liberty.
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hatefulness and without the endorsement of persecution." 323 Thus, before speak-
ing, a potential speaker must consider whether he can prove in court that the
context is "free of hatefulness" and that he is not endorsing "persecution." This
is not necessarily an easy determination. For example, some would no doubt
argue that statements urging the elimination of affirmative action are hateful
and advocate persecution, yet such statements seem to be the kind of political
speech that is at the core of first amendment protection.
Exempting targeted vilification in the context of an imbalance in power
from the strictures of the first amendment might satisfy Delgado's desire for a
racist-speech tort, but it would leave a great deal of speech that has heretofore
been regulated under Title VII unregulated. Many courts have permitted har-
assment actions to proceed based in part upon offensive speech that was not
directed toward the plaintiff324-- that is, not "targeted"--and some courts have
permitted harassment actions based in part upon speech that was not even wit-
nessed by the plaintiff.3 25 Other courts have permitted harassment actions by
coworkers where no such imbalance in power is present,3 26 and some courts
have even permitted harassment actions by supervisors challenging the speech
of their subordinates.3 27 Unless "inequality of power" means something other
than the relationship between the individual speaker and the individual listener,
Delgado's exception would not apply.
The fact that the preceding discussion has focused on the more extreme
and vicious epithets that may be hurled at blacks and women should not ob-
scure the fact that harassment doctrine under Title VII is not so limited. Even
if the word "nigger" may be prohibited consistent with the first amendment,
what about other words applied to blacks, such as "nigra," "Negro," ".colored,"
and, with the advent of the now-preferred "African American," perhaps even
the term "black" itself? All of the above words were at one time thought to be
the "civil" alternative to more demeaning references. They may now be consid-
ered to be insulting to varying degrees.328 Moreover, not all offensive speech
consists of discrete epithets; it may also include ideas that are viewed as offen-
323. Matsuda, supra note 256, at 2358. This standard is reminiscent of the group libel statute considered in
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254 (1952), where truth was a defense only when "published with good
motives and for justifiable ends."
324. See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 n.2 (I Ith Cir. 1982) (even though racial slurs not
directed at plaintiff, language nonetheless had effect of altering conditions of employment); Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at 31 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("The perception that the work environ-
ment is hostile can be influenced by treatment of other persons of a plaintiffs protected class, even if that treat-
ment is learned second-hand"); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("the record is
replete with [the supervisor's] . . . attitude toward and remarks about other women").
325. See Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.D.C. 1988) ("evidence of the general work atmo-
sphere, involving employees other than the plaintiff, is relevant to the issue of whether there existed an atmosphere
of hostile work environment which violated Title VII").
326. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) ("The capacity of any person to create a hostile
or offensive environment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which the employer
confers upon that individual").
327. Moffctt v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 244, 272 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (allowing action by supervi-
sor based upon harassment of subordinates on ground that "the relationship between the parties is immaterial to
the question of whether plaintiff could be harassed in violation of Title VII"); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods.
Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
328. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 179-80 ("boy" might be actionable, but "dumb honkey" might not be).
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sive but expressed without use of offensive words.329 Many harassment claims
have been based upon racial, ethnic, or sexual jokes. Although some may find
such jokes categorically offensive, most would acknowledge a broad range of
meaning for such jokes. Although some are hateful, others are more gentle,
even affectionate.330 Courts in harassment cases, however, almost never describe
the jokes for which they are imposing liability, instead simply describing them
as "racial and ethnic jokes" or "dirty jokes" and assuming that is the end of the
inquiry.
Similarly, in the sexual context, assuming that the most offensive vulgari-
ties are regulable, other terms, such as "broads," 331 "girls," or even "ladies," or
such terms of address as "honey," "babe,"' 32 and "tiger"33 3 are less obviously
so, even though they are often considered "degrading" of the female sex. 33'
Moreover, if sexual terms limited to women are prohibited, that suggests that
equivalent terms relating to men should likewise be prohibited. 33 6 A rule that
prohibited anti-female statements but permitted anti-male statements would be
inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality required by the first amendment.
A mighty conviction that "women should not be sex objects" or that "big-
otry is bad" is an insufficient basis for attempting to outlaw expressions of those
views. In the first place, the first amendment requires an official agnosticism on
questions of social policy.336 Government may legitimately advocate and imple-
One court has even held that the term "Mexican" is derogatory when applied to Mexicans. Dominguez v.
Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 213, 638 P.2d 423, 425 (N.M. App. 1981).
329. See, e.g., EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Minn. 1980) ("Send
all blacks back to Africa").
330. Consider for example, the joke, "How many Jewish mothers does it take to screw in a light bulb?
None-I'll just sit here in the dark." Even though some people may be offended by the joke, it is difficult to
consider it hateful. Of course, part of the reason that it is not considered hateful is that it builds on a stereotype
that Jews themselves endorse; many a borscht-belt comedian has made a career out of similar jokes.
331. Sanchez v. Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
332. See Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460, 463 (E.D. Va. 1987).
333. Yolk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (7th Cir. 1988).
334. See Love, supra note 3, at 139 n.140:
The word "female" was preferred over "women" in the nineteenth century, but soon "female" was consid-
ered degrading, and it was replaced by "lady," which in turn became vulgarized. As a society, we have
now come full circle, and "woman," newly rehabilitated, is the term of choice for referring to a person of
the female sex.
But see Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D. Va. 1987) (supervisor "used the term *woman' in a
derogatory manner").
335. Greenawalt argues that "[ci]alling a woman a cunt should be treated like calling a man a 'prick."'
Greenawalt, supra, note 319, at 299. The two epithets may not be equivalents in meaning, however, even if they
enjoy equivalent status under the first amendment. Calling a man a "prick" is equivalent to calling him a "bas-
tard," an "asshole," or a "son of a bitch." He is being attacked as an individual on the basis of an obnoxious
personality. The term "cunt," on the other hand, is perceived, at least by some, as having a broader meaning that
is derisive toward the entire sex. Thus, "bitch" is probably more equivalent to "prick," having at least in some
contexts more of an individualized meaning. The statement "She's a bitch" is not usually intended to reflect on
women as a whole, although the use of the term generically-such as "The bitches are out to lunch"-probably
does. However, that is a distinction that not everyone would necessarily make. See Strauss, supra note I, at I
("Women are called 'cunt.' 'pussy,' and 'bitch' "). In any event, a restriction on expression that rests on such fine
distinctions cannot help but overregulate expression.
336. But see Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 106 (M.D. Ala. 1965): "[I]t seems basic to our consti-
tutional principles that the extent of the right to assemble, demonstrate and march peaceably along the highways
and streets in an orderly manner should be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs that are being pro-
tested and petitioned against."
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ment one policy over another, but it may not stifle debate simply by labelling
certain social views "wrong." Mari Matsuda, however, would do just that. She
argues: "We can attack racist speech- not because it isn't really speech, not
because it falls within a hoped-for neutral exception, but because it is
wrong." 337 How do we know it is wrong? She tells us that racist speech is wrong
because everybody knows it is wrong: "The uniform rejection of racist ideology
is evidence of moral truth. 338  Of course, not everyone rejects racist ideology; if
everyone did there would be nothing to discuss. 339 But if we assume that her
point is rather that where a vast majority has rejected the ideology, we may
label the beliefs of the holdouts "wrong," she is advocating a rule that the
speech of minorities is not entitled to protection where it conflicts with the views
of a substantial majority. Such reasoning turns the first amendment on its head,
since if majority sentiments may be called upon to justify suppression of minor-
ity viewpoints, the first amendment fails in its essential purpose: The views of a
majority need no constitutional protection from political processes, and, accord-
ing to Matsuda, the views of the minority are not entitled to protection when
they run counter to the majority. To paraphrase Justice Powell in Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc.,340 there is almost no such thing as a false idea.
Judge Keith, dissenting in Rabidue, had similar confidence in his ability to
divine the morally correct position. The majority had invoked contemporary mo-
res for its conclusion that the effect of pin-up posters should not be deemed
hostile "in the context of a society that condones and publicly features and com-
mercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the news-
337. Matsuda, supra note 256, at 2380. See also Wright, supra note 235, at 2 (theory of article "seeks also
to give appropriate theoretical weight to the society's recognition of the sheer moral wrongness of racist speech, as
distinguished from the possible harmful social and psychological consequences of such speech in particular
cases"): Id. at 9 ("[t]he essence of the public policy underlying the wrongness of the use of racial epithets is...
that it is morally wrong, largely independent of its degree of popularity or offensiveness").
Suggestions of this kind demonstrate the danger in relying upon a "search for truth" justification for free
expression. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 617 (1982):
[A]ny theory positing that the value of free speech is the search for truth creates a great danger that
someone will decide that he finally has attained knowledge of the truth. At that point, that individual (or
society) may feel fully justified, as a matter of both morality and logic, in shutting off expression of any
views that are contrary to this "truth."
338. Matsuda, supra note 256 at 2359 n.203 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978). But see J.S. MILL ON LIBERTY 16
(London 1859) ("If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing
that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind").
339. Matsuda acknowledges that perhaps not every country has rejected a racist ideology, but she suggests
that if South Africa has not done so, it does not disprove her assertion of "uniform rejection," but rather shows
that South Africa is morally wrong. Matsuda, supra note 256, at 2359. She points out that in making its case to
the world community, South Africa is careful to avoid an "explicit ideology of racial supremacy." But to show
that expression of a given ideology is impolitic at a given time is hardly dispositive of whether it is a moral
absolute. Moreover, the same argument could be made about other ideologies as well, such as democracy. Even
the most repressive countries-perhaps especially those countries-have taken pains to label themselves democra-
cies: the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of China.
Few countries advocate an ideology of dictatorship. By Matsuda's reasoning, banning advocacy of nondemocratic
forms of rule would thus be consistent with the first amendment because a dictatorship of a few oppressing the
many is "morally wrong." Needless to say, we already know that not only is advocacy of a dictatorship constitu-
tionally protected, advocacy of armed overthrow of our democratic government in order to establish that dictator-
ship is likewise protected. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
340. 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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stands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places. 34 1
Judge Keith rejected that line of argument, suggesting that "'society' in this
scenario must primarily refer to the unenlightened," and then went on to assert
that "the relevant inquiry at hand is what the reasonable woman would find
offensive, not society, which at one point also condoned slavery. '342 Judge Keith
then expressed doubt that "reasonable women condone the pervasive degrada-
tion and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American culture. '343
He thus dismissed societal norms-in addition to the values of "unreasonable"
women-as a basis for evaluating the offensiveness of speech, preferring instead
to measure the speech against the views of the "enlightened." Needless to say,
it would be the rare judge for whom the views of the enlightened were in con-
flict with his own.
An impulse to censor should not follow from the certainty of one's moral
views. Those who are willing to restrict speech based upon their views of "moral
truth" or "enlightened vision" should consider the following observation by
John Stuart Mill:
Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from
carrying the weight in their practical judgment which is always allowed to it in theory;
for while everyone well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any
precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of
which they feel very certain may be one of the examples of the error to which they
acknowledge themselves to be liable.3" '
Certainty about the correctness of one's views should not lead to certainty about
the correctness of silencing one's opponents.
It has been argued that categorical protection of speech is necessary to
protect free expression in "pathological times. 3 45 That protection should not be
viewed, however, as protection that we are preserving for a hypothetical "rainy
day." A greater or lesser degree of pathology is always with us; only its form
changes. We feared communists in the 1950s, hippies in the 1960s, and Nazi
marchers in Skokie in the 1970s. Today's bogey men are the racists and the
sexists. Of one thing we may be certain: any precedents established "just this
once" to permit regulation of racist and sexist speech will later be called upon
to support regulation of other speech.
Any kind of balancing approach presents the opportunity for the decision-
maker to judge the challenged speech against his own values and is therefore
unlikely to be sufficiently protective of speech. The risk that a balancing ap-
proach will "balance away" the right to free speech is demonstrated by the
arguments of Marcy Strauss.341 She identifies four categories of sexist speech
that might be the subject of sexual harassment complaints; then, employing a
balancing approach, concludes that almost all such speech is subject to prohibi-
tion. The four categories are: "(1) sexual demands or requests; (2) sexually
341. Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d at 622.
342. Id. at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting).
343. Id.
344. J.S. MILL, supra note 338, at 17.
345. Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 474-80 (1985).
346. See Strauss, supra note I.
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explicit speech directed at the woman employee; (3) degrading speech directed
at the employee; and (4) sexually explicit or degrading speech or expression
that is not directed at the woman, but which she overhears or sees". 3,7 Accord-
ing to Strauss, a balancing of the state's interest in prohibiting the first three
categories always outweighs the free speech interest. Sexual demands or re-
quests may be regulated because of "the state['s] interest in preventing employ-
ers from coercing employees into sexual relationships. '34 8 The state's interest in
regulating sexually explicit speech directed at an employee is outweighed by
"the state's interest in equality" and "the state's interest in protecting a captive
audience. 3 49 Directed speech that is degrading is "discriminatory" and there-
fore subject to regulation.350 Only degrading speech not directed at the em-
ployee is subject to an ad hoc balancing test. However, once the plaintiff shows
that "she was unable to escape exposure to the speech," the speech should be
considered directed, therefore falling into the third category of automatically
regulable speech.351 As a result, "the area of nondirected speech is limited. 352
Surprisingly, however, Strauss suggests that her approach "reaffirms . . . a
commitment to preserving the values of freedom of expression. ''353
The risk of balancing is also demonstrated by the analysis of the court in
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,354 in which the court engaged in a
balancing of "the governmental interest in cleansing the workplace of impedi-
ments to the equality of women" against the offensive speech. Not surprisingly,
the court favored the former interest. The way it formulated the comparison, no
rational person could come to the opposite conclusion. After all, what is more
important-the equality of women or a few dozen dirty pictures? Seldom will
the speech suppressed by a given application of a law outweigh the abstract
goals supporting the law, but in assessing a first amendment challenge to a na-
tional-security law that suppresses dissent, we do not balance national security
against the value of the unpatriotic ramblings of the mentally ill war protester
who happens to have been ensnared by the law. A proper comparison in Robin-
son would be between the goal-the equality of women-and the total amount
of expression that is suppressed by Title VII. Even then, the means would have
to be narrowly tailored to achieve the end, and there would have to be a strong
nexus between the means and the ends. Although the Robinson court asserted
that the means were narrowly tailored, 355 the court nowhere explained how a
standard that makes speech unlawful if "a reasonable woman would perceive
that an abusive working environment has been created,"3 56 could possibly be
347. Id. at 43.
348. Id. at 44.
349. Id. at 45.
350. Id. at 46.
351. Id. at 48.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 51.
354. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *158-59 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
355. Id. at 159.
356. Id. at 118.
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considered narrowly tailored. What the court's analysis really demonstrates is
that it did not take the first amendment issue seriously.
B. The Value of Offensive Speech
The considerations discussed above counsel hesitation even if we are con-
vinced that offensive speech lacks first amendment value. The problem of the
"slippery slope" suggests that regulating speech that we assume valueless may
lead to regulation of speech that does have value.3 57 Moreover, there is a sub-
stantial difficulty in establishing an acceptable mechanism for determining on
an ad hoc basis which speech is protected and which is not. These concerns
assume even greater proportions, however, if it is acknowledged that some of
these statements are not wholly without first amendment value.
Scholars over the years have identified a number of reasons that we protect
speech.3 58 A detailed discussion of these reasons is beyond the scope of this
Article, but under almost any rationale, at least some of the speech involved in
harassment cases has some value. The most obvious traditional first amendment
value of racist and sexist speech is that it constitutes an expression of views on
important issues of social policy. Political speech is often said to be at the
"core" of first amendment protection.359 It cannot be doubted that the general
subject of relations between the sexes and the races is an important matter of
public concern. Everyone would agree that statements such as "blacks are enti-
tled to the same respect as whites" or "women have as much right to participate
in the economic life of our country as men" have significant value under the
first amendment; indeed those sentiments have been enshrined in many of our
laws. For purposes of political debate, the converse of those statements must
also be seen as having first amendment value because of the government's "par-
amount obligation of neutrality." 6 0 Although we may personally believe that
the former statements have greater merit, in the sense that they are morally
correct and reflect contemporary values, under the first amendment both state-
ments are entitled to equal legal protection.3 61 That we as a society no longer
accept the truth of the statements arguing for inequality does not make them
any less worthy of protection.3 62 Under almost everyone's view of the first
357. See Heins, supra note 273, at 592 n.39 ("Tolerating ugly, vicious speech is a small but necessary price
to pay for the freedom to advocate social change and justice").
358. Compare T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (asserting that the first amend-
ment serves four values: (I) "assuring individual self-fulfillment"; (2) "advancing knowledge and discovering
truth"; (3) "provid[ing] for participation in decision making by all members of society"; and (4) "achieving a
more adaptable and hence a more stable community . . . maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus") with Bork, supra note 321, at 26 (the first amendment protects only "explic-
itly and predominantly political speech").
359. See generally A. MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948).
360. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
361. See A. MEIKELJOHN, supra note 359, at 26-28 (1948). ("The vital point . . . is that no suggestion of
policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than another.. .. These conflicting
views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but because they are relevant.") See also
J.S. MILL, supra note 338 at 17. ("To refuse a hearing to an opinion because they are sure that it is false is to
assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
infallibility.")
362. But see L. BOLLINGER. THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 54 (1986):
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amendment, the statements would have been protected in the nineteenth cen-
tury, when they reflected prevailing social norms; they cannot be banned now
simply because conceptions of sound policy have changed.13
In addition to whatever value it might have in contributing to political dis-
course, sexist and racist speech also may serve a valuable function by acting as
a "safety valve," which has been recognized by some as a reason to protect
speech.36' A similar value has been identified in ethnic jokes.3 65 One of the com-
monly cited functions of the first amendment is to encourage expression of feel-
ings of frustration and thereby decrease resort to violence.38 In a number of
harassment cases, it appears that some of the offensive language is a product of
resentment of affirmative action or even of prohibitions against discrimination.
If so, that resentment can only be exacerbated by insulating women and minori-
ties from offense and requiring a modification of employee behavior upon entry
of women or minorities into the workplace. Expressions of hostility may be su-
perior to the manifestations of hostility that might result if the expression is
prohibited.
Modification of first amendment doctrine should not even be contemplated
to accommodate harassment claims without a clear vision of the benefits of do-
ing so. Yet, it is far from obvious that regulation of offensive speech achieves
The more we believe in the immorality or error of the ideas being expressed through the speech, the more
attenuated is the truth-seeking advantage claimed as the justification for the free speech principle. The
"'value" to us in these terms ranges from remote to none. Just as in [the] libel area the Court sometimes
recognized no "value" in defamatory false statements of fact, so we might appropriately extend that to at
least some portion of the realm of opinion as well.
363. See Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("a state is, ordinarily.
denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its
citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence").
364. Id. at 375. Justice Brandeis continued:
But [the founders) knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infrac-
tion; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportu-
nity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.
See also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON. ON TORTS, 59 (5th ed. 1984):
There is still, in this country at least, such a thing as liberty to express an unflattering opinion of another,
however wounding it may be to the other's feelings; and in the interest not only of freedom of speech but
also of avoidance of other more dangerous conduct, it is still very desirable that some safety valve be left
through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
But see Wright, supra note 235, at 3 (suggesting that use of racial epithets to "vent frustration" does not "impli-
cate significantly the purposes or values underlying the free speech clause").
365. See Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 529-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (for majority group members.
ethnic humor may displace aggression, protect self-esteem, define self-image, and reduce uncertainty about the
perceived world, and for minority group members, it may "strengthen their morale and bolster their sense of
identity") (collecting sources).
366. Redish has commented on such a function, suggesting that the theoretical fallacy of the Chaplinsky
doctrine "is the assumption that the value of free speech is as a means to attain truth":
Why not view Chaplinksy's comments as a personal catharsis, as a means to vent his frustration at a
system he deemed-whether rightly or wrongly-to be oppressive? Is it not a mark of individuality to be
able to cry out at a society viewed as crushing the individual? Under this analysis, so-called "fighting
words" represent a significant means of self-realization, whether or not they can be considered a means of
attaining some elusive "truth."
Redish. supra note 337, at 626. See also Greenawalt. supra note 319. at 289 ("Despite causing occasional divi-
siveness, [freedom of expression] can enhance social stability by reducing resentment"); Snell, 611 F. Supp. at
531 (suggesting that ethnic slurs may have "cathartic value").
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the goals of eliminating prejudice. In fact, expressions of sexist and racist views
may actually have a beneficial impact on social views, because hearing such
statements in their baldest form may have the effect of demonstrating the pov-
erty of the beliefs expressed. As John Stuart Mill recognized, even obviously
false statements are worthy of protection:
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suf-
fered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those
who receive it, be held in the manner 'of, a prejudice, with little comprehension or
feeling of its rational grounds.367
The creators of All in the Family understood this. Archie Bunker was not cre-
ated as a television character for the purpose of persuading viewers of the cor-
rectness of his ideas.368 Rather, his character was an attempt to demonstrate the
ugliness of prejudice by exposing viewers to its expression. Stifling that expres-
sion could have the unwanted effect of reducing the extent to which persons
having unarticulated prejudices examine them. 9
It is also doubtful that regulation of offensive speech advances the goal of
facilitating the acceptance of women and minorities in the workplace; indeed,
one can imagine the frustration that accused harassers must sometimes feel. For
example, in Lynch v. Des Moines, 70 the court agreed that when it came to
"raw sexual banter," the plaintiff "sometimes gave as much as she got." None-
theless, the court sustained her claim on the ground that she had indicated to
the alleged harassers and her supervisor that "this state of affairs was offensive
and unacceptable."137' Likewise in Loftin-Boggs v. Meridian,37 2 the court, al-
though denying plaintiff's claim because she had participated in and even initi-
ated some of the crude language, jokes, and sexual storytelling that were al-
ready prevalent in the department, suggested that she legitimately could
continue to exercise veto power over the speech of her coworkers.
Plaintiff's participation in the conduct leading to the creation of the alleged hostile
environment does not permanently bar a successful claim of sexual harassment. Once
her participation is established, however, she must be able to identify with some preci-
sion a point at which she made known to her co-workers or superiors that such con-
duct would [henceforth] be considered offensive.373
In other words, though a willing participant in the sexual banter, the plaintiff
has a continuing power to silence her coworkers.
367. J.S. MILL, supra note 338, at 50.
368. See Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (referring to
Archie Bunker as "a character who is prejudiced and biased against all persons other than of his own neighbor-
hood, religion and nationality").
369. Vincent Blasi has suggested another reason to tolerate extremist speech: "[T]here is real value in letting
persons who hold extremist views participate in the processes and rituals of governance. It is a significant gesture,
symbolizing a reliance on consent rather than force, for a political community to treat its most hated and irrespon-
sible members as citizens nonetheless."
Blasi, The Teaching Function of the First Amendment (Book Review), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 387. 408 (1987).
370. 454 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1990).
371. Id. at 834.
372. 633 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
373. Id. at 1327 n.8.
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Similar reasoning was employed in Swentek v. USAir, Inc.,37 4 in which the
court of appeals overturned a defense judgment that had been granted in part
because of the plaintiff's own past conduct and use of foul language. The dis-
trict court had ruled against the stewardess plaintiff based upon findings that
she had placed a "dildo" in her supervisor's mailbox to get her to "loosen up,"
urinated in a cup and passed it as a drink to another employee, and had
grabbed the genitals of a pilot with a "frank invitation to a sexual encounter."
The court of appeals held that "[p]laintiff's use of foul language or sexual innu-
endo in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal protections against unwel-
come harassment.' ,,37' The court instructed the district court on remand to de-
termine "whether plaintiff welcomed the particular conduct in question from
the alleged harrasser. a37
The "continuing veto" approach has been adopted by analogy to rules es-
tablished in rape cases and expanded to quid pro quo harassment, but it is inap-
propriate for courts to import those principles on a wholesale basis into the law
of environmental harassment. There is substantial difference between a rule
that a woman may withhold consent at will to each act of intercourse and a rule
that a woman may withhold consent at will to each utterance of foul language
by others.377 The courts in Lynch, Loftin-Boggs, and Swentek seem to permit
employees in a protected class to engage in the same conduct that they later
complain of and then to "touch base" and declare that they prefer to participate
no longer. That seems less an antidiscrimination principle than a principle of
special treatment, which is more likely to lead to resentment than acceptance of
women and minorities in the workplace.
If the goal of those who advocate eliminating first amendment protection
for offensive speech is to decrease the amount of offense suffered by the groups
intended to be protected, their means may be counter-productive. There is sub-
stantial question whether it is sound public policy to permit a person to recover
for offense, since the moral hazard is great. Creation of a cause of action for
offense may simply result in an increase in offense, because the potential for
recovery in a civil action creates a substantial incentive to interpret language as
offensive.3 78 It may well be that, as Magruder argued over a half-century ago, a
"toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever
374. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
375. Id. at 557 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)). In Katz, there was no evi-
dence that "linguistic intimacy" was known to harassing employee.
376. Swentek. 830 F.2d at 557.
377. The court in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). also adopted a view that allows a plaintiff
substantial unilateral control over whether a defendant's conduct is actionable. There, the court held that even
though the district court had understandably characterized the accused harasser's conduct as "isolated and triv-
ial," id. at 880, the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of harassment because she did not consider the
conduct to be trivial and the court could not say that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's reaction was "'idiosyncratic
and hypersensitive," Thus. under the Ninth Circuit's view, the plaintiff need not establish that the defendant's
conduct was unreasonable: she need show only that her reaction to it was not unreasonable as a matter of law.
378. In one sexual harassment case about which the author has personal knowledge, the plaintiff contended
that her supervisor had told her that she should turn her house into a brothel. On deposition it turned out that the
basis for her contention was that her supervisor, who sold real estate in his spare time, had told her, "You should
make your house work for you."
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be."3711 Kent Greenawalt acknowledges that general principle, but argues that in
the context of racist speech it is inapplicable: even if "coarse and . . . hurtful
comments should be protected in the rough and tumble of vigorous dialogue
• . . group epithets and slurs designed to wound listeners are another mat-
ter."' a 0 However, it is not clear why group epithets and slurs are "another mat-
ter" other than the fact that we may choose to believe that they are. Under
Greenawalt's view, the most hurtful epithet that might be hurled at a particular
white person is protected by the first amendment; any hurtful epithet relating to
race that one might direct to "a reviled minority" is not.381 Although the Su-
preme Court has in several cases held that expression directed toward children
is entitled to less constitutional protection than that directed toward adults,382 it
is probably not in the interests of minorities (and women) to be the beneficiaries
of that kind of protectionist doctrine. In any event, in an age when racist and
sexist sentiments are deemed in most circles to reflect adversely on the speaker
rather than the target, modification of constitutional doctrine to permit legal
sanctions against racist and sexist expression seems largely unnecessary.
VII. THE FUTURE OF HOSTILE-ENVIRONMENT THEORY
A conclusion that the current definition of hostile-environment harassment
is unconstitutional does not sound the death knell for the hostile-environment
theory. The truly egregious cases, such as Hall v. Gus Construction Co.,383 will
remain unaffected, because they typically rely little on protected expression.
Moreover, the analysis presented here does not impair the strength of hostile-
environment cases based upon unwanted sexual touching. Only the ability of a
plaintiff to make out a hostile-environment case based upon expression is sub-
stantially affected.
Given that most of the expression involved in harassment cases cannot be
punished under the first amendment, admission into evidence of expression to
support a hostile-environment claim should be the exception, rather than the
rule. A hostile-environment claim cannot be based even in part on protected
expression.38 4 Therefore, the woman who complains that her supervisor touched
her in inappropriate ways and posted Playboy pin-ups on his wall should not be
permitted to introduce the latter evidence; instead, her case must stand or fall
on whether the touching was unwanted and sufficiently severe and pervasive to
create a hostile environment. 385
379. Magruder. Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts. 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1035
(1936). See also Bradshaw v. Swagerty, I Kan. App. 2d 213, 216, 563 P.2d 511, 514 (1977) (racial epithets are
"insults of the kind which must be tolerated in our roughedged society").
380. Greenawalt. supra note 319, at 307.
381. Under this view, calling a white man the "illegitimate son of a diseased whore" is protected by the first
amendment: calling a black man "boy" is not.
382. New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989).
383. See supra note 57.
384. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.. 458 U.S. 886, 920-24 (1982).
385. The fact that viewpoint-neutral prohibitions of unprotected speech are permissible does not save Title
VII harassment claims that are based upon unprotected offensive expression, because the nature of the Title VII
claims is not viewpoint neutral. Graphic expression of the ideal of equality will not support a Title VII claim:
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The one circumstance in which expression might be relied upon consistent
with the first amendment to support a claim of hostile environment is when
expression is used to show motive, but the expression may not be used to add
weight to the assertion that the environment was hostile. Because Title VII pro-
hibits harassment only on the basis of protected status, an employee must show
that harassment taking a nonsexual or nonracial form was the product of sexual
or racial animus. What is said in the context of the harassment may well shed
light on the motivation. If so, it should be admissible for that purpose. However,
the trier of fact should not be permitted to consider the offense engendered by
the expression in determining whether the environment was a hostile one. If the
trial is to a jury, the jury should be given a limiting instruction to that effect.
Moreover, the court should consider carefully in such circumstances whether
the potential prejudice of admitting that evidence outweighs its probative
value.38 6
As a practical matter, it is precisely because of its prejudicial effect that
plaintiffs often seek to introduce evidence of protected speech. Where clear evi-
dence of bad acts is present, such evidence is not necessary. However, plaintiffs
seek to support their claims by demonstrating that the defendants are "bad per-
sons." The trier of fact need not agonize in a close case on either liability or
punitive damages (under those statutes that permit such damages) if it is clear
that the defendant is an odious person with odious beliefs. There are few ways
more effective today to demonstrate "badness" than to show that a person is a
racist or a sexist. Once it is shown that a defendant is a member of the Ku Klux
Klan or a self-proclaimed "male chauvinist pig," wears "Wallace for President"
buttons, or argues that blacks are fit only to be slaves and women fit only to
serve the sexual needs of men, whether the defendant actually committed a spe-
cific punishable act is almost beside the point. In many circumstances, the rules
of evidence have been effective in protecting defendants from prejudice by limit-
ing introduction of "bad character" evidence. The need for such protection is no
weaker in harassment cases.
As long as hostile-environment claims may be based to any extent upon
expression, a pleading requirement similar to that employed by many courts in
defamation cases is necessary. 38 7 Courts should require the plaintiff to specify in
the complaint the precise language used by the alleged harasser upon pain of
dismissal. Plaintiffs should not be permitted simply to allege in conclusory terms
graphic expression of the ideal of inequality will. Unless the standard for harassment is transformed into a view-
point-ncutral one, a result seemingly inconsistent with Title VIl's status as a discrimination statute, even unpro-
tected speech may not be called upon to support a hostile-environment claim. Cf. Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241.
244 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding West Virginia telephone-harassment statute on ground that it "is clearly not a
censorial statute, directed at any group or viewpoint. It seeks to protect citizens from harassment in an even-
handed and neutral fashion. Indeed, the statute requires no inquiry into the content of the telephone
conversation").
386. See FED R. EVID. 403.
387. See. e.g.. Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp.. 857 F.2d 96. 109 (3d Cir. 1988) (if "constitu-
tional protections are to have meaning, a plaintiff must be required to set forth allegedly actionable statements
with particularity"): Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692. 699 (8th Cir. 1979) ("the use of in haec verba
pleadings on defamation charges is favored in the federal courts because generally knowledge of the exact lan-
guage used is necessary to form responsive pleadings").
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the existence of "racial slurs," "racist jokes," "sexual innuendo," "dirty jokes,"
"sexist remarks," "pornographic pictures," and so forth.3 88 A requirement of
specificity in pleading allows defendants subject to litigation over protected ex-
pression to extricate themselves from meritless cases as quickly as possible,
thereby reducing the burden on first amendment rights. If the complaint reveals
that the claim is based upon speech that cannot be regulated under the first
amendment, then the defendant may escape on a motion to dismiss, rather than
being forced to the expense of conducting discovery only to learn that the plain-
tiff's claim rests wholly on protected expression.
The standards advocated in this Article are necessary to comport with the
first amendment. It should be acknowledged, however, that there is some ex-
pression that is not regulable under current doctrine that in an ideal world
would be regulated. Consider the supervisor who deliberately sets out to make
the workplace inhospitable to employees and does so not through use of expres-
sion outside the protection of the first amendment, not through increased work
assignments or lesser pay, but through daily statements that he knows will be
offensive to the employee with the intent to drive the employee into resigning.
Speech that is intended to cause emotional distress is entitled to little first
amendment protection, 389 especially if uttered with the conscious intent to com-
pel an employee to resign. It is difficult to see any first amendment value in such
speech and tempting to consider such expression as "conduct." If a standard
could be devised that would fairly limit restrictions of expression in such con-
texts, the first amendment would not be imperiled, even if the restriction was
not, strictly speaking, viewpoint neutral. The difficulty would be in identifying
the proper cases and ensuring that no liability would attach in other cases and
that an inordinate amount of expression would not be chilled. Surmounting that
difficulty appears impossible.
Even a narrowly tailored exception that looked to intent would swallow the
rule. Because there seldom will be direct evidence of intent-few potential
plaintiffs would be lucky enough for their harasser to tell them that he intends
to drive them from the workplace-circumstantial evidence of intent will be
required in virtually all cases. What kind of evidence would a plaintiff be able
to present? A sexual harassment plaintiff might argue, for example, that offen-
sive statements or posted "girlie" pictures reveal that intent. After all, one in-
tends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, and the natural and
probable consequence of saying or doing something offensive is to offend. The
approach of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit would likely become the
standard: "The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sex-
ual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory lan-
guage is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course."390 Thus
388. In one sexual harassment case about which the author has personal knowledge, the plaintiff alleged in
her complaint that her supervisors and coworkers subjected her to "pornographic radio programs." On deposition.
it turned out that her complaint was that some employees listened to the "Dr. Ruth" show.
389. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
390. Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).
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could an intent to drive someone from the workplace be inferred from any of-
fensive speech, and the problems of censorship recur.
The situation with respect to coworker speech would be similar. The em-
ployee complains to management about comments she does not like; manage-
ment does nothing or dismisses the comments as jokes. A failure on the part of
management to put an end to the offensive speech could support a claim that
management intended that the plaintiff be driven from the workplace."' 1
Because courts are reluctant to grant summary judgment when intent is
disputed, offensive statements will often be sufficient to get the plaintiff to trial;
then, at trial, any offensive statements or pictorial material of the kind that
have been discussed in this Article could be admitted for the purpose of showing
intent. Because that is so, the very same kinds of self-censorship imposed by
employers under current Title VII doctrine would occur. As unpalatable as it
may seem, this may be one of those circumstances where we must protect
speech lacking first amendment value in order to preserve the protection of
speech entitled to it.392
VIII. CONCLUSION
The impulse to censor is a powerful one, and it has been given free rein
under Title VII. Not only has "targeted vilification" been regulated, but much
less harmful and less invidiously motivated expression has been restricted as
well. That so much speech has been stifled without substantial outcry is in large
measure a reflection of the powerful current consensus against racism and sex-
ism. But it is precisely when a powerful consensus exists that the censorial im-
pulse is most dangerous and, ironically, least necessary. The primary risk of
censorship in our society today is not from a government fearful of challenge,
but from majorities seeking to establish an orthodoxy for all society. When the
orthodoxy is one of "equality," that risk is at its highest. 393
391. Cf. Illinois Dep't of Corrections v. Human Rights Comm'n, 178 III. App. 3d 1033, 1048-49, 534 N.E.2d
161. 171 (1989) (supervisor's "repeated use of the language after [plaintiff's] numerous requests that he cease
'suggests either a deliberate course of causing discomfort or at least a deliberate and knowing disregard of her
objections'") (quoting decision of administrative law judge).
392. Similarly, although "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact," Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). the Constitution nonetheless protects such statements, New York Times, Inc. v.
Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In other words, "[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood
in order to protect speech that matters." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341. See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 213:
It must be recognized, of course, that a reason implicit in the breadth of the protection afforded speech is
due to the judicial recognition of its own capacity to make nice discriminations. It reflects a strategy that
requires that speech be overprotected in order to assure that it is not underprotected.
By the same token, to acknowledge first amendment protection of the expression of social views-even odious
ones-but to allow defeasance of that protection by a showing of intent to offend or to drive from the workplace, is
to extend no first amendment protection at all. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64. 73 (1964) ("Debate on
public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke
out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of
ideas and the ascertainment of truth").
393. See generally Browne. Liberty vs. Equality. Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 59 DEN. L. 417 (1982). See also A. DE TOCQUEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191-92 (1842):
Democratic nations are at all times fond of equality, but there are certain epochs at which the passion
they entertain for it swells to the height of fury . . . . Tell them not that, by this blind surrender of
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The definition of "harassment" contained in the EEOC Guidelines and ap-
plied by the courts, combined with vicarious employer liability, creates a sub-
stantial chilling effect on discussion in the workplace of matters even tangen-
tially dealing with sex and race. Acting pursuant to those Guidelines, courts
have displayed remarkably little discernment among examples of expression.
Once they have been labelled as racist or sexist, all such expression has been
deemed regulable. Although much of the speech that has been described in this
Article arguably may be regulated through appropriately narrow and specific
legislation that is viewpoint neutral, the Guidelines are not the appropriate vehi-
cle, and, in fact, are so vague and so overbroad that they may not be applied
even to unprotected speech consistent with the Constitution.
The current approach to regulation of offensive speech is directly contrary
to the traditional notion that noxious ideas should be countered through juxta-
position with good ideas in the hope that the bad ideas will lose out in the
marketplace of ideas. To a degree perhaps unprecedented, the current attempt
to stifle offensive speech can be viewed as an attempt to achieve not only an
egalitarian orthodoxy of speech and action but an orthodoxy of thought itself.
Consider, for example, prohibitions against employees' having sexually explicit
pictures on the inside of their lockers or their reading Playboy (or worse) in the
workplace. The justification for such regulation is not that women of delicate
sensibilities might see the material and be shocked by it. Rather, the basis for
the prohibition is that some people, mostly women, are offended by what the
employee is thinking while he is looking at the pictures; they are offended by
the way he "views" 94-that is, "thinks about"-women.
39 5
An apparently growing number of academics and judges explicitly defend
limitations of expression on the ground that restricting expression will modify
beliefs.396 Thus, Delgado states, "a tort for racist speech will discourage such
themselves to an exclusive passion, they risk their dearest interests: they are deaf. Show them not freedom
escaping from their grasp whilst they are looking another way: they are blind, or, rather, they can discern
but one object to be desired in the universe.
I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for freedom: left to themselves, they will
seek it, cherish it, and view any privation of it with regret. But for equality, their passion is ardent,
insatiable, incessant, invincible: they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still
call for equality in slavery.
394. See Abrams, supra note 86, at 1212 n.l 18.
395. It is not only nude pictures that some find objectionable. Because the objection is largely based upon
what the viewer of the pictures is thinking while he is looking, a picture of a woman completely, but sexily, clad
and exhibiting a "debauched look" may be substantially more offensive to some than a picture of a completely
nude woman (or the Venus de Milo). A prudent employer operating under a system of vicarious liability will not
take the risk of offending anyone and will, under current law, censor the picture because of fear of what the legal
system will do to it if it does not. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4678, * I I
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (enjoining possession of any "sexually suggestive" materials to read at work: material will be
presumed sexually suggestive if it depicts a person of either sex "who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not
suited to or ordinarily accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and around the shipyard and who is
posed for the obvious purpose of displaying or drawing attention to private portions of his or her body").
396. Lee Bollinger has commented on the relationship between intolerance and the desire to control thought:
What leads us to react with intolerance is, typically, a concern with the mind perceived to be at
work-with the way of thinking of the person or persons, whether that be political beliefs or general
attitudes or values or whatever one might call it; and, equally important, with the fact that this thinking is
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speech, establish a new public conscience, and ultimately change attitudes. '3 9 7
It should not be concluded that the censorship advocated is solely for protection
of the target; Delgado seeks also to protect the speaker. In a passage reminis-
cent of the Soviet attempt to label political dissidents mentally ill, he argues:
"Bigotry harms the individuals who harbor it by reinforcing rigid thinking,
thereby dulling their moral and social senses and possibly leading to a 'mildly
. . . paranoid' mentality."398
The "thought-control" rationale for restricting expression is not confined to
academic commentary. A similar justification for limitation of speech was pro-
vided by the Sixth Circuit in Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co.:399 "By inform-
ing people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes in public is unaccept-
able, people may eventually learn that such views are undesirable in private, as
well. Thus, Title VII may advance the goal of eliminating prejudices and biases
in our society."400 Thus is the "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think," so celebrated by Justice Brandeis,41' converted to a duty to think as you
are told and to speak as you are told to think.
It is but a small step from requiring a person to refrain from expressing
beliefs in the hope that he will cease to hold them to requiring a person to
express beliefs in the hope that he will begin to hold them. If the state may
justify a prohibition on a person's saying "blacks are inferior" by pointing to the
effect of the prohibition on a person's beliefs, the state should have equivalent
power to require that a person affirm a belief in racial equality on the ground
that repeated affirmation will cause the person to come to believe it, and, once
having come to believe it, to conform his actions to his newly acquired beliefs.
Thus, the state could require as a condition of holding public employment-or
essentially being communicated by the actions of those who hold, or appear to hold, these different beliefs,
attitudes, or values.
L BOLIENGER. supra note 362, at 112.
397. Professor Delgado Replies, supra note 302, at 595. R. George Wright suggests a similar justification:
"Assuming that legal restraints on legal speech deter racist speech, genuine social gains may result. Enforced
behavioral change, in the form of avoiding racist speech. may tend to produce genuine attitudinal change, as
persons bring their attitudes into line with their non-racist speech."
Wright. supra note 235, at 23-24. Mari Matsuda also would justify regulation on the basis of its impact on beliefs:
"Racism as an acquired set of behaviors can be dis-acquired. and law is the means by which the state typically
provides incentives for changes in behavior." Matsuda, supra note 256, at 2361.
398. Delgado. supra note 3, at 140. Delgado also argues: "[b]igotry, and thus the attendant expression of
racism, stifles, rather than furthers, the moral and social growth of the individual who harbors it." Id. at 176.
Of course, if all it took to justify regulation of speech was a determination that it "stifles ... the moral and
social growth of the individual," we could limit expression of any ideas that we did not value. Some might argue
that Marxism stifles the moral and social growth of the individual, while others might argue that laissez-faire
capitalism does the same. Educators across the country believe that Bart Simpson stifles the moral and social
growth of the individual, although the Nielsen ratings suggest that a substantial segment of the population either
does not agree or does not care. See A Giant Case of Sinpsonitis, Chicago Tribune. Style Section. at 12, (June
13, 1990).
399. 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988).
400. The Third Circuit has endorsed this view as well. Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469. 1486 (3d
Cir. 1990) (quoting Davis, 858 F.2d at 350).
401. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis. J.. concurring).
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attending public school - that an applicant sign an "equality oath," affirming a
belief in the equality of the races and sexes.40 2
In addition to its Orwellian overtones, the assumption that beliefs can be
altered by forbidding expression is probably wrong. 403 As Paul Chevigny has
suggested in the context of the debate over pornography regulation, propa-
ganda-whether in the form of "anti-female" pornography or racist expres-
sion-appeals only to those whose systems of belief make them receptive to the
representations. 404 Suppressing pornography (or racist speech) is "beside the
point in a cognitive world where we can interpret new experience only through
existing patterns. '40 5 The only effective method of altering a world view that is
deemed pernicious is to provide a persuasive response-that is, "more
speech.1406 "Shut up!" is not a persuasive response.
Although the contrary is sometimes asserted, 4 7 challenging censorship is
not to cast one's lot with those censored or to minimize the substance of the
opinions of those urging censorship. Instead it is to accept the fundamental con-
stitutional truth that the government may not establish a fundamental moral
truth through suppression of expression. Probably everyone reading this Article
would agree that the world would be a better place without much of the expres-
sion that is described in the harassment cases. It does not follow, however, that
the world would be a better place if elimination of such expression is compelled
by the threat of governmental sanctions. Persuasion that the offensive views are
wrong or that they not be expressed where they are unwelcome is a far better
solution than "silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst
form."408
402. But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (prohibiting state from punishing motorist for taping
over license plate motto, "Live Free or Die" on ground that state lacks authority to compel endorsement of
governmental positions); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down
mandatory Pledge of Allegiance in public school).
403. See Heins, supra note 273, at 586-87 (1983) ("Delgado. . .makes no attempt to show that as a matter
of psychology punishing name-calling is a means of changing deeply-held attitudes").
404. Chevigny. Pornography and Cognitiow A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DUKE LJ. 420, 432.
405. Id.
406. But see Wright, supra note 235. at 21 (suggesting that having to rely on "'some sort of 'counterspeech'
remedy" is "degrading").
407. See Professor Delgado Replies. supra note 302, at 596 (arguing that criticism of his earlier article.
Words that Wound. supra note 3. by a staff attorney for the ACLU. was based on fact that organi7ation "is
composed mostly of white, male, middle-class lawyers who care a great deal about free speech" and who "rank
speech over the right of women to be free from pornographic exploitation and the right of elderly Jewish survivors
to be free from painful reminders of the Holocaust") (footnotes omitted).
408. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis. J., concurring).
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